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When patients diagnosed with schizophrenia process figurative language, they often make 
literality and/or concreteness mistakes. These mistakes can be related to certain cognitive 
functions that are underperforming or impaired in schizophrenia. This research found that 
cognitive functions that often present deficits in patients with schizophrenia (PwS) are working 
memory, cognitive control, cognitive flexibility and ToM. The aim of this study is to provide 
evidence of the cognitive impairments that might be underlying poorer figurative language 
processing in schizophrenia, as well as to shed a light on the cognitive functions that might be 
at play when figurative language is processed. Disclosing the cognitive functions that can be 
underperforming in schizophrenia can be relevant for therapeutics and for the development of 
more effective forms of treatment for the disorder. The present thesis analyses figurative 
language processing (metaphor, logical metonymy and irony) and theory of mind using eye-
tracking and behavioural tasks, both on-line and off-line, to disclose how strongly literality and 
concreteness of language are present in schizophrenia and how closely related these 
















To all members of my family, both alive and deceased, from whom I have learned to cherish 
the search for knowledge. 
To my husband and daughter, my special gratitude for having been generous enough to 




























First, I would like to thank my main supervisor, Dr. Steven Frisson, from whom I have learned 
a lot and whose support has been essential along the way. The challenges this work presented 
would not have been possible to be overcome without his contribution and support. 
I would also like to thank my second supervisor, Professor Stephen Wood, who, although 
distant, was always ready to offer valuable advice whenever I needed. His contribution to this 
work was invaluable and very welcome. 
Many most sincere thanks to all my participants, especially the ones who travelled from far 
just to take part in the study. They brightened up my hard days and gave me hope everything 
would turn out OK.  
To all the people from the department who directly and indirectly contributed to the success of 
this research, including a special thanks to Denise Clissett, who was always friendly and kind 
to all my participants. 














TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES …………………………………………………………………………11 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ………………………………………14 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION .............................................……………..15 
1.1 Other Types of Figurative Language and Non-literal Expressions ………………….20 
1.2 Schizophrenia: Aetiology and Recent Research ……………………………………. 21 
1.3 Thesis Presentation and Structure …………………………………………………...25 
 
CHAPTER 2: PARTICIPANTS’ COGNITIVE ASSESSMENT AND FIRST 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
2.1 Participants’ Cognitive Assessment …………………………………………………28 
2.2 Method ……………………………………………………………………………….34 
2.2.1 Participants …………………………………………………………………….34 
2.2.2 Battery 1: Cognitive Skills Matching ………………………………………….35 
  2.2.3 Battery 2: Detailed Cognitive Skills Assessment ……………………………...36 
  2.2.3.1 Correlations between the Cognitive Control Task and Other Tests Used 
in Battery 2 …………………………………………………………………..38 
6 
 
 2.2.3.2. Correlations between Positive and Negative Symptoms, Thought 
Disturbance, the Cognitive Dimension of the PANSS and Other Battery 2 
Tests…………………………………………………………………………..41 
 2.2.4 Principal Component Analysis of Battery 2 Tests …………………………….44 
 2.2.5 General Discussion ……………………………………………………………..49 
CHAPTER 3: THEORY OF MIND STUDY 
3.1  Introduction …………………………………………………………………………..54 
3.2  Method ……………………………………………………………………………….60 
 3.2.1 Experiment 1: The Perspective-taking Task ……………………………………60 
 3.2.1.1 Participants …………………………………………………………….60 
 3.2.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure ………………………………………………….60 
 3.2.1.3 Accuracy Analysis Results ……………………………………………..63 
 3.2.1.4 Accuracy Analysis Discussion ………………………………………....65 
 3.2.1.5 Response Time Results ………………………………………………...65 
 3.2.1.6 Response Time Results Discussion ……………………………………66 
3.3  Principal Component Analysis ……………………………………………………….67 
 3.3.1 Correlations between the Perspective-taking Task and the Second PCA……….69 
3.3.2 Second Principal Component Analysis Discussion …………………………….72 
3.4  Experiment 2: Facial Emotion Recognition ……………………………………….…73 
 3.4.1 Participants ……………………………………………………………………..75 
7 
 
 3.4.2 Stimuli and Procedure ………………………………………………………….76 
 3.4.3 KDEF Test Results ……………………………………………………………..77 
 3.4.4 KDEF Test Results Discussion …………………………………………………78 
3.5  Experiment 3: The Hinting Task ……………………………………………………..80 
 3.5.1 Participants ……………………………………………………………………..83 
 3.5.2 Stimuli and Procedure ………………………………………………………….83 
 3.5.3 Hinting Task Results …………………………………………………………...84 
 3.5.4 Hinting Task Results Discussion ……………………………………………….86 
3.6  General Discussion …………………………………………………………………..88 
CHAPTER 4: IRONY PROCESSING STUDY 
4.1  Introduction ………………………………………………………………………….94 
4.1.1 Models of Irony Processing …………………………………………………..97 
4.1.2 Relationship between Irony Processing and Mentalising Skills ……………...99 
4.2  Hypotheses ………………………………………………………………………….100 
4.3  Method …………..………………………………………………………………….101 
 4.3.1 Participants ……………………………………………………………………101 
 4.3.2 Stimuli and Procedure ………………………………………………………...101 
4.4  Experiment 1: Eye-movements-while-reading Task ………………………………..102 
4.4.1  Analysis …………………………………………………………………….103 
4.4.2  Irony Eye-movement Experiment Results & Discussion …………………………...105 
8 
 
 4.4.2.1 Reading Time Analysis ……………………………………………………..105 
 4.4.2.2 Irony Effect Correlations ……………………………………………………110 
4.5  Experiment 2: Sentence Interpretation Task ………………………………………..114 
 4.5.1 Participants ……………………………………………………………………114 
 4.5.2 Stimuli ………………………………………………………………………...114 
 4.5.3 Procedure ……………………………………………………………………..115 
 4.5.4 Hypotheses ……………………………………………………………………115 
 4.5.5 Sentence Interpretation Task Results …………………………………………115 
4.6  General Discussion …………………………………………………………………116 
CHAPTER 5: METAPHOR PROCESSING STUDY 
5.1.  Introduction ………………………………………………………………………...122 
5.1.1  Theories of Metaphor Comprehension ……………………………………...125 
5.2  Method ……………………………………………………………………………...128 
 5.2.1 Stimuli Pre-Testing …………………………………………………………...128 
 5.2.2 Participants ……………………………………………………………………130 
 5.2.3 Procedure ……………………………………………………………………..131 
5.3  Eye-movement-while-reading Task ………………………………………………...131 
 5.3.1 Analysis ……………………………………………………………………....131 
 5.3.2 Metaphor Eye-movement Experiment Results ………………………………..133 
  5.3.2.1 Target Region ……………………………………………………….137 
9 
 
  5.3.2.2 Spill-over Region …………………………………………………...138 
 5.3.3 Metaphor Effect Correlations …………………………………………………139 
 5.3.4 Metaphor Eye-movement Results Discussion ………………………………...140 
5.4  Experiment 2: Sentence Interpretation Task ………………………………………..142 
 5.4.1 Participants ……………………………………………………………………143 
 5.4.2 Stimuli …………………………………………..…………………………….143 
 5.4.3 Procedure …………………………………………………………………..…144 
 5.4.4 Hypothesis ………………………………………………..…………………..144 
 5.4.5 Sentence Interpretation Task Results ……………..………………...………...145 
5.5 General Discussion …………………………………………………………………..…149 
CHAPTER 6: LOGICAL METONYMY PROCESSING STUDY 
6.1  Introduction ………………………………………………………………………...154 
6.2  Method ……………………………………………………………………………...159 
 6.2.1 Participants ……………………………………………………………………159 
 6.2.2 Stimuli Pre-Testing …………………………………………………………...159 
6.3  Experiment 1: Eye-movement while Reading Task ………………………………...161 
 6.3.1 Analysis ………………………………………………………………………161 
 6.3.2 Logical Metonymy Eye-movement Experiment Results ……………………...163 
  6.3.2.1 Target Region ……………………………………………………….169 
  6.3.2.2 Spill-over Region …………………………………………………...169 
10 
 
 6.3.3 Logical Metonymy Effect Correlations ……………………………………….171 
 6.3.4 Logical Metonymy Eye-movement Results Discussion ………………………175 
6.4 Experiment 2: Sentence Interpretation Task ………………………………………..175 
 6.4.1 Participants …………………………………………………………………....176 
 6.4.2 Stimuli ………………………………………………………………………...176 
 6.4.3 Procedure ……………………………………………………………………..176 
 6.4.4 Sentence Interpretation Task Results …………………………………………177 
6.5  General Discussion …………………………………………………………………182 















LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Battery 2 – Tests Used 
Table 2. Cognitive Skills Assessment – Battery 1 
Table 3. Cognitive Skills Assessment – Battery 2: Means Comparisons 
Table 4. Correlations Between the Cognitive Control Task and Battery 2 Tests – Control 
Group (n=21) 
Table 5. Correlations Between the Cognitive Control Task and Battery 2 Tests – Patient 
Group (n=25) 
Table 6. Correlations Between Positive and Negative Symptoms, Thought Disturbance, The 
Cognitive Dimension of the PANSS and Other Battery 2 Tests (Patients only; n=25) 
Table 7. Principal Component Analysis Results 
Table 8. Principal Component Analysis: Five Factors with Loading Values 
Table 9. Accuracy 
Table 10. Reaction Times (correct trials) 
Table 11. Principal Component Analysis Excluding Perspective-taking – Results 
Table 12. Principal Component Analysis Excluding Perspective-taking: Four Factors with 
Loading Values 
Table 13. Correlations between Errors in Perspective-taking and Second PCA 
Table 14. Correlation between Reaction Time in Perspective-taking and Second PCA 
12 
 
Table 15. KDEF Results by Group – Number of Mistakes in Percentages 
Table 16. Hinting Task Results 
Table 17. Condition and Stimuli Examples – Irony Processing 
Table 18. Average Reading Times – Irony Processing 
Table 19. Eye-movement analyses – Irony Processing 
Table 20. Irony Effect Correlations – Patients 
Table 21. Irony Effect Correlations – Controls 
Table 22. Metaphor Experiment Examples 
Table 23. Reading Times – Target and Spill-over Regions 
Table 24. Eye-movement Analysis - Metaphor 
Table 25. Metaphor Effect Correlations with Components Extracted from PCA 
Table 26. Percentage of Errors in the Sentence Interpretation Task – Patient and Control 
Group  
Table 27. Condition and Stimuli Examples – Logical Metonymy Processing 
Table 28. Average Reading Times – Logical Metonymy Processing 
Table 29. Eye-movement Analysis – Logical Metonymy Processing 
Table 30. Logical Metonymy Effect Correlations with Components Extracted from PCA 
Table 31. Percentage of Errors in the Sentence Interpretation Task – Metonymy Experiment -  
Patient and Control 
13 
 
Table 32 (Appendix C). Percentage of Errors in the Sentence Interpretation Task – Irony 
Experiment – Patient Group 
Table 33 (Appendix C). Percentage of Errors in the Sentence Interpretation Task – Irony 
Experiment – Control Group 
Table 34 (Appendix D). Percentage of Errors in the Sentence Interpretation Task – Metaphor 
Experiment – Patient Group 
Table 35 (Appendix D). Percentace of Errors in the Sentence Interpretation Task – Metaphor 
Experiment – Control Group 
Table 36 (Appendix E). Percentage of Errors in the Sentence Interpretation Task – Logical 
Metonymy Experiment – Patient Group 
Table 37 (Appendix E). Percentage of Errors in the Sentence Interpretation Task – Logical 













LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
1. PwS: Patients with Schizophrenia 
2. WAIS-IV: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
3. SCID: Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
4. PANSS: Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
5. KDEF: Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Test 

















1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1.1 Oher Types of Figurative Language and Non-literal Expressions 
1.2 Schizophrenia: Aetiology and Recent Research  









1. General Introduction 
 
Research describing cognitive deficits involved in schizophrenia, such as that 
presented here, has increased lately (Addington & Addington, 1993; Aiken, Daly & 
Soni, 1993; Kuperberg, 2010a, 2010b; Kuperberg, 2000; Kuperberg & Heckers, 2000; 
Langdom et al., 2002;). Deficits reported often refer to visual attention (Addington & 
Addington, 1993), memory (Mueser, Blanchard & Bellack, 1995) and language 
impairments (Kuperberg, 2010a, 2010b; Kuperberg, 2000; Langdom et al., 2002). Why 
would language deficits in schizophrenia be relevant for studies in language processing 
or neurocognition? As a matter of fact, studies on language impairments in 
schizophrenia have been able to provide insights into the impact of brain function in 
the human capacity of processing and producing language.  
Language skills, just as motor skills, are key to human development and have 
had a crucial role in human evolution. Language has brought humans together in such 
a sophisticated fashion that we can today share knowledge, communicate worldwide, 
share goals, work together and accomplish things our ancestors never thought possible. 
Language is a vital human tool, it is one crucial differentiation between ours and other 
species that only became possible with the brain growth (encephalisation pattern) that 
started with the Homo habilis. Hence, learning about language is also learning about 
the brain and its development. Language processing in psychiatric pathologies, like 
schizophrenia, can only help unveil the relationship between brain and language. 
Learning what makes language a more effective tool for some people and not so much 
for others can only be a valuable and relevant contribution to science, as it can help us 
understand the boundaries of a fascinating human skill: the capacity to produce and 
understand language.  
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Studies on language deficits present in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia 
(PwS) have mostly tested adult patients after receiving a diagnosis and they have not 
investigated the cognitive correlates linked with lower performance in specific 
language skills, such as figurative language processing. The present thesis aims to 
clarify the role of underdeveloped language functions present in schizophrenia, mainly 
the ones connected with figurative language processing, as well as disclose the 
cognitive deficits associated with such deficits. 
Problems in understanding figurative language and other cognitive deficits in 
patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (PwS) were first identified by psychiatrists more 
than 60 years ago (Benjamin, 1944; Finckh, 1906) and tests using metaphorical 
proverbs for measuring severity of abstract thinking impairment in schizophrenia were 
introduced decades ago. However, the impaired cognitive mechanisms underlying 
figurative language processing in schizophrenia remain unclear and this is precisely 
what this thesis aims to contribute. The scope of this thesis is the investigation of the 
cognitive processes involved in figurative language processing among patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia who have been undergoing regular psychiatric treatment 
with second generation anti-psychotics for more than 10 years and to compare their 
figurative language processing performance to that of neuro-typical controls. 
The investigation of the cognitive correlates associated with difficulties in 
figurative language processing in schizophrenia can contribute to a disclosure of the 
neurocognitive functions that might not be working so efficiently in the disorder and 
ultimately help in the development of therapeutics. If therapies were designed to tackle 
precisely the functions that seem to be underdeveloped or deficient in PwS, then it 
would mean that patients would be able to improve their cognitive performance, their 
language use and improve the quality of their social interactions.  Cognitive and 
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language impairments related to schizophrenia can represent a challenge for patients, 
carers and for the community. Being able to overcome them, even if only partially, 
can be highly beneficial to patient integration in society.  
Addington and Addington (1998) reported poorer visual attention in patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and that the presence of negative symptomatology 
significantly correlated with visual attention deficits in the disorder. Mueser, Blanchard 
and Bellack (1996) reported that impaired memory correlated positively with poorer 
social skills in women diagnosed with schizophrenia. Kuperberg (2000, 2010a, 2010b) 
and Kuperberg and Heckers (2000) reported impairments in working and semantic 
memory, semantic priming, sentence processing, source monitoring and speech 
perception, with semantic memory, semantic priming and sentence processing deficits 
being related to thought disorder and source monitoring and speech perception deficits 
related to auditory hallucinations. Nonetheless, most of the research has not focused 
exclusively on figurative language processing and its relationship with specific 
cognitive measurements, such as working memory, cognitive control and flexibility of 
thought.  
The fact that certain patients diagnosed with schizophrenia displayed 
difficulties in performing proverb interpretation tasks (“Too many cooks spoil the 
broth”, “Space is bad for so many people to do one thing”; “Don’t cross the bridge until 
you come to it”, “Don’t worry about things you can’t control”) was considered by 
psychiatrists in the 20th century as an indication of “literality” (first example) or 
“concretism” (second example)1, a characteristic that became related to schizophrenia 
and is nowadays also reported to be found in some patients with dementia and patients 
                                                          
1 Literality: interpretation of words in their primary meaning; concreteness: interpretation of words in a 
secondary or more abstract meaning, but still not context-appropriate. 
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with Parkinson Disease whose verbal working memory skills are impaired (Monetta & 
Pell, 2007). 
When manifested as a symptom in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia, 
concreteness of language seems to suggest that the patient is somehow not able to grasp 
the speaker’s intentions. If we consider certain forms of figurative language processing, 
such as irony, for example, which requires comprehension of the interlocutor’s 
intention, a deficit in mentalising skills could lead to a patient not performing as 
expected in tests assessing irony understanding. Hence, this thesis aims to uncover the 
relationship between mentalising skills and figurative language processing, not only 
irony, but also metaphor and metonymy. 
This thesis presents an analysis of figurative language processing in 
schizophrenia (metaphor, logical metonymy, irony) and theory of mind aiming at 
disclosing some of the underlying cognitive mechanisms related to the literality and 
concreteness of language hypothesis for figurative language processing in 
schizophrenia. Additionally, this research will help unveil the reality of the existence 
of literality and concreteness of language in patients who have been on second 
generation anti-psychotic medication for more than 10 years and help shed a light on 
the cognitive processes that could remain impaired, even after treatment has been steady 
for a long time. The various studies that revealed certain cognitive impairments 
associated with schizophrenia have argued that these deficits characterise the disorder, 
even perhaps reflecting psychological markers or a personal vulnerability to 
schizophrenia (Addington & Addington, 1993). As this thesis will present studies that 
tested outpatients who had been on regular and enduring second generation anti-
psychotic medication, it will be able to help clarify aspects in relation to the existence 





1.1. Other Types of Figurative Language and Non-literal Expressions  
 
 There are many kinds of figurative and non-literal expressions. For example, 
idioms such as kick the bucket share some similarities with proverbs, but don’t 
incorporate advice or a truism and their meaning is often unrelated to the meanings of 
their individual words. Research in idiom processing in schizophrenia has reported 
mixed results, and it’s unclear whether patients diagnosed with schizophrenia have an 
actual deficit in idiom processing. Some findings report that PwS only display 
difficulties in supressing the competing literal meanings, but not in understanding the 
non-literal meanings (Titone et al., 2002), while other findings report no differences in 
comprehension of idiomatic sentences between PwS and controls (Pesciarelli et al., 
2014). Contrasting findings (Sela, Lavidor & Mitchell, 2015; Tavano et al., 2008), 
however, do report that PwS present a deficit in idiom comprehension, with Sela et al. 
(2015) suggesting that a dysfunctional cognitive control could be connected to flaws in 
idiom perception in PwS. 
 Titone et al. (2002) also suggested that literally plausible idioms, such as kick 
the bucket presented a challenge for PwS, but not literally implausible idioms, such as 
be on cloud nine. In this case, PwS presented difficulties in inhibiting literal 
interpretations of the idioms which would compete with the idiomatic ones, requiring 






1.2. Schizophrenia: aetiology and recent research 
 
 Schizophrenia aetiology remains relatively unknown. Recently however, 
schizophrenia research has broken into genetics and a few recent studies (Sekar, 
Bialas, de Rivera, Davis, Hammond, et al., 2016) have been able to link complex 
complement component variations of a gene (complement component 4) with risk for 
schizophrenia development. This was considered an advancement in the disclosing of 
the underlying biological mechanisms related to the disorder, as before this study, 
other genetic studies (Ripke, Neale, Corvin, Walters, Farh, Holmann, et al., 2014) 
unfolded the genetic regions (loci) associated with the disorder, never having been 
able to previously identify a variation in a gene as connected with risk for developing 
schizophrenia. As genetic regions (loci) are not so helpful for gene tracking, the risk 
signal sources remained unknown. It has been revealed by the most recent study 
(Sekar, Bialas, de Rivera, Davis, Hammond, et al., 2016) that a region on chromosome 
6 contains the genes that deliver the greatest risks associated with schizophrenia. This 
region on chromosome 6 has genes responsible for acquired immunity, and the loci 
that showed the most relevant associations were near the gene C4. The variation in 
gene C4 alone has finally been appointed as relating to risk for schizophrenia 
development, although other gene variations that could be associated with 
schizophrenia development risk remain to be found. The main hypothesis in Sekar et 
al.’s study (2016) for schizophrenia aetiology is a loss of healthy brain synapses 
(synaptic pruning) during adolescence associated with variations in gene C4. 
An earlier study (Boska, 2010) had suggested that the decreased cell density in 
schizophrenia could be connected to a decreased neuronal density, decreased neuronal 
size and decreased neuropil (axons + dendrites + glia) that could cause a reduction in 
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grey matter that is often observed in PwS. Falaudi and Mirnics (2011) suggested that 
adult patients diagnosed with schizophrenia don’t have the same number of synaptic 
connections in various brain regions when compared to neurotypical controls. 
Postmortem brain studies (Garey, 2010; Glantz, Lewis, 2000) also reported a decrease 
in dendritic spine density and dendritic architecture on the pre-frontal cortex. These 
studies hypothesised that schizophrenia could be a neurodevelopmental disorder 
manifested in pre-frontal microcircuits. As we know, the pre-frontal cortex has been 
related to executive function performance in attention and memory (Goldman-Rakic, 
1997) and more recent studies (Koechilin, Ody & Kouneiher, 2003) have connected 
this region of the brain with cognitive control and the ability to balance thoughts and 
goal-directed actions.  
The dopamine hypothesis, which claims that schizophrenia symptoms relate to 
a hyperactive dopaminergic signal transduction, and, so far, the mainstream line of 
schizophrenia understanding, but not of its aetiology, has dominated schizophrenia 
treatment, as the first neuroleptic drugs acted therapeutically on blocking 
dopaminergic receptors in the brain, causing side effects of adrenergic, serotoninergic, 
cholinergic and histaminergic blockage as well, inhibiting psychomotor functions.  
Some recent studies (Moncrieff, 2009) claim that dopamine blockage only 
proves that the drugs act in reducing hallucinations and delusions, two major 
symptoms of the disorder, but they only produce a general neurological depression 
that produces a reduction in these symptoms, but the effect of dopamine activity 
reducing drugs in decreasing hallucinations and delusions does not demonstrate the 
causality between overactivity of dopamine and schizophrenia. Treatment of 
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schizophrenia has grossly up to now produced a neurological depression that acted 
mostly on prominent positive2 symptoms, such as hallucinations and delusions.  
Other earlier studies (Reynolds, 1988) also claimed that measurements of 
dopamine metabolites in vivo and in post-mortem brain tissue do not give explicit 
evidence of a relationship between increased dopamine synaptic transmission and 
schizophrenia. What such studies highlighted was a possible relationship between 
neuron loss in specific regions that could result in increased action of other limbic 
dopamine neurons, that ultimately benefited from dopamine-blocking drug treatment 
to reduce their activity, but not really acting on the underlying causal mechanisms 
related to the disorder. 
In fact, a patient who took part in the present study reported that medication 
hasn’t helped him much and that even after being on medication for a long time, he 
had not experienced a decrease in a strong feeling of loss generated by the social and 
professional limitations imposed by society on PwS which often lead to financial 
instability. Yet, this patient reported that medication didn’t help overcome feelings of 
vulnerability in relation to, for example, hypersensitivity to specific noises or sounds 
like coughs, traffic, feet and wheels, which seem to cause him distress and anxiety. 
Other patients report to experience a reduction in positive symptoms, but not in 
negative symptoms3. 
The overactive synaptic pruning hypothesis as connected to a genetic variation, 
especially linked to structurally diverse alleles of a specific complement component 
                                                          
2 Positive symptomatology refers to supplementary properties that are added to a patient’s 
daily experience of life, such as hallucinations and delusions. In this case, positive means “more 
than” or additional, not good. Positive symptoms commonly lead to a loss of touch with external 
reality. 
3 Negative symptoms are the opposite of positive symptoms, they express behaviours the 
person usually presented before the manifestation of the disorder and that they no longer display. 
Negative symptoms are commonly related to lethargy, apathy, social withdrawal, reduction in 
speech and anhedonia (inability to experience pleasure). 
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(C4) sounds like a more promising path if compared to the dopamine hypothesis, as 
the underpinning neurobiological mechanisms of schizophrenia could be more 
clarified. However, schizophrenia studies still have a long way to go before finally 
disclosing the causality of the disorder and developing more effective forms of 
treatment. Research in cognition in schizophrenia can only help uncover the reality 
that this disorder goes beyond the mere symptomatology of hallucinations and 
delusions and that it encompasses broader neurodevelopmental deficits whose 
aetiology remains to be revealed. 
If we consider, for example, that children at risk of developing schizophrenia 
already present neurodevelopmental delays and that other neurodevelopmental studies 
(Johnstone, Ebmeier, Miller, Owens, 2005) have included language and motor 
performance deficits as risks for later adult psychopathological development, 
including schizophrenia development, then we would have to question whether 
schizophrenia as a disorder would fall into a categorical classification developed in 
adolescence or would be a neurodevelopmental disorder that results from interactions 
between genetic proneness and environment, with genetic proneness being more or 
less likely to be manifested depending on the degree of genetic proneness and degree 
of environmental disadvantage. 
Although synaptic pruning in adolescence as connected to a genetic variation of 
complement component 4 can be an exciting new promise in unveiling schizophrenia 
aetiology, we must still consider the neurodevelopmental aspect involved in the 
disorder and the reported presence of neurocognitive deficits since early childhood 
only supports this idea (Johnstone et al., 2005). The loss of healthy brain synapses 
occurring in adolescence might only reinforce and add to previous synaptic 
connections that had not been occurring as expected. In the neurodevelopmental view, 
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there is a risk for developing schizophrenia that is already present since early 
childhood. Other contributing factors, such as childhood adversities can trigger the 
manifestation of the disorder.  
 
 1.3. Thesis Presentation and Structure 
 
The following brief review presents an analysis of figurative language 
processing in schizophrenia (metaphor, logical metonymy, irony) and theory of mind 
aiming at disclosing the reality of the literality and concreteness hypothesis for 
figurative language processing in schizophrenia, as well as investigating the cognitive 
processes that could be impaired for PwS and that could be preventing them from 
properly understanding figurative utterances.  
The structure of the present thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents 
the two stages of cognitive assessment of all participants, from both the patient and 
the neurotypical control group. The goal of the first stage assessment is to control 
participants for general cognitive functions involved in reading and interpreting 
figurative language extracts. We aimed to control participants for verbal 
comprehension IQ, general IQ and reading skills on a first stage and later, on a second 
stage, we tested participants who did not display significant discrepancies on the first 
stage. The second stage included tests on Theory of Mind (perspective-taking and 
mentalising), facial emotion recognition, cognitive flexibility, auditory-verbal 
working memory and cognitive control. A principal component analysis of the factors 
extracted for all the second stage test battery is presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 presents a Theory of Mind study. It reports and analyses results 
obtained from the Perspective-taking Task, the Hinting Task and the Karolinska 
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Directed Emotional Faces Test – KDEF (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). A second 
principal component analysis is included, excluding the Perspective-taking Task. The 
aim of the second PCA analysis was to unveil the relationship between the variables 
from the second battery of tests and the Perspective-taking variables. Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 present the irony processing study, the metaphor processing study and the 
logical metonymy processing study. Each chapter displays results and analyses of two 
experiments, an eye-tracking one and an offline sentence interpretation task. To 
investigate the cognitive correlates of figurative language processing in both groups, 
we present correlation results between the components extracted in the first PCA 
analysis and the figurative language effect in each chapter. 
Finally, in the general discussion of the thesis, we summarise our findings and 
draw conclusions based on the results obtained. Cognitive correlates related to 
figurative language processing are outlined for each type of figurative language 
studied and differences between these different types of figurative language are 
highlighted. Additionally, specific figurative language differences in both processing 
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2.1. Participants’ Cognitive Assessment 
 
As we intend to unveil the underlying cognitive mechanisms associated with figurative 
language processing, we ran two separate batteries of cognitive tests in order to control all 
participants on basic cognitive functions (battery 1) and to assess their performance on 
cognitive skills that have been implicated in figurative language processing (battery 2; e.g.  
Spotorno, Koun, Prado, Van Der Henst, & Noveck, 2012). Performance on the second battery 
will be analysed using independent samples t-tests and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). 
Results of the PCA will be used in the analyses of the ToM, irony, metaphor and metonymy 
data.  
The first battery involved cognitive skills. Because participants needed to have similar 
reading and verbal comprehension IQs to avoid possible confounds in our data, we decided to 
run a first set of cognitive tests in order to select the patients that could in fact take part in our 
study without causing data bias. For the purpose of verbal and reading skills matching, all the 
WAIS-IV sub-tests related to verbal IQ and working memory were used, as well as the Gray 
Silent Reading Test (GSRT, Wiederholt & Blalock, 2012), a test that measures silent reading 
comprehension skills. We used patients and controls who did not display significant 
differences in accuracy on the first battery of tests (see below). Considering that patients and 
controls were matched for social and educational background, as well as verbal IQ, and had 
been on second-generation anti-psychotic medication for more than ten years, we can say that 
the patient population who took part in this study was not the usual population of inpatients 
used in various previous studies of schizophrenia (Carter, Robertson, Nordahl, Charderjian & 
Oshora-Celaya, 1996; Cohen, Barch, Carter & Servan-Schreiber, 1999; Corcoran, Mercer & 
Frith, 1995; Cornblatt & Keilp, 1994); therefore, we can expect these patients to be functioning 
cognitively in a more effective way than inpatients. 
Because we wanted to avoid a bias in our data, the second battery was administered to 
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patients and controls who were matched in the first cognitive battery assessment. Patients who 
displayed significant discrepancies in the basic cognitive functions’ battery (battery 1) 
required to process the figurative language stimuli were not used for the second stage of the 
study.  During testing of battery 1, we noticed that even though most patients were comparable 
in accuracy to controls, they tended to take longer to respond in certain tasks (response 
latencies are not measured in the WAIS-IV tests) and their answers did not come as 
straightforwardly as answers given by controls, especially in tasks involving working memory 
and flexibility of thought. We therefore ran a second battery of tests to evaluate these cognitive 
skills further. We included ToM tasks to investigate the hypothesis that ToM is related to irony 
processing in reading (Spotorno et al., 2013) and possibly other types of figurative language 
processing. Detailed results related to this investigation can be found in Chapter 4.  
Tests in battery 2 included the Hinting task (Corcoran, Mercer, & Frith, 1995), a task 
on Theory of Mind and mentalising skills in indirect utterances, an on-line Perspective-Taking 
task (Samson et al., 2010), measuring the ability to switch perspectives, a facial emotion 
recognition task, the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Test – KDEF (Lundwist, Flyict, & 
Ohman, 1998) a Cognitive Control task (designed by the author, see Appendix A for details) 
and four sub-tests of the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA, Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway & 
Nimmo-Smith, 1994): the Elevator Counting with Distraction, the Elevator Counting with 
Reversal, Visual Elevator 1 and Visual Elevator 2. The TEA (Robertson et al., 1994) sub-tests 
are measures of audio-verbal working memory and flexibility of thought. We included the 
TEA as the ability to manipulate information in working memory seems relevant for 
contextual processing in language (Kuperberg, 2010a; 2010b), and deficits in working 
memory have been implicated in higher cognitive dysfunctions in schizophrenia, such as 
attentional deficits (Carter, Robertson, Nordahl, Charderjian & Oshora-Celaya, 1996). The 
perspective-taking task involves participants judging self and other perspective (represented 
by an avatar) in trials where the avatar’s and participant’s point of view coincide (consistent 
trials) and in trials where their point of view do not coincide (inconsistent trials). More details 
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of this task, as well as details of the Hinting Task and the on-line perspective-taking task can 
be found in Chapter 3. 
The Cognitive Control task aims at measuring inhibition of irrelevant cognitive 
activations and the ability to quickly change the train of thought. Deficits in cognitive control 
have been considered a distinctive feature of schizophrenia (Green, 1996; Green, Kern, Braff, 
Mintz, 2000; Lesh, Niendam, Minzenberg & Carter, 2010) and cognitive control has even been 
proposed as a unifier of most of the general cognitive abnormalities found in the disorder (Lesh 
et al., 2011). Finally, the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Test (KDEF), in which 
participants must recognise seven different facial emotions in pictures displayed in 70 different 
face angles, has been used for the measurement of perception skills and interpretation of facial 
emotional expressions skills, as these can be relevant for more effective social interaction 
(Goeleven, Raedt, Leyman & Verschuere, 2008). Research has shown that in-patient PwS 
perform worse than controls on the KDEF, especially when judging happiness and surprise 
(Larøi, Fonteneau, Mourad, & Raballo, 2010). 
It should be noted that the Cognitive Control Task used for the PCA analysis is not a 
standardized measure, but a task developed by the author. An independent samples t-test 
showed that patients’ performance (M = 6.48, SD = 2.98) on this task was significantly below 
controls’ (M = 9.00, SD = 3.46), t(44) = 2.65, p < .05. The degree of difficulty (scale from 1 
to 10) on the Control and Flexibility Task perceived by participants was also significantly 
different in both groups, with patients (M = 5.04, SD = 2.24) reporting it significantly more 
difficult than controls (M = 3.33, SD = 2.52), t(44) = 2.43, p < .05. Performance on this task 
strongly correlated with other individual measures, such as the TEA Elevator Counting with 
Distraction (r = .529, n = 25, p < .01), the TEA Visual Elevator 1 (r = .502, n = 25, p = .01), 
and the cognitive variables measured in the PANSS4 (r = -.408, n = 25, p < .05). The latter 
                                                          
4 The “cognitive dimension of the PANSS” (Hofer et al., 2007; Nielsen, Lindström, Telléus, 
Levander, 2014) is a compound of four cognitive variables measured in the PANSS within the three 
main axes (positive, negative and general symptomatology), conceptual disorganization, difficulty in 
abstract thinking, disorientation and poor attention. 
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finding is notable as it indicates that patients who scored higher on the Control and Flexibility 
task showed a lower degree of cognitive impairment as measured by the PANSS. In short, 
while this task has not been used previously, it does seem to tap into processes also found in 
more established tests, such as the WCST (Wisconsin Card Sorting Test). We chose to 
develop a novel cognitive control task because we wanted to have a task which involved 
cognitive control in language processing skills. The WCST is mainly a task-switching test 
where people are required to classify cards according to certain criteria. The WCST was found 
to correlate positively with other flexibility of thought tasks in the TEA (Robertson et al., 
1994) used in the second battery. Further information on the second battery of tests is 




Table 1: Battery 2 – Tests used  
AUTHOR NAME - BRIEF DESCRIPTION SKILL 
INVOLVED 
Robertson et al. (1994) TEA Visual Elevator - Participants count “floors” up or down following the arrows representing the way the elevator 
is going 
Cognitive flexibility 
Robertson et al. (1994) TEA Visual Elevator - Time participant takes to switch up or down at each arrow Cognitive flexibility 
Robertson et al. (1994) TEA Elevator Counting with Distraction - Participants must count the low tones and ignore the high tones they hear 
as they go up and down in the pretend elevator 
Auditory-verbal 
working memory 
Robertson et al. (1994) TEA Elevator Counting with Reversal - Participants must count floors up or down when hearing high-pitched (up) or 
low-pitched (down) tones 
Auditory-verbal 
working memory 
Lundwist et al. (1998) Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Test - Participants must recognise facial emotions by looking at pictures on the 
screen from different face angles 
Facial emotion 
recognition 
Samson et al. (2010) Visual on-line perspective-taking task - Participants must click “yes” or “no” on the mouse while responding to 





Helena de Andrade Conde 
(2015) 
Cognitive control task - Participants must link the first letters of the words in each sentence on the left to meaningful 








Patients: Twenty-five patients (average age 40; range 20-55) with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia were tested. They had an average of 14 years of formal education (range: 9-22) 
and had been on second-generation anti-psychotic medication for an average of 15 years 
(range: 11-19). All patients were submitted to the PANSS (Positive and Negative Syndrome 
Scale) questionnaire (Kay, Fitzbein & Opler, 1987) and the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV/SCID (First, Williams, Spitzer, Gibbon & Miriam, 2007), specifically the Psychotic 
Symptoms Questionnaire. Sixteen participants received a classification of current paranoid 
schizophrenia and 11 participants had a single episode that was classified as paranoid 
schizophrenia and were currently in partial remission. 
Controls: Twenty-one participants (average age 30; range 20-55) who had never 
received a diagnosis of mental disorder participated in the study. They had an average of 13 
years of formal education (range: 11-19). None of these controls had ever been on any 
psychiatric medication, nor had any of their first-degree relatives. Control participants were 
also submitted to the SCID, the non-patient questionnaire part of the interview, including the 
Screening Module. 
All participants answered the Hollingshead Four Factor Index of Social Status 
questionnaire, and both patient and control group had similar socio-educational and socio-






2.2.2. Battery 1: Cognitive Skills Matching 
 
All participants were tested for verbal comprehension IQ and working memory with the 
WAIS-IV and reading comprehension with the GSRT (Wiederholt & Blalock, 2012). Means 
and standard deviations can be found in Table 2. All comparisons were calculated using 
percentages. The groups did not significantly differ on each sub-test of the WAIS-IV used for 
this stage and the GSRT did not significantly differ either (all ps > .50).  
 
Table 2: Cognitive skills assessment - Battery I 







Vocabulary WAIS-IV 56.4% (8.81) 52.9% (9.77) 
Information WAIS-IV 57.4% (4.15) 49.7% (5.22) 
Comprehension WAIS-IV 53.7% (4.34) 55.2% (4.35) 
Digit span forwards WAIS-IV 78.7% (2.27) 78.2% (2.21) 
Digit span backwards WAIS-IV 57.2% (2.55) 59.2% (2.92) 
Digit span sequencing WAIS-IV 47.7% (1.49) 49.8% (1.72) 
Arithmetic WAIS-IV 63.8% (3.85) 68.5% (3.96) 
Letter-number sequencing  58.7% (4.41) 62.6% (2.9) 






2.2.3. Battery 2: Detailed Cognitive Skills Assessments 
 
Results for the tests used in the second battery of tests can be found in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Cognitive skills assessment - Battery 2: Means Comparisons 
Tests Patients Controls 
Perspective-Taking Task 





           t = 1.545, p = .129 
Perspective-Taking Task 





         t = 1.571, p = .123 
Perspective-Taking Task 





      t = 1.352, p = .183 
Perspective-Taking Task 





         t = 1.571, p = .123 
KDEF 53.52 (7.04) 56.71 (6.60) 
    t = 1.738, p = .089 
Hinting Task Score 72.4 (2.80) 80.25 (2.56) 
 t = 2.132, p < .05* 
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Hinting Task Time 450.44 (105.58) 358.95 (84.17) 
                                                                                    t = 3.683, p = .001** 
Degree of Difficulty in the Hinting Task 3.72 (1.85) 2.07 (1.03) 
                                                                                     t = 3.559, p = .001** 
TEA Visual Elevator 1 8.76 (3.67) 9.71 (3.58) 
   t = 889, p = .378 
TEA Visual Elevator 2 4.04 (2.26) 5.95 (3.33) 
                                                                             t = 2.30, p < .05* 
Elevator Counting with Reversal 9.28 (3.30) 8.62 (4.29) 
                                                 t = .590, p = .558 
Elevator Counting with Distraction 8.60 (3.05) 
           t = 1.030, p < .309 
9.48 (2.64) 
Cognitive Control Task Score 6.48 (2.99) 
               t = 2.65, p < .05* 
9.00 (3.46) 
Degree of Difficulty in the Cognitive Control Task  
5.04 (2.24) 
                t = 2.43, p < .05* 
 
3.33 (2.52) 
Note: Perspective-taking errors, Hinting Task and Cognitive Control Task scores are in 
percentages, TEA scores are in scaled scores, Hinting Task Time is in seconds and represents the average 
time each group took to finish the Hinting Task. Standard deviations can be found in brackets. Degrees 





Means comparisons revealed that patients and controls significantly differed in 
cognitive control, in the degree of difficulty in the Cognitive Control task, in the TEA 
Visual Elevator 2 (flexibility/time to change the train of thought), in the Hinting Task 
time, in the Degree of Difficulty in the Hinting Task and in errors they made when 
analysing inconsistent other trials in the Perspective-taking task. 
 It seems that cognitive control, flexibility, mentalising skills and perspective-
taking (ToM related variables) are sensitive areas of discrepancy between groups. 
 
2.2.3.1. Correlations between the Cognitive Control task and other tests 
used in battery 2  
 
 We ran correlation analyses between the Cognitive Control task and the other 
tests used in the second battery in order to verify how this task, which was designed 
by the candidate, integrated with the other tests used in battery 2. Results can be found 











 Table 4: Correlations between the Cognitive Control task and Battery 2 Tests 
– Control Group (n = 21) 
Test TEA Elevator Counting 
with Reversal 
TEA Visual Elevator 1 Degree of Difficulty in the 
Cognitive Control Task 
Cognitive Control Task  r = .484, p <.05 r = .569, p <.01 r = -.619, p <.01 
    
Degree of Difficulty in the 
Cognitive Control Task 
r = -.469, p <.05   
 
 
The results showed that better working memory skills and better flexibility of 
thought related to control participants finding the Cognitive Control task easier, that is, 
sharper working memory and good flexibility skills made the task easier, increasing 





Table 5: Correlations between the Cognitive Control task and Second Battery Tests – Patient Group (n=25) 




PANSS Positive Cognitive Dimension of the 
PANSS 
Degree of Difficulty in the 
Cognitive Control Task 
Cognitive Control 
Task  
r = .529, p < .01  r = -.399, p < .05 r = -.408, p < .05 r = -.388, p = .055 
      
Degree of 
Difficulty in the 
Cognitive Control 
Task 
r = -.469, p < .05 r = .502, p = .010    
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Correlations results for patients were similar, revealing that the better the flexibility of 
thought and working memory skills were, the fewer the difficulties in the Cognitive Control 
task. Interestingly, the higher the score in the PANSS Positive, the lower the score in the 
Cognitive Control task. Likewise, the higher the score in the Cognitive Dimension of the 
PANSS (Hofer et al., 2007; Nielsen, Lindström, Telléus, Levander, 2014), a compound of four 
cognitive variables measured in the PANSS (conceptual disorganization, difficulty in abstract 
thinking, disorientation and poor attention), the lower the score in the Cognitive Control task. 
Hence, this novel task seems to tap into relevant executive functions that concern the present 
study. 
Results from both groups suggest that flexibility and working memory are cognitive 
skills that can promote more successful scores in the Cognitive Control task for all 
participants. Inversely, the less efficient these skills, the more likely that the Cognitive Control 
task scores will be lower. 
 
2.2.3.2. Correlations between Positive and Negative symptoms, Thought 
Disturbance, the Cognitive Dimension of the PANSS and other second battery tests  
 
Correlations between positive and negative symptoms, thought disturbance, the 
cognitive dimension of the PANSS and the other second battery tests, apart from the Cognitive 
Control task, revealed that mentalising skills, abstract thinking, organisation, orientation and 
attention (cognitive dimension of the PANSS) decrease if the patient is more affected by 
positive symptomatology. Likewise, negative symptomatology decreases the cognitive 
dimension of the PANSS, as well as make the patient take longer to change their train of 
thought. Negative symptomatology is also connected to thought disturbance and passive 
apathetic social withdrawal. Poorer attention, orientation, abstract thinking and organisation 
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Table 6: Correlations between Positive and Negative symptoms, Thought Disturbance, the Cognitive Dimension of the PANSS and other second battery tests 
(Patients only; n=25) 











PANSS Positive  r = -.524, p < .01 r = .484, p < .05  r = .534, p < .01  r = .600, p < .01 
PANSS Negative    r = -.448, p < .05 r = .483, p < .05 r = .501, p < .05 r = .467, p < .05 
Cognitive Dimension 
of the PANSS 





2.2.4. Principal component analysis of battery 2 tests 
 
We conducted a principal component analysis (PCA) in R (R Core Team, 2016) using 
variables from battery 2 to find out which variables accounted for most of the variance in the 
data and how they clustered to form the principal components. Before running the principal 
component analysis, we ran a Bartlett’s test to determine whether we had an identity matrix 
in our correlation matrix and a KMO test to identify the degree of common variance in the 
data and to check whether it would be appropriate for PCA. Five components were retained 
based on the Kaiser’s Rule. Components were named based on the strongest positive loadings 
on each factor. Negative loadings were considered exclusionary, as they suggest an inverse 
relationship to the compound expressed by the factor. The names in Table 9 below reflect the 
essence and commonalities of the major loadings for each factor (Wu, Larrabee, & Putman, 
2006; Zea, Asner-Self, Birman, & Buki, 2003). 
The principal component analysis extracted 13 components from the data set, with 
eigenvalues ranging from -0.49 to 0.70 (see Plot 1). Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) 
were based upon the correlation matrix within the data set. The first five components 
accounted for 71% of the variance and were retained as their loadings were greater than 1. 
These five components received construct names and appear in order of variance accounted 
for, as shown in Table 9. Residuals statistics applied to the five components revealed a root 
means squared residual of 0.076, which was below the 0.08 threshold. The proportion of 
absolute residuals was slightly above the 0.05 threshold, 0.0526. We then ran a principal 
component analysis defining only five factors to be extracted from the dataset and applied a 
varimax rotation to it. The root mean square of the residuals was 0.08. Table 7 displays the 
results for the 13 components and Table 8 displays the results for the five components kept 





Table 7: Principal Component Analysis Results 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11 PC12 PC13 
SS loadings 3.64 1.85 1.46 1.22 1.08 0.83 0.65 0.61 0.56 0.38 0.32 0.26 0.14 
Proportion Var 0.28 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Cumulative 
Var 
0.28 0.42 0.53 0.63 0.71 0.78 0.83 0.87 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.99 1.00 
Proportion 
Explained 
0.28 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Cumulative 
Proportion 






Table 8: Principal Component Analysis: Five Factors with Lading Values 
Component 1:  
Flexibility and Working Memory 
Component 2: 
Difficulties in Cognitive Control  
Component 3:  
Errors in Perspective-taking 
Component 4: 
Hinting Comprehension  
Component 5: 
Facial Emotion Recognition 
Elevator Counting 
with Reversal 
.86 Degree of 
Difficulty in the 
Cognitive Control 
Task 
.85 Error Analysis 
Consistent Self 
.81 Hinting Task Score .84 KDEF .87 
TEA Elevator 1 .84 Degree of 
Difficulty in the 
Hinting Task 
.85 Error Analysis 
Inconsistent Self 
.76 TEA Elevator 1 .30 Elevator Counting 
with Distraction 
.51 
TEA Elevator 2 .70 Elevator Counting 
with Distraction 
-.45 Error Analysis 
Inconsistent Other 
.30 Error Analysis 
Inconsistent Other 
-.35   
Elevator Counting 
with Distraction 
.34 Cognitive Control 
Task 
-.69 Error Analysis 
Consistent Other 
-.38 Error Analysis 
Consistent Other 
-.56   
Error Analysis 
Consistent Other 
-.32         
Error Analysis 
Inconsistent Other 
-.43         
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The first component labelled “Flexibility and Working Memory”, which accounted for 
the most variance (19%) in the whole data set (see Table 9), included the TEA sub-tests 
involving flexibility of thought (TEA Elevator 1 and 2) and audio-verbal working memory 
(Elevator Counting with Reversal and Elevator Counting with Distraction). Perspective-
taking skills were negatively loaded on this component, which means that Perspective-taking 
correlates negatively with the major positive components in this factor, so people with more 
effective working memory skills and more effective cognitive flexibility tended to make fewer 
errors in judging the “Other” perspective, both in consistent and inconsistent trials.  
The second component labelled “Difficulties in Cognitive Control”, which accounted 
for 17% of the variance in the total data set, included the degree of difficulty in performing 
two of the tasks, the Cognitive Control Task and the Hinting task. The negative covariance in 
this component indicated that the higher the degree of difficulty in the Cognitive Control task 
covaried with lower scores in this task. Additionally, the more difficulties presented in the 
Hinting Task, the lower the scores in the Elevator Counting with Distraction sub-test, which 
taps into audio-verbal working memory. The higher the degree of difficulty in both the 
Cognitive Control and the Hinting Task, the lower the scores in the Cognitive Control Task 
and the TEA Elevator Counting with Distraction (working memory). 
The third component labelled “Errors in Perspective-taking” and accounting for 13% 
of the total variance in the data set, had its main loadings from perspective-taking skills. In 
the on-line Perspective-taking task, consistent and inconsistent trials evaluating the “Other” 
perspective inversely covaried, suggesting that when judging the “Other” perspective, errors 
arose more substantially when participants had to juggle the discrimination between their own 
and the avatar’s perspective. The fourth component labelled “Hinting Comprehension”, which 
accounted for 11% of the variance in the data set, had its major loading from the Hinting Task 
score, more than double the loading of the TEA Elevator 1 sub-test, the second positive 
variable in the component, suggesting that hinting comprehension skills were the most 
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prominent variable in this component. According to this component organisation, we can see 
that more effective hinting comprehension skills correlate with fewer errors when judging the 
“Other” perspective, which makes sense and adds to the robustness of the model. The fifth 
component labelled “Facial Emotion Recognition”, which also accounted for 11% of the 
variance in the data, had facial emotion recognition as its major loading in the component 
with the TEA Elevator Counting with Distraction sub-test following, but not closely. As the 
TEA Elevator Counting with Distraction had already been accounted for in component 1, the 
fifth component had facial emotion recognition as its more relevant naming variable. In 
component 5, facial emotion recognition (KDEF) appeared to covary with the results from the 
TEA Elevator Counting with Distraction sub-test (working memory), suggesting that these 
variables might be connected in some way (see Table 9). 
 
2.2.5. General Discussion 
 
The PCA analysis produced component groupings that accounted for most of the 
variance in the data. Results indicated that most of the variance in the second cognitive battery 
data was localised in working memory, flexibility, difficulties in cognitive control, in 
mentalising, errors in perspective-taking, hinting comprehension and facial emotion 
recognition, the five factors that accounted for 71% of the variance in the data. We can infer 
from these results that the data vary mostly across these variables and we can then expect to 
find major differences between patients and controls exactly in these variables. Additionally, 
factors did not often display the same variables with similar positive loadings, except the 
Elevator Counting with Distraction sub-test which loaded positively onto Component 5 




The PCA analysis revealed that perspective-taking task variables loaded onto the same 
component as the Hinting Task (Component 4), suggesting that there can be in fact 
perspective-taking components on the task created by Samson et al. (2010), which challenges 
Rubio-Fernandez (2017) claim that the Samson et al.’s task limits participants’ perspective-
taking abilities. If perspective-taking were not a prominent cognitive function tested by the 
Samson et al.’s task, it would likely not have loaded onto the same component as the Hinting 
Task. 
There were no differences between groups in basic cognitive functions in battery 1. We 
found significant differences between groups in battery 2 though, including cognitive control, 
degree of difficulty in cognitive control, flexibility of thought (time to change the train of 
thought), time to perceive hints in a conversation, the difficulty in perceiving hints in a 
conversation and the number of errors in analysing inconsistent “Other” trials. These tests 
load onto four out of five of the components.  
As working memory and cognitive control seem to be relevant for language processing 
according to previous studies (Condray, Steinhauer, Kasparek & Yao, 1995; Kuperberg, 
2010) and have stood out as significantly different in mean comparisons between the groups, 
we can expect that these variables may have an impact on the figurative language processing 
results. Other variables that also have been reported to bear relevance for irony processing, 
as, for example, ToM (Spotorno et al., 2012), are also expected to display significant results 
in the study. 
Although there were no significant differences between patients and controls in battery 
1, battery 2 did display clear differences between groups, which demonstrates that a few 
variables seem to point to a deficit in patients’ cognitive functioning. These variables are 
basically cognitive control, degree of difficulty in cognitive control, flexibility of thought, 
mentalising skills and perspective taking. We can expect to find significant differences 
between groups in the use of these functions when correlating them with the processing cost 
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that the participants showed during the processing of different types of figurative language 
(which we will call the figurative language effect, see Chapters 4-6). 
If the cognitive functions expressed by the PCA components do seem to display 
differences in relation to how they are used and recruited by PwS and neurotypical controls 
when correlated with the figurative language effect, then we might be able to discern some of 
the underlying factors that are at play when PwS process and interpret figurative expressions. 
In addition, this methodology can also provide us with insights into the cognitive functions 
that are associated with the different types of figurative language processing, which ultimately 
will shed more light on the specificities of each type of figurative language. 
Finally, while one of the main aims of the thesis is to test how patients and controls 
process different types of figurative language, we will also relate their performance to the 
different components that we have identified in the PCA. This will allow us to examine 
whether patients and controls make use of similar cognitive functions when processing 















THEORY OF MIND STUDY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
3.2  Method  
3.2.1  Experiment 1: The Perspective-taking Task  
3.2.1.1  Participants  
   3.2.1.2  Stimuli and Procedure 
  3.2.1.3  Accuracy Analysis Results 
3.2.1.4  Accuracy Analysis Discussion  
     3.2.1.5  Response Time Results 
 3.2.1.6  Response Time Results Discussion 
3.2.2   Principal Component Analysis 
3.2.3   Experiment 2: Facial Emotion Recognition 
 3.2.3.1   Participants 
 3.2.3.2   Stimuli and Procedure 
53 
 
 3.2.3.3   KDEF Results 
 3.2.3.4   KDEF Results Discussion 
3.2.4    Experiment 3: The Hinting Task 
 3.2.4.1   Participants 
 3.2.4.2   Stimuli and Procedure 
 3.2.4.3   Hinting Task Results 
 3.2.4.4   Hinting Task Results Discussion 
3.3   General Discussion 
 






Historically, several studies focusing on mentalising skills in children with ASD 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) and in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia 
(Frith, 1992) claimed that people who received a diagnosis of ASD or schizophrenia 
tend not to do well in identifying other people’s point of view. Psychotic phenomena, 
such as delusions, a landmark symptom of schizophrenia, often relate to contents 
where patients report very peculiar feelings or ideas that their thoughts are audible to 
others. Nickerson (1999), who explored the adult tendency of imputing one’s own 
beliefs to others, claims that when a knowledge base of the other person’s judgment is 
non-existent, a tendency to impute their own judgment to other people arises.  
Often, patients who received a diagnosis of schizophrenia have difficulties in 
recognising the legitimacy of other people’s different views. PwS often interpret other 
people’s gestures, even common environmental cues, such as a destination written on 
a bus stop, as signs directed only to them and to nobody else, like a type of message 
especially addressed to them. In addition, PwS frequently report that at some point in 
time they felt they had extraordinary abilities or skills and that they felt they were 
special in some way, such as, for example, feeling they were the direct descendants of 
Jesus Christ or that they were famous or wealthy. These symptoms highlight that 
patients regularly tend to take a rather self-centred position in relation to reality (seeing 
reality not objectively) that is very hard to change even if evidence proves otherwise. 
Not being able to admit that one’s conceptions could be mistaken in view of evidence, 
especially when the person in question is an adult, is something that has intrigued 
psychologists and psychiatrists for years.  
55 
 
In Theory of Mind (ToM) studies, specific neuro-cognitive tasks have been 
developed to examine how well someone can inhibit their self-perspective and 
recognise other people’s perspectives (e.g. Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, 
& Scott, 2010; Santiesteban, Shah, White, Bird & Heyes, 2015). When neuro-
cognitive functions related to acknowledging somebody else’s point of view are 
underperforming or present a deficit, we can hypothesise that self-perspective would 
tend to gain a larger dimension, becoming undesirably prominent and overtaking, 
leading to a more individualised and peculiar interpretation of reality. 
 We will use an on-line task measuring perspective-taking, the Perspective-
taking task, and an off-line task measuring mentalising skills, the Hinting task. 
According to literature on ToM (Sodian, Thoermer & Metz, 2007), the capacity to 
theorise about other people’s mental states and impute beliefs to others and the ability 
to recognise other people’s point of view develops at an early stage of life. As early as 
14 months old, toddlers can already identify that an object that they see can go totally 
unnoticed by somebody else. Another study involving ToM (Carlson & Moses, 2001) 
demonstrated a positive correlation between maturity of executive functions and 
children’s ability to put their own perspective aside when tested in false belief tasks.  
Birch and Bloom’s (2004) study highlighted that, although much more common 
in children below 4 years of age, egocentric behaviour is a trait that people can 
sometimes still present in adulthood. In the task reported by Keysar, Lin and Barr 
(2003), adult participants repeatedly failed to remember that the tape that they had 
hidden in a bag could not possibly be the one the director was indicating5. It became 
                                                          
5 Keysar et al. (2003) used a version of the Director task to investigate adult people’s ability to 
distinguish between their beliefs and other people’s beliefs. In the case of the Director task used, a 
person who played the role of “director” gave participants instructions to move objects around a 
grid. Before receiving instructions, participants were supposed to hide an object in a bag that only 
them, not the director, would know the identity. When the description of the objects given by the 
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clear that adults in that context displayed an egocentric behaviour and they responded 
to the director’s commands or requests in accordance with their own knowledge of the 
situation, not the director’s knowledge (see also Keysar, 1997; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & 
Brauner, 2000; for an overview, see Apperly, 2010).  
Shifting from your own way of seeing things to another person’s way of seeing 
things involves the ability to inhibit one’s own knowledge of the situation, which 
means that there can be an inhibitory or control process present in the apparent simple 
act of recognising another person’s perspective. In addition, there have been claims 
that the Director task, often used to measure ToM skills and designed by Krauss and 
Glucksberg (1977), can involve selective attention, which is a cognitive executive 
function (Rubio-Fernández, 2017). The fact that the Director Task also places demands 
on participants’ selective attention and consequently on their cognitive control (Rubio-
Fernández, 2017) would suggest that for recognising the other person’s perspective, 
good cognitive control skills are needed.  
In this sense, if we consider that attention to external stimuli can only happen if 
there is an inhibition of internal stimuli, we must consider the precedence of inhibitory 
and control processes when ToM is involved. Inhibitory mechanisms mature with age 
(Diamond & Taylor, 1996) and that is the reason why younger children are less able 
to inhibit or control the intrusion of the self-perspective (Diamond & Taylor, 1996).  
In schizophrenia, it could be the case that inhibitory or control mechanisms are 
dysfunctional, making it harder for patients to monitor egocentric responses and 
behaviour. Evidence for this comes from studies that have demonstrated that 
                                                          
director matched the object in the bag, participants often took the hidden object as the one being 




participants diagnosed with schizophrenia tend to do worse in tasks involving 
executive functions (Weickert et al., 2000), which are not necessarily related to IQ 
measures. Additionally, results from battery 2 tests (see Chapter 2) revealed that 
patients and controls significantly differed in cognitive control scores and degree of 
difficulty in the cognitive control task. 
Thought rigidity, a symptom present in the development of delusions, has been 
linked to poor flexibility of thought (Schultz & Searleman, 2002). Behavioural rigidity 
was often measured in previous studies with the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Schultz 
& Searleman, 2002), which is a test of cognitive reasoning that has been used since the 
late 1940’s (Grant & Berg, 1948) as a measurement of a patient’s level of ability to shift 
to new responses. This test has been widely used for brain-damaged patients. Other 
similar task switching tests are also used when a clear brain damage is not involved. The 
Visual Elevator task from the TEA (Test of Everyday Attention), used in the present 
thesis, loaded on the same factor as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test when the TEA was 
being standardised (Robertson et al., 1994). Both tasks involve attentional switching and 
measure degrees of deficit in flexibility of thought, one of the executive functions 
performed in the pre-frontal cortex (Granpeesheh, Tarbox, Najdowski & Kornack, 
2014). Previous research (Lysaker, Bryson, Davis & Bell, 2004) had indicated that 
work performance in PwS was significantly greater when patients did better both in 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and in the Digit Symbol sub-test of the WAIS-R.  
A flexibility of thought measure, as the one used in our cognitive tests, can help 
us understand the relationship between poorer flexibility skills (thought rigidity) and 
ToM skills. Recognition of the other person’s perspective involves inhibition of self-
perspective and switching to the other person’s perspective. If someone is not able to 
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switch from one’s own perspective to another, it can be an indication that control, and 
flexibility skills might not be performing as expected. 
Finally, in addition to investigating the process of switching from one’s own 
perspective to another person’s perspective both in PwS and controls, this chapter will 
also examine how facial emotion perception recognition interacts with ToM processes 
in the same groups. Facial emotion recognition is a valuable social cognition skill that 
is largely used in everyday social interactions (Martino et al., 2011) and is important, 
for example, in spoken irony interpretation, as it provides non-linguistic cues, such as 
tone of voice (Deliens et al., 2017). As previously highlighted, the process of inhibiting 
one’s perspective in favour of acknowledging somebody else’s perspective has been 
associated with ToM (see Apperly, 2012 for an extensive overview; Apperly, 
Humphreys, Kathirgamanathan, & Samson, 2005; Samson et al., 2010). It remains 
unclear, however, whether emotion perception skills, such as the ones required for the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) test, a task used for assessing the 
recognition of emotions in others and employed in this thesis, would be connected to 
the same source of cognitive functions involving inhibitory control and recognition of 
the other person’s perspective. Emotion perception could eventually form a separate 
and distinct cognitive skill unrelated to ToM or be different from other types of ToM 
skills, not perhaps being subject to cognitive inhibitory processes. Research by Lee et 
al. (2014) on ToM as a mediator of reasoning and facial emotion recognition found 
that ToM and analogical reasoning (in this study measured by only one test, the SPM6) 
are independent predictors of facial emotion recognition and that ToM can partially 
mediate the relationship between analogical reasoning and facial emotion recognition. 
                                                          
6 The Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) is a test designed to assess analogical reasoning, a 
function associated with higher-order executive functions. 
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The question whether facial emotion recognition is within the ToM scope or not is 
something the study presented in this chapter may be able to answer.  
The on-line perspective-taking task was taken from Samson et al. (2010; see 
below for a detailed description of the task itself). Samson et al., using neurotypical 
undergraduate and post-graduate students, found the following results: 
- Evidence of intrusions: Slower RTs and higher error rates when the 
perspectives of the participants and the avatar did not match (i.e. inconsistent trials); 
- Evidence of egocentricity: When judging the avatar’s perspective when 
there was a mismatch with the participant’s perspective, both RTs and error rates 
increased; 
- Evidence of altercentricity: When judging their own perspective when 
there was a mismatch with the avatar’s perspective, both RTs and error rates increased 
(though the altercentric intrusion effect was smaller than the egocentric intrusion 
effect, but only for the RT analyses); 
Our aim is to use the same task with patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and 
neuro-typical controls. We predict that PwS, even after a long-course of second 
generation anti-psychotic medication, can still display more difficulties in recognising 
the Other perspective, which would relate to more errors or longer reaction times 
especially in inconsistent trials that require judgement of the avatar’s perspective. This 
would be in line with findings from Corcoran et al. (1995).  
Additionally, we will relate the results obtained in the Perspective-taking task 
with the components extracted from a new PCA (excluding perspective-taking 
variables; see below) in order to determine which underlying skills are important while 
doing this task. By disclosing which cognitive skills relate to participants making 
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fewer mistakes in the task and which makes them react more quickly can help identify 








The same participants that took part in test battery 2, (see Chapter 2) participated 
in the experiment. 
 
3.2.1.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
 
The stimuli were taken from Samson et al. (2010) and showed a picture of a 
room with a human avatar in it. When looking at the picture, participants could see 
three walls (back, left and right). These three walls had red discs presented on either 
one or on two of them. The human avatar was in the centre of the room. The avatar, 
which could be male (for male participants) or female (for female participants), looked 
at the left or the right wall. On half of the trials participants and human avatar would 
share the same perspective, that is, the participant and the human avatar would see the 
same discs (consistent perspective condition). On the other half of the trials, the human 
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avatar and the participants would not see the same discs, as the avatar would not be 
able to see the discs on a wall behind them though these were still visible to the 
participants (inconsistent perspective condition). Although the position of the red discs 






Following Samson et al.’s (2010) design, this task first presented a fixation cross 
for 750ms, followed by the word “YOU” or “HE/SHE” (depending whether the 
participant and avatar were male or female) 500ms later. The word “YOU” or 
“HE/SHE” remained on the screen for 750ms and it instructed participants to take 
either their own perspective (“Self” condition) or the avatar’s (“Other” condition).  
Following the perspective instruction, a number appeared on the screen 500ms after 
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the word “YOU” or “HE/SHE”. This number could be any digit from zero to three. 
Again, the number remained on the screen for 750ms and it instructed participants on 
how many discs they should be certifying on the stimulus presentation. For example: 
“You” then “3” would appear on the screen and participants had to respond by clicking 
a mouse button if there were three discs spread on the walls of the room, ignoring the 
avatar’s perspective (see picture above). Using the example above, the following 
configurations are possible: “You” – “3” = correct; “You” – “2” = incorrect; “He” – 
“3” = incorrect; “He” – “2” = correct. 
Following the perspective and the number of discs instruction, the picture of the 
room with the avatar in it facing one of the walls appeared on the screen one by one. 
Participants in our version of the task had 5,000ms7 to respond to the stimuli by either 
clicking “YES” (left button) or “NO” (right button) on the mouse. By doing this, they 
responded that the picture matched the instructions (“YES”) or that it did not match 
either the perspective or the number of discs instructed (“NO”). 
If participants did not respond to a trial within 5,000ms, the following trial would 
come up on the screen. On consistent trials, the number of discs matched the number 
instruction for a given perspective (either “Self” or “Other”), and the correct answer 
was YES. On inconsistent trials, the number instruction for a given perspective did not 
match the number of discs that could be seen from that perspective, but could match 
the number of discs seen from the other perspective, and the correct answer was NO. 
Inconsistent trials for which the number of discs did not match anybody’s perspective 
                                                          
7 Due to patients taking longer to complete tasks in batteries 1 and 2 and also due to the fact 
that patients were not so familiar with the mouse, all participants in this version of the Perspective-
taking task were given more time (5,000ms) to either press “correct” or “incorrect” rather than the 
2,000ms used in Samson et al. 
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also required a NO answer. These trials worked as fillers in the task and were removed 
from the results analysis. 
The experiment consisted of an initial block of 26 practice trials, followed by 
four blocks of 48 test trials and four filler trials, totalling 196 test trials and 16 filler 
trials. A participant saw the same number of Self and Other perspective trials, and the 
same number of consistent and inconsistent trials. Presentation of the trials was 
randomized for each participant and presentation of the blocks was counterbalanced.  
Participants had to certify their own perspective (48 trials with 24 consistent, 
matching perspective and 24 inconsistent, mismatching perspective in relation to the 
avatar’s), as well as the avatar’s perspective (48 trials with 24 consistent, matching 
perspective and 24 inconsistent mismatching perspective). The 16 filler trials did not 
have any discs on the walls. There was a maximum of three successive trials of a given 
type.  
 
3.2.1.3. Accuracy Analysis Results  
 
We analysed accuracy using the percentage of correct trials. We used a 2 x 2 
repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with Consistency (consistent vs. 
inconsistent) and Perspective (self vs. other) as within-items factors and Group 
(patients vs. controls) as a between-subjects factor. The accuracy analysis revealed a 
main effect of Consistency, F(1, 48) = 20.16, p < .001, with more correct answers for 
consistent than inconsistent trials, and a significant interaction between Group and 
Perspective, F(1, 48) = 6.38, p < .05. Means comparisons indicated that controls made 
more mistakes when judging the Self perspective (88% vs. 96%; t(24) = 2.18, p< .05), 
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which was not found for patients (94% vs. 92%; t(24) = 1.28, p > .21). No further 
significant differences were found. Further comparisons indicated that patients were 
marginally more accurate than controls when judging the Self perspective (t(24) = 
1.80, p  < .09) but marginally worse than controls when assessing the Other perspective 
(t(24) = 1.76, p  < .10). Mean accuracy and mean reaction times for the four conditions 
(consistent self, consistent other, inconsistent self and inconsistent other) can be found 
in Tables 9 and 10. 
 




















     
Controls 98.5 91.7 93.2 84.9 
Note: values are in percentages. 
 
 


















     
Controls 901 (254) 973 (373) 1051 (329) 1104 (460) 





3.2.1.4. Accuracy Analysis Discussion 
 
 
Both groups showed better performance for consistent trials, i.e. when the 
perspective of the participant and the avatar matched. More interestingly, though, was 
the finding that controls, but not patients, showed worse performance when judging 
the Self perspective. This suggests that controls are affected by the “Other” 
perspective, the altercentric interference, which corroborates the findings of Samson 
et al. (2010). Hence, the two participant groups seem to have a different baseline when 
evaluating “Self” and “Other.”  Patients display errors due to the “Self” perspective 
(egocentric intrusion), while controls also often make mistakes due to an influence of 
the “Other” perspective while judging their own “Self” perspective (altercentric 
intrusion). 
  
3.2.1.5. Response Time Results  
 
Following the same model used for the accuracy data analyses, we used a 2 x 2 
two-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) using Consistency and 
Perspective as separate factors. Only trials with correct responses were included in the 
analyses. We found a main effect of Consistency, F(1, 46) = 74.28, p < .001, with 
consistent targets being responded to faster than inconsistent targets, a main effect of 
Perspective, F(1, 46) = 4.07, p < .05, with faster RTs for Other-perspective trials, and 
a main effect of Group, F(1, 46) = 4.39, p < .05, with controls reacting faster than 
patients, although none of the interactions approached significance. While the 
interactions were not significant, the averages (see Table 11) suggested that there 
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might have been differences between the two groups for specific conditions. Indeed, 
independent samples t-tests revealed a significant difference between groups when 
participants judged the “Other” perspective, with patients significantly slower than 
controls in consistent, t(48) = 2.29, p < .05, and inconsistent “Other” trials, t(48) = 
2.55, p < .05. The comparisons for the “Self” conditions did not show significant 
differences (ps > .13). 
 
3.2.1.6. Response Time Results Discussion 
 
 
Overall, consistent trials were responded to faster than inconsistent ones, and 
judging the “Other” perspective took somewhat less time than judging the “Self” 
perspective. Further analyses did show a difference between groups, with patients 
taking longer to evaluate the “Other” perspective, although these results did not reach 
significance.  
The “altercentric effect”, which was apparent in the accuracy analyses of the 
controls, did not appear in the RT analyses of correct responses. While the actual RTs 
for the controls did show that the “Self” perspective took longer to compute than the 
“Other” perspective (1033ms vs. 977ms), as predicted by the altercentric hypothesis, 
this was not significant (p > .13). The difference between the “Self” and the “Other” 
perspective was smaller (1176ms vs. 1152ms) among patients than among controls. 
The difference in RT when judging the Other perspective did not produce a statistic 






3.3. Principal Component Analysis  
 
We conducted a second principal component analysis (PCA) in R (R Core Team, 
2016) without using the variables from the Perspective-taking task to find out how the 
components from the second battery of tests correlated with the Perspective-taking 
task variables. A Bartlett’s test was run to establish whether there was an identity 
matrix in the correlation matrix and a KMO test was used to determine the degree of 
common variance in the data and suitability for a PCA analysis, a varimax rotation 
was applied. Four components accounting for 77% of the variance were retained based 
on Kaiser’s Rule. We kept the same component names from the previous PCA 
analysis, as their loadings were very similar. 
The principal component analysis extracted nine components from the data set, 
with eigenvalues ranging from -0.28 to 3.19. Standardised loadings (pattern matrix) 
were based upon the correlation matrix within the data set. The first four components 
accounted for 77% of the variance and were retained as their loadings were greater 
than 1, except for Component 4, which presented a loading of 0.97. These four 
components appear in order of variance accounted for, as shown in Table 13. Residuals 
statistics revealed a root means squared residual of 0.08, which was equal to the 0.08 
threshold. The proportion of absolute residuals was 0.05, equal to the threshold. Table 
11 displays the results for the nine components and Table 12 displays the results for 
the four components accounting for 77% of the variance that were kept for the analysis. 
As was the case for the original PCA, for this PCA analysis and the correlations 




Table 11: Principal Component Analysis Excluding Perspective-Taking - Results 
 PC1 
 
PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 
SS loadings 3.19 
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Table 12: Principal Component Analysis Excluding Perspective-Taking: Four 
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 All components extracted in the second PCA analysis were very similar to the 
previous PCA analysis, except that this time the Facial Emotion Recognition 
component explained slightly more of the variance than the Hinting Comprehension 
component (which were equal in the original PCA, see Chapter 2). 
  
3.3.1 Correlations between the Perspective-taking Task and the second 
PCA 
 To find out how the cognitive, mentalising (Hinting Task) and facial emotion 
recognition skills extracted related to perspective-taking, we ran separate correlation 
analyses for the accuracy and the RT data for each group. Results for the accuracy 
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correlations are presented in Table 138 and results for the reaction times correlations 
are presented in Table 149. 
Table 13: Correlations between errors in perspective-taking and the second PCA 




































r = .360 r = .565** r = .014 r = .354 
                                                          
8 Correlation results presented in the table are uncorrected for multiple comparisons due to 
the relatively small number of participants. Results shown in Table 15 are exploratory and we didn’t 
want to miss trends that could be present in the data by being overly strict. After Bonferroni 
corrections, results for the control group remained significant. 
9 Like in Table 15, Table 16 correlation results are presented uncorrected for multiple 
comparisons for the same reasons reported above. No reaction time correlations remained 






r = .009 r = 102 r = -.595** r = -.294 
 Inconsistent 
Self 
r = .129 r = -.178 r = .091 r = -.013 
Note: Significance level is indicated by stars: *p ˂.05; **p ˂ .01; ***p ˂ .001. 
 
Table 14: Correlations between reaction time in perspective-taking and the second 
PCA 




























r = -.104 r = .402* r = .040 r = -.343 
Controls Consistent 
Other 
r = -.286 r = .248 r = -.151 r = .265 
 Consistent 
Self 
r = -.378 r = .405 r = -.047 r = .246 
 Inconsistent 
Other 





r = -.363 r = .261 r = -.015 r = .181 
Note: Significance level is indicated by stars: *p ˂.05; **p ˂ .01; ***p ˂ .001. 
 
3.3.2. Second Principal Component Analysis Discussion  
 
Results from the second PCA and their correlations with errors in perspective 
taking confirmed results obtained from the first PCA in the sense that perspective-
taking variables appeared inversely (negatively) connected with Hinting 
Comprehension, except that in this case we were able to determine this to be true 
among patients, not controls. Patients who had more effective hinting comprehension 
skills made fewer errors when judging both the “Self” and “Other” perspectives.  
For the controls, accuracy correlation results revealed that more perspective-
taking errors in the Consistent Self condition were related to more difficulties in 
mentalising and cognitive control. Hence, these results suggest that more effective 
mentalising skills can have a positive impact on perspective taking. The results from 
the control group also indicated that Facial Emotion Recognition was negatively 
correlated with errors in judging the “Other” perspective in inconsistent trials in the 
Perspective-taking task. This suggests that more effective facial emotion recognition 
skills can be related to fewer errors in judging a different person’s perspective in 
inconsistent trials. 
Reaction time correlation analysis showed that longer reaction time for patients 
related to difficulties in mentalising and in cognitive control for patients. Results for 
controls were only borderline significant for the “Consistent Self” condition. For 
patients, more effective hinting comprehension skills related to shorter reaction times 
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in judging inconsistent other trials, which agrees with the findings from the accuracy 
analysis, where patients who had more effective hinting comprehension skills tended 
to make fewer mistakes when judging inconsistent other trials. It seems that 
mentalising skills help participants do better in perspective-taking, which only 
reinforces the connection between these two tasks and between these two tasks and 
ToM. 
 
3.4. Experiment 2: Facial Emotion Recognition 
 
Another cognitive skill often associated with theory of mind is facial emotion 
recognition (Bora, Yucel, Pantelis, 2009; Kohler et al., 2010). Facial emotion 
recognition is the ability to give a meaning to facial expressions coming from 
interlocutors in everyday conversation. In fact, a great deal of human spoken 
communication in common interactions relies on nonverbal signs, such as facial 
emotion expression (Knapp, Hall & Horgan, 2014). Being able to give a meaning to 
facial expressions is a very important skill for anyone to be successful in daily social 
interactions and is a primary communicative tool that most humans manage to acquire. 
Irony and sarcasm rely greatly on prosodic elements such as pitch, stress and 
volume (Ekman, O’Sullivan, Friesen & Schererk, 1991) and facial expressions seem 
to accompany prosodic features in everyday communication. We can then say that the 
ability to interpret prosodic features and facial expressions is core to human 
understanding of one another. 
Research so far has reported that in schizophrenia facial emotion recognition is 
impaired (for an overview, see Kohler et al, 2009). A large majority of these studies, 
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however, has tested inpatients. The present study aims to shed a light on facial emotion 
recognition in outpatients who have been on medication for more than ten years (M = 
16.37, ME = 12.5) and who had not received any other psychiatric diagnosis besides 
schizophrenia, not even schizoaffective disorder, as they were checked for diagnosis 
accuracy with the SCID and the PANSS (see Chapter 2). Besides being on anti-
psychotics, three of the patients were either on anti-depressants or on low doses of 
anxiolytics as well. 
Asgharpour et al. (2015), in an eye-tracking study, found that patients diagnosed 
with schizophrenia had a smaller number of eye-fixations on faces in general, despite 
the emotions the photographs showed. However, in the case of Asgharpour et al.’s 
(2015) study, patients had a 500ms threshold fixation time in each image that could 
not have been enough for patients, who tend to be slower. Akbarfahimi et al. (2013) in 
an ERP study found that patients diagnosed with schizophrenia displayed longer 
latencies and reduced N170 peaks when looking at happy, fearful and neutral faces 
when compared to controls. 
Up to 2009, Kohler et al. (2010) identified 86 studies on facial emotion 
perception in schizophrenia and many of them reported a large impairment in emotion 
perception in patients. Although these studies involved a vast range of clinical and 
socio-demographic characteristics, they tend to point to a general emotion recognition 
impairment that the present study aims to investigate in patients who have been on 
medication for a long time and are in the process of remittance. 
Since facial emotion recognition is a basic tool acquired from people’s first 
social experiences, it is possible that a patient can more easily employ it after having 
gone through a schizophrenic episode and, medicated and/or in psychological therapy, 
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being on the route to recovery. In this case, to be able to use emotion perception skills 
would represent a positive prospective for patients and it could enhance the quality of 
their daily interactions. In addition, if a patient can retrieve emotion recognition skills 
after a schizophrenic episode, it could be a sign of a more favourable clinical outcome, 
at least as far as social cognition skills are concerned. 
We hypothesise that people in remittance from schizophrenia would have 
recovered their facial emotion recognition skills because they would be functioning 
closer to normality at a psychosocial level. In this sense, outpatients diagnosed a long 
time ago who have been on medication since the first episode, like the patients who 
took part in the present study, would tend to perform more effectively if compared, for 
example, to inpatients, who are in the middle of a schizophrenic episode. However, we 
did not test inpatients, and our research question is whether outpatients will perform 






The participants for the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Test (KDEF) were 
the same used in the Perspective-taking task, except that in the KDEF there were 27 
participants in the patient group and 29 participants in the control group. Because the 
KDEF was one of the first tests administered in the research, participants had not yet 
dropped out or discontinued their participation in the study, so we could count on more 
participants for both groups. 
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One participant from the patient group reported a high score in the Levenson 
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale, a screening test for this study, and because his results 
on the KDEF were clear outliers, we excluded him from the analysis. 
 
3.4.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
 
 
A shortened version of the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Test (KDEF), 
Lundqvist et al. (1998), was used in this study. It had 70 trials that consisted of 70 
different photographs of people displaying one of seven different emotional 
expressions: fear, disgust, happiness, anger, neutrality, sadness and surprise. These 
seven basic emotional expressions appeared in five different face angles each (full left, 
full right, half left, half right and straight). Male and female photographs emerged 
equally across the trials. 
Participants saw a photograph on the computer screen containing either a male 
or a female model acting one type of emotional expression in an angle. The emotional 
expression options for participants to choose from (angry, afraid, disgusted, happy, 
neutral, sad and surprised) appeared on the right-hand side of the computer screen. 
Participants then saw the picture in the centre together with the options. To test 
participants’ abilities to distinguish emotions even in not so favourable or clear picture 
contexts, KDEF test photographs are not completely clear or sharp. After participants 
looked at the pictures and analysed the emotional expression options to choose from, 
the experimenter would then ask participants to say which emotional expression they 
thought would best describe the photograph they saw on the computer screen. 
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We did not track the time in the KDEF test and participants had as much time as 
they needed to analyse the options and respond. After responding, participants hit the 
spacebar to proceed to the next photograph. They responded to 70 trials and the 
experimenter ticked the options each participant chose. We computed results 
according to the number of correct answers given by each participant.  
 
Table 15: KDEF results by group – Number of mistakes in percentages. 
Group 
 




41(1.8) 21(2.2) 23(2.1) 7.5(.594) 4(.742) 8(1.05) 41(2.54) 
Control 
(29) 
38(2.1) 23(2.0) 27(1.8) 13(1.63) 2(.412) 12(1.48) 36(2.87) 
 Note: Standard deviation between brackets 
 
 
3.4.3. KDEF Test Results 
 
 
We ran a 7 (Emotion Type) x 2 (Group) repeated measures ANOVA with the 
KDEF scores collected for both groups (see detailed table in the Appendix). There was 
a significant effect of Emotion Type: F(6) = 34.104, p < .001. There were no overall 
differences between the two groups (F(1) = .105, p > 1), nor did we observe a 
significant interaction (F(1) = .002, p < 1). 
The effect of condition in the repeated measures ANOVA was expected, as 
participants behaved differently when judging the different emotions. Some emotions 
were easier for both groups and others more difficult. Overall, patients and controls’ 
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scores were very similar in this task, with patients’ mean accuracy scores being 54 
(77% accuracy) and controls’ 56 out of 70 (80% accuracy). Moreover, no differences 
between groups in any emotion recognition were found in independent samples t-tests 
(all ps > .158). 
Since Laroi and Raballo (2010) found that participants made more errors when 
judging fear (“afraid”) than when judging happiness, we compared the accuracy on 
these two emotions in our sample as well. Our data showed a similar difference: t(55) 
= 4.2, p < .001 (fear: 10.3% mistakes, happiness: 3.0% mistakes). The fact that 
happiness is much easier to be recognised than sadness in both groups suggests that 
the recognition of sadness is not as straightforward as happiness. It should be noted 
that there were many other differences in accuracy between the different emotions. 
However, as this is not relevant for our research question, we will not report these. 
Details of all emotion comparisons can be found in Appendix B. 
 
3.4.4. KDEF Test Results Discussion 
 
 
Results above indicate that, unlike Laroi, Fonteneau, Mourad and Raballo 
(2010), this experiment found no significant differences in facial emotion recognition 
between PwS and controls. The fact that most of the patients used in this study were 
people who had been on medication for more than 10 years could have had a positive 
impact on the KDEF results, as facial emotion recognition impairments are usually 
more severe in the acute phase of the illness (Bora et al., 2009). In addition, Laroi et 
al. (2010) used inpatients, not outpatients, and inpatients often present a more acute 
form of the disorder when compared to outpatients.  
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In addition, 11 out of 25 patients in this experiment were in partial remittance, a 
fact that we must take into consideration if results obtained in this study are to be 
compared with results obtained by other studies (e.g. Laroi et al., 2010). Finally, since 
we did not track time in this task and patients had as much time as they needed to be 
able to choose one facial emotion expression, we cannot be certain about patients’ 
facial emotion recognition speed. We can only say that accuracy was not significantly 
different between groups.  
The suggestion by Kohler et al. (2010) that facial emotion recognition 
impairment could be a trait of schizophrenia is not supported by this study. Differences 
in patients’ profiles, their status as inpatients and outpatients and their social 
integration in the community (12 participants in this study worked or were doing 
voluntary work and had some kind of integration in the community) apparently can 
increase or decrease the group score in the task. 
Our study is the first study we know of that tested facial emotion recognition in 
patients in remission of schizophrenia and patients who have been on second-
generation anti-psychotic medication for a long time. The finding of the present study 
adds information about the effects of long-term basis second-generation anti-psychotic 
medication on facial emotion recognition. It appears that patients can perform well on 
facial emotion recognition if they sustain treatment with second generation anti-
psychotic medication, and perform markedly better than inpatients (Bora et al., 2009; 
Laroi et al., 2010).  
However, when testing facial emotion recognition, studies in the future must 
take into consideration the necessity of eliminating participants who have a high score 
in psychopathy scales. For the present study, the one participant we eliminated for this 
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reason from the analyses made an inordinate number of mistakes (43). The patient 
group mean was much lower than that (16). 
Another aspect that requires attention from researchers is that the fact that people 
can recognise facial emotions does not necessarily imply that they can acknowledge 
the “Other” point-of-view. Recognising facial emotions and acknowledging the 
“Other” point-of-view seem to be relatively independent cognitive functions (see 
Chapter 2). At least, the fact that patients and controls did display similar results in the 
KDEF, unlike results from the Perspective-taking task, suggests that recognition of 
facial emotions and recognition of the “Other” and “Self” perspectives can involve 
relatively autonomous operations. It is possible, judging from the results of the tasks 
described so far, that the recognition of “Self” and “Other” perspectives could require 
the presence of more complex neural operations.  
 
3.5. Experiment 3: The Hinting Task 
 
 
Corcoran et al. (1995) were the first to propose the Hinting Task as a test to 
measure the ability to infer what different people mean in common daily utterances 
when they choose to use hints and implicatures to communicate an idea. The test 
involves identifying what the character really meant when he/she used an indirect form 
of communication, rather than a simple, straightforward one. 
The Hinting Task presents 10 short stories that the experimenter reads aloud to 
each participant. At the end of each short story, a character drops a hint or implies 
something about the situation described in the story. The experimenter than asks, 
“What does the character [normally naming the character] really mean when he/she 
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says this?” Each participant then must answer according to the context and according 
to the character’s intention, which becomes clear in the story. If participants are not 
able to give a correct answer the first time they answer the question, the experimenter 
proceeds to the second hint and asks a direct question, such as, “What does Jessica 
want Max to do?” If participants need to listen to the story again and require so, the 
experimenter reads it again.  
In this study, differently from Corcoran et al. (1995), and unlike all other studies 
that used the Hinting Task, there are two other measurements being recorded besides 
accuracy, which are Time and Degree of Difficulty of the Task (on a scale from 1 to 
10). Time is an important measurement in the Hinting Task because it can tell a lot 
about how participants react to the task and it also can tell you about how 
straightforward the hints sounded to participants. The Degree of Difficulty estimate is 
useful because it can show how easy or difficult participants perceived the task. 
Accuracy alone does not tell everything about how participants felt the task and how 
they reacted to it. 
For example, a participant can give the experimenter a correct answer, either 
after the first or the second hint, but that participant could have taken a lot more time 
than typical. This fact could be an indication that the knowledge of what is going on 
in the other person’s mind in the story, the mentalising skill, is not available for that 
participant in an on-line fashion. Imagine, for example, in an actual social interaction, 
the implications of not having a theory of mind available on-line. The person talking 
to the one who is slower to understand what she/he is hinting can give the impression 
that slowness is a sign that the person they are talking to is not following. The scores 
in themselves do not give us precious pieces of information that we can access by 
measuring Time and Degree of Difficulty and this is the reason why these 
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measurements were included in this study. It is possible that patients will take longer 
to do the Hinting Task and they find it more difficult as well. 
Corcoran et al. (1995) first used the Hinting Task to test patients’ ability to infer 
implicatures and indirect meanings in specific speech contexts. The experiment had a 
control group of 44 people and a patient group of 55 people who were divided into six 
separate groups according to their symptoms (negative features, paranoid symptoms, 
incoherence, passivity experiences, other symptoms and remission). Most of the 
participants used in the study were inpatients on psychiatric wards.  
The difference Corcoran et al. (1995) found between the two groups was 
significant, t(97) = 4.16, p ˂ .001, and they found a correlation between the Hinting 
Task score and estimated IQ in the patient group, which was not found in the control 
group. The authors suggested that patients were relying on general intellectual abilities 
to perform a social task that seemed to have no reliance on intellectual abilities for 
controls. They also found that this could be taken as evidence for cognitive deficits 
among some of the patients they tested. Overall, patients who did not present any 
symptoms (N = 8) had a normal performance on the Hinting Task. The results 
Corcoran et al. (1995) obtained support the idea that patients had difficulties in 
inferring what the intentions of other people were. 
Later, Corcoran and Frith (2003) used the Hinting Task, The Theory of Mind 
Stories test and several memory tests to investigate the relationship between 
autobiographical memory and Theory of Mind in schizophrenia (they considered the 
Hinting Task as a ToM task). Their findings suggested that patients have a ToM deficit 
and an impoverished autobiographical memory retrieval, and they reported a 
connection between hint comprehension and memory accessibility with approximately 
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44% of the variance on the Hinting task being accounted for by the ability to recollect 
memories. Again, they found that patients in remission (N = 15) performed similarly 
controls. 
In the present study, we did not use autobiographical memory measures. We 
wanted to test whether our patients indeed showed a deficiency on the hinting measure. 
In addition, given that the sample of patients in remission was relatively small in 
Corcoran and colleagues’ studies, we wanted to confirm their findings of normal 
performance for patients in remission. Finally, we wanted to extend the research by 






Participants who took part in the Hinting Task were the same as for the KDEF, 
with the same number of participants. Results from the participant from the patient 
group who had reported a high score in the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 
had been excluded from the experiment. 
 
3.5.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
 
 
The experimenter read the instructions of the test aloud to each participant and 
then read 10 short stories of one paragraph each. Participants answered the question 
posed after the first hint. If participants did not give a correct answer to the first 
question, then the experimenter would read the second hint and ask another question. 
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If participants still did not give a correct answer to the second hint, then they would 
receive zero (0) points in the general score for that story. If participants got the second 
hint answer right, then they would receive one point (1) for that story and if participants 
had given a correct answer in the first hint, then they would receive two points (2) in 
the general score. 
The experimenter tracked the time used by each participant to do the Hinting 
Task with a stopwatch, which was set as soon as she started reading the first story. As 
soon as participants finished answering the last question of the last story, the stopwatch 
would be paused. At the end of the task, the experimenter asked participants how 
difficult they had found the task on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being very, very easy 
and 10 very, very difficult. Participants would then give their Degree of Difficulty 
score to the task. 
 
 
3.5.3. Hinting Task Results 
 
 Results for the different measures can be found in Table 16. Independent 
samples t-tests showed significant differences in all three measurements, Hinting Task 
Score: t(48) = 2.132, p <.05; Time: t(48) = 3.683, p = .001; and Degree of Difficulty: 






Table 16: Hinting Task results 
Measurement Means 


















Note: Standard deviations in brackets 
 
We did not find a significant difference between patients in partial remission (N 
= 11) and controls for their hinting score: t(34) = .494, p = .625 (Mpatients = 15.64, 
SD = 2.01; Mcontrols = 16.04, SD = 2.35). Similarly, for the time measure, we did not 
find a difference between patients in partial remission, (M = 402, SD = 102) and 
controls (M = 354, SD = 78.03), t(34) = 1.559, p = .128. However, we found a 
significant difference for the Degree of Difficulty measure between patients in partial 
remission (M = 4, SD = 1.94) and controls (M = 2.22, SD = 1.0), t(34) = 3.280, p = 
.002, with patients in partial remission finding the Hinting Task significantly more 
difficult than controls. 
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Overall, there were significant differences between the patient and control group 
in the Hinting Task. It became clear too that the results obtained in the variables 
“Time” and “Degree of Difficulty of the Test” confirm our hypotheses that patients 
may need more time to do the task and that they may find it more difficult. Even when 
patients take approximately the same time to do the tasks as neurotypical controls, as 
is the case for patients in partial remittance, they still find it more taxing than controls.  
 
 
3.5.4. Hinting Task Results Discussion 
 
 
Although most of the patients used in this study had been on second- generation 
anti-psychotic medication for more than 10 years and, at the time of testing, a few of 
them were even doing voluntary work and partially integrated in the community, the 
ones who still presented positive/negative symptomatology still performed more 
poorly in the Hinting Task when compared to controls.  
Patients classified as in partial remission according to the SCID results had 
similar scores to controls, which supports Corcoran et al. (1995). Although there was 
no significant difference in Time between patients in partial remission and controls, 
there was still a significant difference in Degree of Difficulty, which means that 
patients in remission still found the Hinting Task significantly more taxing than 
controls. 
Overall, patients took significantly longer to do the Hinting Task and they found 
it significantly more difficult than controls, although they did not find the task 
extremely difficult, giving it a mean score of 4 in difficulty on a scale from 1 to 10. 
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The fact that patients and controls don’t find the Hinting Task equally easy suggests 
that ToM for patients is still taxing, even though the patients used in this study have 
been on second generation anti-psychotic medication for more than 10 years. 
The difference in Time between groups suggests that mentalising skills may not 
be available for patients in an on-line fashion, and, in an actual social interaction, the 
time gap in picking up the hints can somehow indicate that the interlocutor is simply 
not following the conversation. Again, time used to perform the tasks is something that 
we must consider when analysing schizophrenia data because it is a sign that 
adjustments needed for the mentalising processes to take place can be too slow and 
social interactions in the real world, either in the workplace or in a more familiar 
context, require more effective skills. Nevertheless, the fact that patients in remission 
did not present a significant difference in relation to controls in Time suggests that the 
presence of positive/negative symptomatology increases the time used to do the task 
and makes cognitive adjustments more taxing. 
The difference in degree of difficulty between patients and controls could be an 
indication that patients rely on other complex cognitive operations to be able to 
interpret hints. For patients, interpreting the hints in the task was not as straightforward 
as it was for controls; in fact, it was more taxing, and this also becomes apparent when 
we consider that patients in partial remission still found the Hinting Task significantly 
more difficult than controls. 
Results obtained in this study confirm previous ones (Corcoran & Frith, 2003; 
Corcoran et al., 1995; Pickup & Frith, 2001). The fact that 14 patients out of 25 who 
participated in this study still presented positive or negative symptomatology, either at 
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a subthreshold or at a threshold level, could have decreased patient group results in the 
task.  
Results obtained for the Hinting Task in this experiment cannot confirm Herold 
et al.’s (2002) suggestion that, in schizophrenia, Theory of Mind impairment would be 
a trait that is present even in the remittance stage of the illness. Although we only had 
11 participants in remittance stage, their results did not show a significant difference 
in relation to controls, except in the variable Degree of Difficulty. We can say that they 
find it more difficult, but we cannot say that the impairment persists in the remittance 
stage. 
 
3.6. General Discussion 
 
In general, results from the Perspective-taking task supported Samson et al. 
(2010) in the sense that controls made more mistakes when judging the “Self” 
perspective when compared to the “Other” perspective. This means that there was in 
fact an intrusion of the “Other” perspective when controls were judging their own 
perspective, which could suggest that patients might not be as tuned in to the “Other” 
perspective as controls, although this effect did not produce more errors for patients 
when judging the “Other” perspective, possibly only making the judgement of the 
“Other” perspective more difficult for patients. 
In general, reaction times corroborated results for accuracy in the Perspective-
taking task, as patients were significantly slower than controls when evaluating the 
“Other” perspective. This slowness became even more apparent when trials were 
inconsistent, although it was present for both consistent and inconsistent trials. 
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Inconsistent trials required sharper tuning skills as the participant and avatar did not 
share the same perspective when looking at the discs on the wall, which we found can 
be more difficult to patients. These findings highlight the presence of a “self-reference 
effect” for patients, indicating that adjustments to the “Other” point-of-view can be 
challenging for patients. 
Results from the first PCA (see Chapter 2) indicated that perspective-taking 
(error analysis consistent and inconsistent other) was inversely correlated in 
Component 1 with flexibility and working memory, suggesting that more effective 
flexibility of thought and working memory can improve accuracy in judging the 
“Other” perspective. The same pattern of results was found for Component 4 (Hinting 
Comprehension), indicating that more effective mentalising skills can also improve 
accuracy in judging “Other” trials, both consistent and inconsistent. The pattern found 
in Component 4 only reinforces that both the Perspective-taking and the Hinting 
Comprehension tests tap into ToM skills. 
Results from the second PCA and their correlations with the perspective-taking 
variables confirmed results obtained from the first PCA. We found again an inverse 
correlation between perspective-taking variables and Hinting Comprehension, 
although in the second PCA this was true only for patients, not for controls. Patients 
who had more effective hinting comprehension (mentalising) skills made fewer errors 
when judging “Self” and “Other” perspective. Results for the control group revealed 
that errors in perspective-taking when judging the “self” perspective related to more 
difficulties in mentalising and in cognitive control. Apparently, judging from these 
results, mentalising and cognitive control are relevant cognitive functions for ToM. 
Additionally, more effective facial emotion recognition among controls related to 
fewer errors in judging the “Other” perspective (inconsistent trials), which suggests 
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that good facial emotion recognition skills can contribute to a more effective judgment 
of the “Other” perspective. 
The KDEF experiment results revealed no significant differences in facial 
emotion recognition between PwS and controls. When evaluating the results, we must 
consider that most of the patients used in this study were people who had been on 
medication for more than 10 years. In this case, we can speculate that medication can 
have a positive impact on facial emotion recognition for PwS, as other studies (Bora 
et al., 2009; Laroi et al., 2010) with inpatients, probably in more severe phases of the 
illness, did not report similar results.  
In addition, because facial emotion recognition was in a separate uncorrelated 
component in relation to perspective-taking and mentalising skills in both PCAs (see 
Chapter 2) and did not appear either positively or negatively correlated with 
perspective-taking in any component, unlike mentalising skills tested in the Hinting 
Task, we cannot say that facial emotion recognition underlies the same type of ToM 
processing. In fact, considering the results, it is possible that they are related, but 
independent cognitive functions, involving relatively autonomous operations, 
although results showed that facial emotion recognition helped increase effectiveness 
of perspective-taking skills when judging the “Other” perspective in inconsistent 
trials.  
Results from the Hinting Task, which revealed significant differences between 
patients and controls in all measures tested, score, time and degree of difficulty, 
suggest that mentalising skills are generally still impaired for PwS, except for patients 
in partial remission, whose results were compatible with neurotypical controls. 
Patients in partial remission, however, still found the Hinting Task more difficult than 
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neurotypical controls, which suggests that although mentalising skills can be used by 
patients in remission, they are still more challenging for these patients than for 
neurotypical controls. It seems that although the impairment is no longer there, some 
difficulty in relation to mentalising still remains. 
The present study does not support the idea that an impairment in facial emotion 
recognition could be a trait of schizophrenia (Kohler et al., 2009). On the contrary, 
results from this study suggest that facial emotion recognition can be working 
effectively for patients who have been on medication for a long time and are relatively 
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Language phenomena related to schizophrenia are a source of neuroscientific 
curiosity (Kuperberg, 2010a; 2010b; Kuperberg & Heckers, 2000; Reichenberg et al., 
2009) because having a broader perspective of the mechanisms underlying cognitive 
functioning in schizophrenia can be valuable for improving the current understanding 
of the factors underpinning some of the symptoms related to the disorder.  In language 
production, patients with schizophrenia (PwS) can sometimes display difficulties in 
maintaining an organised discourse plan (thought disorder) and sometimes their 
speech also contains neologisms or unintelligible utterances (schizophasia) 
(Kuperberg, McGuire & David, 1998). The manifestations of thought disorder can be 
seen in poor speech content (inability to transmit enough information), in a difficulty 
or inability to stick to the intended topic, and in a general discourse illogicality that 
makes the person’s speech sound more like a chain of incoherent associations. 
Figurative language processing deficits were first identified in patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia in the early twentieth century (Benjamin, 1944; Finckh, 
1906). Today, proverb interpretation, which involves figurative language processing, 
is used in the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), a scale measuring the 
severity of symptoms in schizophrenia. The fact that proverb interpretation is used in 
the PANSS suggests that inaccuracies in figurative language processing can be a 
valuable tool to measure abstract reasoning and thought disorder levels in patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. It also suggests that language processing measures can 
add valuable insights into cognitive functioning in schizophrenia. Since proverb 
interpretation is also part of the Comprehension sub-test of the WAIS-IV, it can be 
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argued that the ability to build meta-representations is a sign of neuro-typical IQ 
development.  
Some studies on language processing in schizophrenia not involving 
figurativeness (David, Kuperberg & McGuire, 1998; Kuperberg &, Heckers, 2000) 
found that patients who displayed thought disorder were less sensitive to violations of 
the semantic context than patients who did not display thought disorder. These studies 
highlight that the severity of thought disorder could influence a patient’s sensitivity to 
context violations, semantic incongruity and anomaly.  
Other studies (e.g. Hoff et al., 1999) reported deficits in cognitive functioning 
and verbal working memory among patients diagnosed with schizophrenia in the first 
2 to 5 years of the illness and Wood et al. (2007) speculated that working memory 
impairments arose when complex brain interconnections were necessary for patients 
in their first episode of psychosis to perform language tasks. Reading comprehension 
impairments were also found in teenagers who later developed schizophrenia (Fuller 
et al., 2002; Vourdas et al., 2003).  
Overall, several studies (Kuperberg, 2010a; 2010b; Lee & Park, 2005) have 
demonstrated that PwS display deficits in cognition, especially in working memory 
and executive functions, and that positive thought disorder correlates with low scores 
in other cognitive tasks. Kerns and Berenbaum (2002) also reported that patients 
afflicted by thought disorder had a low performance in tests that assessed executive 
functions. Other studies (Kuperberg, 2010a; 2010b) suggest that executive functions 




Research in figurative language processing in schizophrenia has shown that 
patients diagnosed with schizophrenia display a preference for concrete over 
figurative interpretations (Brune & Bodenstein, 2005; Kiang, Kutas, Light & Braff, 
2008). Langdon, Coultheart, Ward and Catts (2002) reported that poor metaphor and 
poor irony understanding made significant contributions to the discrimination 
between PwS and neurotypical controls. It has also been reported that PwS are less 
efficient in integrating the semantic context of all sentences, both figurative and literal, 
and that PwS more typically chose literal interpretations of figurative idioms in idiom 
interpretation tasks when compared to controls (e.g. Iakimova, Passerieux & Hardy-
Bayle, 2006; Iakimova, Passerieux, Laurent, & Hardy-Bayle, 2005; Kircher, Leube, 
Erb, Grodd, & Rapp, 2007). 
Other studies (Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010; Sitnikova, Salisbury, Kuperberg & 
Holcomb 2002; Titone, Levy, & Holzman, 2000) indicated that, when building up the 
meaning of sentences in homonym ambiguity tasks10, patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia were more dependent on semantic associations between individual 
words rather than the whole sentence context, which could be a relevant deficit for 
irony processing because for an irony to make sense, it is required that the whole 
context is processed by the speaker. 
As far as context comprehension is concerned, it has been found that contextual 
familiarity enhances a patient’s ability to extract the meaning from a non-figurative 
text (Ditman & Kuperberg, 2010; Sitnikova, Perrone, Goff & Kuperberg, 2010; 
Sitnikova, Salisbury, Kuperberg, & Holcomb, 2002). These authors reported that, in 
                                                          
10 “Diving was forbidden from the bridge/The guests played bridge… because the river had 
rocks in it.”   Unlike PwS, neuro-typical individuals detected the contextual anomaly when the 
inappropriate initial sentence was used, which was highlighted by a non-attenuated N400 effect 
(Sitnikova et al., 2002). 
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familiar contexts, patients have been able to display a more accurate understanding of 
the events in the text, while in unfamiliar contexts, this did not happen as frequently. 
Contextual processing, both from the linguistic and the extra-linguistic context, could 
be key in irony recognition too, and studies in context processing in schizophrenia 
suggest that global context may not be fully grasped (David et al. 1998; Kuperberg & 
Heckers, 2000).  
The intent of communicating something that is not literally expressed can be 
crucial to language interaction in daily life. The meaning of an utterance often 
intermingles with the non-linguistic context. The knowledge of this extra-linguistic 
context is fundamental for a person to be able to convey and understand meanings 
beyond the literality of a certain single semantic level. Deficits in the ability to build 
meta-representations and processing figurativeness can then become an obstacle for 
patients diagnosed with schizophrenia to be able to understand other people’s 
meanings or intentions.  
 
4.1.1 Models of Irony Processing 
 
There are several models of irony processing, three of which we will discuss 
here. The first one, the Standard Pragmatic Model (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979, 1983), 
proposes that ironic interpretation happens in stages, with the literal interpretation 
taking precedence over the figurative one. The ironic meaning will only be computed 
if the speaker identifies a mismatch between the literal meaning and the context in 
which the irony is embedded. The speaker then, acknowledging the mismatch and 
inappropriateness of the literal meaning for the context, interprets the ironic meaning 
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accurately. In the Standard Pragmatic Model, the ironic meaning is always the 
opposite meaning of the literal utterance. Ironic meaning processing in the Standard 
Pragmatic Model is more taxing than literal meaning processing because it involves 
two stages of cognitive operations. 
The second model is the Direct Access Model, which proposes that appropriate 
contexts induce early appropriate lexical processing (Gibbs, 1986, Gibbs, O’Brian, & 
Doolittle, 1995). Figurative meaning in this model is accessed directly, without any 
further cognitive operations. In this model, we would process ironic meanings just like 
we process literal meanings. Unfamiliarity does not present a problem for this model, 
as it claims that the appropriate context is enough for the speaker to jump straight to 
the figurative interpretation of the utterance, with no need for additional cognitive 
processes to take place.  
The third model is the Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 2003; Giora 
& Fein, 1999). In this model, only the salient figurative meanings are accessed 
directly, just like when we process literal meanings. All novel figurative meanings 
would require additional inferential operations, making them more taxing than salient 
figurative meanings. The Graded Salience Hypothesis model does not claim that the 
ironic meaning replaces the literal one at a later stage, but rather that both meanings 
are maintained (‘retention hypothesis’), so that the identification of the mismatch in 
the context can take place (Giora, 2003, p. 72).  
Filik et al. (2014) reported eye-tracking and ERP results for familiar and 
unfamiliar ironies that supported the Graded Salience Hypothesis, as they found no 
differences in reading times for familiar ironies and a processing cost for unfamiliar 
ironies. Results from their ERP experiment reinforced the findings from their eye-
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tracking experiment, revealing a tendency for a more negative centroparietal N400 
waveform for unfamiliar ironies, not familiar ironies. In addition, Ţurcan and Filik 
(2016) examined sarcastic expressions (sarcasm is a common form of irony) and 
found that unfamiliar sarcastic remarks engendered both early and late processing 
costs, but familiar sarcastic remarks only showed a late cost in eye-tracking. While it 
is sometimes difficult to distinguish between sarcastic and non-sarcastic irony 
(sarcastic comments necessarily involve comments in relation to another person, 
(Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989), the majority of the items we used in the present study 
involved sarcasm (see Appendix C). 
 
4.1.2. Relationship Between Irony Processing and Mentalizing Skills 
 
A few recent neuroimaging studies (Spotorno et al., 2012; 2013) have 
highlighted a close relationship between ToM activations and irony processing in the 
brain. These studies, using neuro-typical participants, claim that the under-
determination of a speaker’s meaning is often to be resolved by the interlocutor when 
ToM network activations are recruited, especially in the right and left temporal 
parietal junction (rTPJ, lTPJ), in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the 
precuneus (PC). These studies also report that ToM network activations happen at an 
early stage of irony processing, which suggests that the integration of linguistic code 
and contextual information takes place at an early stage. Other studies (e.g. Spotorno 
& Noveck, 2014) have emphasised the role of attitude ascription11, a feature of ToM, 
                                                          
11 In attitude ascriptions, people ascribe their opinion to a proposition (e.g. a fact, someone’s belief or view, 
etc.). For example, ‘Mary believes what Phil said’ or ‘Mary believes everything Phil believes’ are both examples 
of propositional attitude ascriptions (see McKay & Nelson, 2014). 
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in irony processing, claiming that the mixed results in the psycholinguistic literature 
as to whether irony processing is more taxing than literal processing could be 
connected to the different ToM skills displayed by speakers. What these studies 
propose is that irony processing can become quicker and more straightforward if the 
individual more effectively recruits ToM networks.   
In order to test whether ToM is implicated in the on-line processing of familiar 
ironies12 in PwS and controls, we included two ToM measures, the Perspective-taking 
task and the Hinting Task in the Principal Component Analysis carried out in this 
research (see Chapter 2). In addition, other cognitive functions (working memory, 
cognitive control and flexibility and facial emotion recognition) besides ToM were 




We hypothesised that irony processing in the patient group would display 
processing discrepancies in relation to the control group and that participants in the 
patient group would more often interpret ironies in an incorrect way. We also 
hypothesised that ToM variables would be implicated in the irony effect size extracted 
from the eye-tracking experiment and that variables related to the manipulation of 
different sources of on-line information in working memory would be implicated in 
the irony effect size for the control group, but not the patient group (Ivanko and 
                                                          
 
12 If patients had more difficulties in processing familiar ironies, not only unfamiliar ironies, which have been 
reported to be more tasking (see Filik et al., 2014), then they would have shown a more relevant discrepancy 
in relation to neurotypical controls. 
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Pexman, 2003). Finally, we hypothesized that effective irony processing involves the 
ability to juggle and use different sources of information input in working memory, 







 The same participants that took part in test battery 2 (see Chapter 2) were 
tested in the present experiment. 
 
4.3.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
 
We created 40 sentence fragments embedded in contexts that directed 
participants towards a literal, an ironic or a neutral interpretation of the irony and asked 
66 participants to assess them in terms of ironicalness (“Is the sentence ironic?”, with 
an explanation of what irony is), familiarity (“How familiar are you with the ironic 
expression?”) and comprehensibility (“How easy is it to understand the ironic 
sentence?”). Items were divided over three separate lists, with a comparable number 
of ironic and non-ironic fragments. Participants who took part in the pre-testing were 
between 18 and 28 years of age, were all native English speakers and did not 
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participate in the eye-tracking experiment.  
Thirty-three items (see Table 17, and Appendix C) with the highest ratings for 
irony (M = 0.90/1, SD = 0.16) were selected for the study. These items were also 
considered familiar (M = 5.62/7, SD = 0.77) and comprehensible (M = 0.86/1, SD = 
0.11). The neutral fragments were of the same length (M = 47.7 characters, SD = 7.50) 
as the ironic and literal fragments (M = 47.0, SD = 7.74). In the target region, neutral 
fragments had a different length (M = 5.8, SD = 2.04) from ironic and literal items (M 
= 4.9, SD =1.94). Ironic and literal target fragments were identical. 
 




Literal The giant Rottweiler was barking menacingly at the 
visitors. One of them said, “I’m scared of that enormous 
beast” and then the owner decided to give it a treat.   
 
Ironic The little chiwawa was barking menacingly at the 
visitors. One of them said, “I’m scared of that enormous 
beast” and then the owner decided to give it a treat. 
 
Neutral The little chiwawa was barking menacingly at the 
visitors. One of them said, “I hope it will stop yapping soon” 




4.4 Experiment 1: Eye-movements-while-reading task 
 
We recorded eye movements using the Eyelink 1000 system operating at 1000 
Hz (sampling every millisecond). Sentences were displayed on three to six equally 
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spaced lines. The experimenter gave all participants a description of the experimental 
procedure and asked them to silently read short texts on a computer screen for 
comprehension. There were 14 occasional comprehension questions randomly spread 
across the 33 items. Participants answered them by pressing the “YES” or “NO” button 
on a button box. All participants had their head and chin stabilised by a head/chin rest. 
The study was granted the approval of the ethics committee of the University of 
Birmingham. 
The items were divided over three lists, with an equal number of items per 
condition in each list so that each participant only read one version of each item. Each 
list was read by an equal number of participants in each group. The 33 items were 




Less than 2% of the items with tracker loss13 and items for which the preceding 
context was not processed attentively (i.e. evidence of skimming) were deleted from 
the analyses. No other cleaning operations were conducted. The two regions of interest 
were defined as follows: target (underlined) and spill-over (in italics): “The giant 
Rottweiler was barking menacingly at the visitors. One of them said, ‘I’m scared of 
that enormous beast’, and then the owner decided to give it a treat.” The spill-over 
region was defined as the first word following the target region if longer than three 
characters, otherwise the next two words. Because the target region for the neutral 
                                                          
13 Tracker loss here refers to situations where the camera loses track of the pupil (e.g. due to excessive head 
movement, occlusion of the eyelid, mascara, etc) 
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condition contained different words and expressions from the ironic and literal target, 
comparisons with this condition must be treated cautiously. We chose a long target 
region because the focus of the analysis was more on the global ironic, higher-order 
interpretation, rather than the fine-grained time course of irony. Additionally, previous 
research using a moving window paradigm (Ivanko and Pexman, 2003) had indicated 
that longer reading times in irony processing were found either in the end of the target 
(final word) or in the spillover or after the last word of an ironic sentence (Pexman, 
Ferretti, and Katz, 2000). Using eye-tracking, Filik and Moxey (2010) also found 
longer fixation times in later reading measures, such as total time. When testing 
written irony, Kaakinen, Olkoniemi, Kinnari & Hyőna (2014) found that the irony 
effect related to an increased probability of rereading and duration of first-pass 
rereading and probability of regressing into the target sentence, and, for this reason, 
we measured regressions into target and spillover.  
The eye movement results were analysed using a linear mixed effects model in 
R (R Core Team, 2016) and the package lme4, version 1.1-12 (Bates, Maechler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2015), checking for effects of Group, Condition and the interaction 
between both variables. The following reading measures were analysed: First Pass 
(i.e. the time to read the region of interest before leaving the region left or right), 
Regression Path (i.e. the time from first entering the region of interest until leaving 
that region to continue on in the text), Regressions In (i.e. the likelihood of making a 
regression into a region of interest from a region further in the text), and Total Time 
(the sum of all fixations in a region of interest).  
For the main analyses, we included random intercepts and random slopes (1 + 
condition/ppt) with both Condition and Group variables. Initially, we tried the 
maximally-appropriate random effects structure (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 
105 
 
2013), but due to non-convergence issues, we de-correlated the random effects 
structure for subjects and items. For the Regressions In measure, Condition was 
removed from the random effects structure due to non-convergence. The Regressions 
In data were analysed with generalized linear mixed effect models, using binomial 
regression (family=binomial, see details in Appendix C).14 
Main effects of Condition and Group, as well as the interaction between 
Condition and Group, were tested with model comparisons using the anova function. 
Comparisons for a main effect of Condition were carried out using sum coding. As 
we are mainly interested in the effect irony has on reading, we compared the Irony 
condition to the Literal condition and to the Neutral condition. The comparison with 
the Neutral condition needs to be treated cautiously as it involves comparing slightly 
different regions of interest. Interactions were examined using comparisons between 
the conditions for each group separately. 
 
4.4.2 Irony eye-movement experiment results & discussion 
 
4.4.2.1 Reading Time Analysis 
 
Average reading times for the different reading measures can be found in Table 
18. An overview of the analyses can be found in Table 19. 
 
                                                          
14 All the data were also analysed with ANOVAs, and the pattern of results was very similar to 





Table 18: Average reading times 
Measure 
 
 Target Region  Spill-over Region 
 Irony Literal Neutral Irony Literal Neutral 
First-Pass      
Patients 902 894 879 331 315 338 
Controls 891 834 876 332 297 292 
All 896 863 877 331 305 313 
       
Regression-Path      
Patients 1095 1091 1009 448 414 475 
Controls 983 919 945 408 332 350 
All 1036 1002 976 427 371 407 
       
Regressions In      
Patients 30 27 21 23 20 22 
Controls 19 14 15 22 17 20 
All 24 21 18 22 19 21 
       
Total Time      
Patients 1362 1188 1096 466 429 445 
Controls 1102 989 1025 406 353 354 
All 1226 1084 1059 434 389 396 





Table 19: Eye-movement analyses 
Measure Target region Spill-over region 
   
First Pass   
Condition χ2 = 3.89, p > .14 χ2 = 1.13, p > .56 
Group χ2 < 1 χ2 < 1 
Interaction χ2 < 1 χ2 < 1 
   
Regression Path   
Condition χ2 = 2.04, p > .36 χ2 = 1.48, p > .47 
Group χ2 < 1 χ2 = 1.17, p > .27 
Interaction χ2 = 3.30, p > .19 χ2 < 1 
   
Regressions In   
Condition χ2 = 6.74, p < .05 χ2 = 1.44, p > .39 
Irony vs. Literal E = 0.032, SE = 0.013, t = -2.34, p < .05  
Irony vs. Neutral E = 0.028, SE = 0.013, t = -2.10, p < .05  
Group χ2 = 8.90, p < .01 χ2 < 1 
Interaction χ2 = 1.91, p > .44 χ2 < 1 
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Total Time   
Condition χ2 = 7.35, p < .05 χ2 = 2.60, p > .27 
Irony vs. Literal E = 0.029, SE = 0.009, t = -3.17, p < .01  
Irony vs. Neutral E = 0.010, SE = 0.009, t = -1.13, p > .25  
Group χ2 = 2.17, p > .14 χ2 = 1.45, p > .22 
Interaction χ2 = 8.98, p < .05 χ2 < 1 
Patients   
Irony vs. Literal E = 0.041, SE = 0.014, t = -3.01, p < .01  
Irony vs. Neutral E = 0.028, SE = 0.014, t = -2.03, p < .05  
Controls   
Irony vs. Literal E = 0.017, SE = 0.012, t = -1.46, p > .14  
Irony vs. Neutral E = 0.006, SE = 0.012, t < 1  




We found a significant effect of condition in Regressions In and Total Time, 
with irony requiring significantly more regressions into the target region than literal 
constructions and neutrals and taking significantly longer to process than the other 
two conditions. A significant interaction was found for Total Time, with patients, but 
not controls, displaying significantly longer processing times when reading ironies in 
the target region when compared to literal constructions and neutrals. No effects were 
found for the spill-over region. 
The reading time analyses indicated that both groups found ironies more taxing 
than literal processing, and that this effect was restricted to later processing measures 
and mainly in the target region, the region where the actual ironic expression is 
located. We also found that patients made significantly more regressions into the 
target region than controls did. The longer processing times for the irony condition 
might reflect the extra effort spent on interpreting the irony (Filik & Moxey, 2010) or 
difficulties in making sense of the passages, and it might even be that groups differ in 
this respect. Since it is not possible to extract from the eye-movement data exactly 
how a participant interpreted the text, we carried out an off-line sentence interpretation 
task (Experiment 2, see below).  
Results are not completely in line with Filik et al. (2014), who found no 
difference in processing times between familiar ironies and non-ironic sentences. We 
did find an effect of condition in Regressions In and Total Time, with irony requiring 
significantly longer to process for both groups, neurotypical controls included. This 
result is in line, however, with Ţurcan & Filik’s (2016) eye-tracking experiment of 
sarcastic utterances. It should be noted that in accordance with Filik et al’s (2014) 
findings, we also found that the effect was restricted to the target region.  
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Our results are also in line with Au-Yeung, Kaakinen, Liversedge & Benson 
(2015) who found that irony processing was more taxing for both participants with 
ASD and neurotypical controls. They also found increased total reading times in 
various regions for participants with ASD compared with controls, even in non-ironic 
conditions. 
 
4.4.2.2 Irony effect correlations 
 
To estimate the additional effort that readers exhibited during irony 
interpretation, we subtracted the literal from the ironic processing time results for both 
groups in all eye-tracking measures. We labelled this processing difference as the 
“irony effect.” The difference scores were then used in the correlations with the factors 
extracted from the first PCA (see Chapter 2). Since we are interested in discovering 
how patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and controls might differ in their reliance 
on certain cognitive operations, we analysed the two groups separately. For patients, 
four correlations came out as borderline (see Table 20), while controls showed 
significant correlations between the irony effect size and four components of the PCA 














Region Measure Component Pearson score 





r = -.379 (p < .07) 
  Regressions In Hinting 
Comprehension 
 
r = -.370 (p = .07) 
  Regression Path Perspective-taking 
 
r = .359 (p < .08) 
  Regression Path Hinting 
Comprehension 









Region Measure Component Pearson score 
Controls Target Regressions In Facial Emotion 
Recognition 
 
r = .466* 
 
 Spill-over First Pass Perspective-
taking 
 
r = .649** 
  Regression Path Facial Emotion 
Recognition 
 
r = .444* 
  Regressions In Flexibility and 
Working 
Memory 
r = -.476* 





Most correlations between the irony effect and the cognitive measures appeared 
in the spill-over region, and none were found for the early reading measures in the 
target region. This, together with a lack of early effects in the target region in the 
reading data, suggests that interpreting an expression as ironic might not be resolved 
immediately upon encountering the ironic remark (Ţurcan & Filik, 2016; see also 
Staub, Grant, Clifton & Rayner, 2009, for an overview of delayed higher-order 
interpretations). 
The irony effect for the patient group displayed borderline correlations with 
Regressions In and Regression Path, both in the spill-over region. The borderline irony 
effect correlation for Regressions In and the Difficulties in Cognitive Control was 
negative, meaning that the more difficulties PwS reported in the Cognitive Control 
and in the Hinting Task (see Table 7), the fewer regressions they made into the spill-
over. This might suggest that the patients who find tasks involving cognitive control 
and indirect language (specifically hints) more difficult, are less likely to notice 
possible ironic interpretations and spend less time appreciating it. The irony effect for 
Regression Path in the spill-over region displayed a borderline positive correlation 
with the Perspective-taking Error component, meaning that patients who made more 
errors in the on-line perspective-taking task also showed a larger irony effect. In this 
case, failures to appreciate Self and Other perspectives can lead to longer irony 
processing times, maybe not due to actual appreciation of irony, but to difficulties in 
irony processing. 
Irony processing in controls was not linked with the Difficulties in Cognitive 
Control component, which was true at a borderline level in the patients’ data. Already 
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for one of the earliest measures immediately following the ironic expression (First 
Pass in the spill-over region, see Table 8) do we see the Hinting Comprehension 
component correlating with the size of the irony effect such that people who are better 
at understanding hints also display a larger irony effect. In addition, regressions into 
the target region, as well as the Regression Path measure for the spill-over region, 
were positively correlated with the Facial Emotion Recognition component, indicating 
that people who are better at recognizing other people’s facial emotions are more 
likely to make additional effort to process the ironic meaning. The fact that the Facial 
Emotion Recognition component appears correlated with the irony effect in the 
control group is in line with Spotorno et al.’s (2013) finding that attitude ascription 
and social skills can have a fine-tuning role in irony processing. Finally, correlations 
were also observed between the irony effect in the Total Time and Regressions In 
measures and the flexibility and working memory component, suggesting that controls 
who scored higher on this component also exhibited a larger irony effect. 
If we consider the control group, we see that the components related to 
perspective-taking and facial emotion recognition, as well as Flexibility and Working 
Memory are the most important processes related to irony processing. It should be 
noted that facial emotion recognition has previously been linked to ToM processing. 
For example, Sucksmith, Allison, Baron-Cohen, Chakrabarti, and Hoekstra (2013) 
found that adults with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) scored lower on a measure 
of empathy as well as on the KDEF measure. More specifically, the ASC group was 
worse at recognizing five out of six emotions expressed in the pictures used in this 
test, indicating that they struggled with understanding what other people might be 








The same participants who took part in the eye-tracking experiment participated 
in the Sentence Interpretation task. There was an average time gap of at least seven 
months between the eye-tracking and the Sentence Interpretation task. However, for 
this task, we had fewer participants (PwS 25, controls, 21), as some of the participants 




We used the same fragments as in the eye-tracking experiment, except that, in 
the sentence interpretation task, participants received a different list from the one they 
had received before. We did not include the neutral condition in this test due to time 
constraints. Participants who had seen an item in the ironic version would be presented 
with its literal version; participants who had seen either literal or neutral would now 









The experimenter read aloud all the fragments in the Sentence Interpretation 
task, one at a time. Participants expressed their individual interpretation of each 
fragment and communicated whether they made sense of them or not.  Fragments were 
also mixed in their two conditions, so that there would not be an expectation in regard 
to the fragments being ironic. The fragments were read to participants up to and 
including the target region, without the spill-over and the following context. One 




We hypothesised that patients would make more literality mistakes than controls 
when giving their interpretation of the ironic fragments. Literality mistakes comprise 
of answers indicating that the ironic fragment didn’t make any sense or that it was 
contradictory.  
 
4.5.5 Sentence Interpretation task results 
 
There were significant differences between patients and controls in irony 
processing: the patient group (M = 41.7% literality errors, SD = 31) made significantly 
more mistakes when processing ironic fragments compared to the control group (M = 
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12.7% literality errors, SD = 14; t(44) = 3.95, p < .001). This supports Langdon et al. 
(2002), as they found poorer irony comprehension among patients. Indeed, given that 
almost 42% of the ironic fragments, which nevertheless received high ironicalness 
ratings (M = 0.93/1.0) in the pre-testing, were incorrectly understood by patients, is 
quite remarkable (details in relation to participants’ percentage of mistakes in irony 
interpretation can be found in Appendix C). 
Results for the literal interpretations revealed that patients made significantly 
fewer mistakes when processing literal fragments when compared to ironic fragments 
(M = 4.4% errors in literal processing, SD = 7.64), t(24) = 5.773, p < .001. Controls 
displayed similar results in literal processing errors (M = 3.0% errors, SD = 6.25) when 
compared to patients. An independent samples t-test revealed no significant 
differences between the two groups in literal processing, (M = 3.53, SD = 13.44, t(44) 
= .772, p = .444). 
 
4.6 General Discussion 
 
The first finding to note is that processing of familiar ironic expressions did not 
lead to early processing differences compared to interpreting the same expressions 
literally. We did observe that processing ironies engendered extra effort in later 
reading measures. This finding is in line with evidence from eye movement 
experiments testing familiar sarcasm (Ţurcan & Filik, 2016) but not with the lack of 
an effect for familiar non-sarcastic ironies (Filik et al., 2014). One possible 
explanation for this delayed effect is that both the literal and ironic interpretations are 
retained (e.g. Giora, 1995; 1997) and the resulting conflict is resolved by contextual 
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integration, which is supposed to be more difficult for figurative expressions (Tartter 
et al., 2002; Turner & Katz, 1997).  
More pertinent for the present research is the finding that the irony effect 
extracted from the eye movement experiment pointed to facial emotion recognition, 
flexibility, working memory and ToM as the more relevant cognitive functions 
associated with irony processing. This result indicates a close relationship between 
mentalizing activations and irony processing (Spotorno et al., 2012; 2013). The 
observation that this already happened in a relatively early measure in the control 
group, such as First Pass, corroborates the idea that ToM network activations happen 
at an early stage of the irony reading (Spotorno et al., 2013).  
When considering the results obtained in the correlations between the irony 
effect and the principal components, we found that overall, considering both groups, 
a link between the on-line manipulation of complex and different information in 
working memory, cognitive control, flexibility and ToM skills appeared to be relevant 
in irony processing. 
It is remarkable that difficulties in perspective-taking and in cognitive control 
among PwS correlated with increased processing effort for ironic expressions, which 
suggests that these functions are relevant for successful irony processing. In essence, 
we found larger irony effects for patients that were better on these cognitive measures. 
This is in line with controls, who showed increased processing for ironies compared 
to literal expressions. Hence, we can speculate that better performance on these 
measures might lead to more effective, and more standard, irony processing. 
It is equally noteworthy that flexibility and working memory and ToM skills 
(Hinting Comprehension component) emerged as relevant functions for successful 
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irony processing in controls, and that these components did not emerge as influential 
for patients. This suggests a qualitative difference in irony processing between both 
groups, which means that patients might have interpreted ironies differently from 
controls, or maybe failed to interpret them at all. Indeed, results from the Sentence 
Interpretation Task confirm that even with unrestricted time to process the 
expressions, patients often did not arrive at the appropriate ironic interpretation. While 
patients did not differ from controls in understanding literal fragments, they perceived 
ironic fragments as non-sensical in almost 42% of the cases. Hence, it is quite clear 
that patients don’t seem to appreciate irony with a comparable level of accuracy as 
controls.  
It is important to keep in mind that the results of the on-line (eye-tracking) and 
off-line (sentence interpretation task) measures do not necessarily tap into the same 
processes and interpretations. For example, patients, when given ample time to 
interpret an expression, might start making a multitude of idiosyncratic associations, 
such that their final interpretation might be quite far removed from the actual 
information provided in the text. This process might take time, and might not be 
captured in the eye movement measures. One hypothesis following from this view is 
that patients and controls might start off similarly during initial processing, but that 
patients then go off on different tangents, which controls might be less likely to do. 
However, as patients do not seem to use the same cognitive functions during on-line 
processing as controls (see correlations with PCA), it might be that even at an early 
stage there are already important differences on how they approach information. In 
any case, what our research makes clear is that when testing on-line processing in 
PwS, one needs to include an off-line assessment as well in order to arrive at a clearer 
understanding of patients’ interpretations of text.  
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In conclusion, while the main eye movement analyses only indicated small 
differences in irony processing between controls and schizophrenic patients, analyses 
including relevant cognitive measures show that there were substantial discrepancies 
between the two groups. The results suggest that patients might often fail to recruit 
crucial cognitive functions such as working memory, flexibility of thought and ToM, 
making non-literal, ironic interpretation extremely challenging. However, there is 
some evidence that indicates that patients who are better at perspective-taking and 
cognitive control are more similar to controls, suggesting more successful irony 
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It has been reported that patients diagnosed with schizophrenia display deficits 
both in language processing (Kiang et al. 2008; Kuperberg, 2010a, 2010b; Langdom 
et al., 2002; Sela, Lavidor & Mitchell, 2015; Tavano et al., 2008) and language 
production (Kuperberg, 2010a, 2010b). Some of these deficits also involve figurative 
language processing, especially metaphor comprehension as measured by proverb 
interpretations (e.g. Don’t judge a book by its cover) in psychiatric scales, such as the 
the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), a scale designed to assess the 
severity of symptoms related to schizophrenia, including difficulty in abstract 
thinking, a symptom related to poor metaphor comprehension.  
Impairments in figurative language processing in schizophrenia have often been 
related to either deficits in executive functions (Hoff et al., 1999; Kuperberg, 2010a, 
2010b, Lee & Park, 2005) or in semantic and contextual integration (e.g. David, 
Kuperberg & McGuire, 1998; Kircher et al., 2007; Kuperberg, 2000; Langdon et al., 
2002; Sitnikova, Salisbury, Kuperberg & Holcomb, 2002; Titone, Levy, & Holzman, 
2000). In addition, poor social language skills (Tavano et al, 2008) and poor Theory 
of Mind (ToM) skills (Brűne & Bodenstein, 2005, Brűne, 2005) have also been related 
to poor figurative language interpretation in schizophrenia.  
However, there are different kinds of figurative and different kinds of non-literal 
expressions. For example, idioms such as kick the bucket share some similarities with 
proverbs but don’t incorporate advice or a truism and their meaning is unrelated to the 
meanings of their individual words. Research in idiom processing in schizophrenia 
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has reported mixed results, and it’s unclear whether patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia have an actual deficit in idiom processing. Some findings report that 
PwS only have difficulties in supressing the competing literal meanings, but not in 
understanding the non-literal meanings (Titone et al., 2002) while other findings 
report no differences in comprehension of idiomatic sentences between PwS and 
controls (Pesciarelli et al., 2014). Pesciarelli et al. (2014) and Schettino et al. (2010) 
related the inability to interpret idioms with poor verbal working memory and poor 
executive functions. 
As for metaphor processing in schizophrenia, Mitchell and Crow (2005) and 
Elvevag et al. (2011) demonstrated that PwS tend to interpret metaphors literally, 
although familiarity in some studies appeared to play a role, with conventionalized 
metaphors being reported as easier to be processed by PwS in comparison to novel 
metaphors (De Grauve et al., 2010). However, in a study using fMRI, Mashal, Vishne, 
Laor and Titone (2013) reported contradictory findings, with a poorer comprehension 
of both novel and conventional metaphors found in patients with schizophrenia when 
compared to neurotypical controls. This study also highlighted that poorer abstract 
thinking as measured in the PANSS was correlated with diminished conventional 
metaphor understanding and the authors speculated that an increased BOLD response 
in the left medial frontal gyrus indicated an additional recruitment of cognitive 
resources, such as working memory. Results of impaired conventional and novel 
metaphor processing in PwS were replicated by Mossaheb et al. (2014), who also 
reported that performance in a conventional metaphor paraphrasing and novel 
metaphor generation task was predicted by the severity of negative symptoms, with 
patients exhibiting more negative symptoms scoring more poorly on these tasks. 
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Mo, Su, Chan and Liu (2008) found impaired metaphor comprehension in 
patients diagnosed with schizophrenia which IQ (the WAIS-R was used to compare 
control and patient group) did not explain. This study also reported a correlation 
between metaphor comprehension and second-order false belief understanding, which 
had been previously connected in literature with irony processing (Happé, 1993,1995; 
Langdon, Coultheart & Ward., 2002b; Langdon, Davies & Coultheart, 2002a). As for 
executive function impairments in schizophrenia, studies by Hoff et al. (1999), 
Kuperberg (2010a; 2010b) and Lee and Park (2005) corroborated the hypothesis that 
not only Theory of Mind, but also executive function deficits are present in the 
disorder, with Kuperberg (2010a; 2010b) arguing that poor working memory skills 
could diminish contextual construction and contextual information use. 
David, Kuperberg and McGuire (2000) and Kuperberg (2000) reported that 
violations of the semantic context were not spotted by PwS who presented thought 
disorder. In general, severity of thought disorder has been linked to poor cognitive 
performance in tasks involving executive functioning (Kerns & Berenbaum, 2002; 
Kuperberg, 2010a; 2010b), although thought disorder is not a requirement for deficits 
in online contextual language processing and use (Kuperberg, McGuire, & David, 
2000). Despite the fact that the ability to use contextual information has been reported 
as impaired in schizophrenia (Kuperberg, 2010a, 2010b), a few studies highlighted 
the positive impact of context familiarity (Ditman & Kuperberg, 2010; Sitnikova, 
Perrone, Goff & Kuperberg, 2010), suggesting that more familiar contexts were easier 





5.1.1 Theories of Metaphor Comprehension 
  
Quite a few models of metaphor comprehension have been proposed over the 
past decades. One of the first models claimed that metaphor interpretation included 
steps (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979), with listeners/readers rejecting the literal meaning 
and finding a figurative interpretation that is context-appropriate. In this view, literal 
interpretations would take precedence over the metaphoric ones and metaphors should 
always take longer to process than literal statements. A second model claimed that 
metaphor perception was optional when the literal meaning made sense (Glucksberg, 
Gildea, & Bookin, 1982; Keysar, 1989). This means that in the absence of a triggering 
inappropriate literal interpretation, metaphoric interpretation would be a matter of 
choice to the listener/reader. A third model proposed that when the unfitness to the 
context presented by the metaphor is recognised, the expression will be transformed 
into an implicit simile, i.e. an indirect comparison (Ortony, 1979b). Hence, metaphors 
such as “My job is a jail” would be interpreted as “My job is like a jail.” 
Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) criticised these previous metaphor 
comprehension theories by pointing out that if metaphors were simply indirect 
comparisons, reversing the metaphoric comparison would not make it hard to 
understand or change its meaning completely. However, that was not the case when 
metaphors such as “The surgeon is a butcher” (the surgeon is unskilled) were inverted 
to “The butcher is a surgeon” (the butcher is very skilled and precise), where meanings 
are completely different. They propose that metaphors such as “My job is a jail” or 
“The surgeon is a butcher” are class inclusion assertions, where features of “job” or 
“surgeon” are compared with features of “jail” or “butcher”, not actual implicit 
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comparisons. Hence, metaphors are processed in similar ways to literal class inclusion 
statements (such as “The jail is a building”). A word such as “jail” can refer to 
different superordinate categories (e.g. a building, types of punishment, but also 
situations that might be unpleasant). During metaphor comprehension, the topic (job) 
will select the relevant features from the vehicle (jail), in this case the unnamed 
category of unpleasant situations, and interpretation then becomes straightforward.  
Later on, Gibbs (1994) proposed a “direct access” view to metaphor 
comprehension, which claims that metaphors are processed as straightforwardly as 
literals. In this view, contextual processes would come into play immediately, so that 
one can access or construct the metaphoric interpretation without additional cost. 
Another version of the direct access view is the “constraint-based satisfaction model,” 
which argues that metaphoric comprehension is achieved if contextual constraints are 
more compelling than lexical ones (Katz & Ferretti, 2001; Pexman, Ferretti, & Katz, 
2000). In this view, just like in the direct access view, metaphors would be processed 
straightforwardly because contextual and lexical meanings would be equally available 
to listeners, with one winning over the other according to how compelling or 
constraining contextual clues are made available to the listener/reader.  
The graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 1999, 2003; Peleg, Giora & Fein, 
2001, see Chapter 4) also applies to metaphor processing, assuming that there are two 
separate mechanisms of metaphor processing, one responsible for lexical processing 
and the other responsible for linguistic and extra-linguistic processing, both running 
in parallel. The mechanism responsible for contextual integration is thought to be 
sensitive to salience (e.g. frequency, conventionality, prototypicality). Salient 
meanings are encoded in one’s mental lexicon, but the degree of saliency can vary 
over time and situation. It is thought that when an interpretation is very salient, 
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whether it is literal or figurative, no processing cost will ensue. There are several 
instances where figurative language, metaphors included, can be understood as 
quickly as literal speech, especially when these expressions are encountered in rich 
linguistic contexts (Gibbs, 1994; 2002), where enough contextual information for the 
listener or reader is provided. 
One common ground shared by all theories is that metaphoric comprehension 
requires both linguistic and non-linguistic inference. In addition, the literature has 
highlighted that mentalising skills may be required when processing some forms of 
figurative language, especially irony (Happé, 1993). It has also been observed that 
metaphor comprehension, unlike irony comprehension, would not require a listener’s 
understanding of a speaker’s judgment of a specific situation, but only the meaning 
conveyed in the figurative expression, consequently, irony comprehension would 
require a step further in mentalising skills when compared to metaphor comprehension 
(Happé, 1993, 1995; Langdon et al., 2002a, b). One aim of the present study is to 
examine how Theory of Mind and mentalising skills intermingle with metaphor 
comprehension, if at all. The role of other cognitive skills involved in metaphor 
comprehension will also be explored. 
For the metaphor study in this thesis, following the same procedure adopted in 
the irony study, we will present an eye-movement experiment, as well as an off-line 
sentence interpretation task, where participants are required to verbally communicate 
their interpretation of metaphoric sentences. In the eye-movement experiment, we 
expect PwS, not controls, to display more difficulty in metaphor interpretation 
compared with literal items. This could be translated by more regressions into the 
target region. We also expect all participants, not only controls, to be able to display 
a nonsensicality effect, which would be translated by significantly longer processing 
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times in the nonsensical condition. In the off-line experiment, we expect PwS to make 
significantly more mistakes in metaphor comprehension when compared to controls. 
 
5.2  Method 
 
5.2.1. Stimuli Pre-Testing 
 
We created 48 items (see Table 19 for an example and Appendix D for the full 
list of items) with lexicalised and novel metaphors and had 66 native English speakers 
assess them, together with 11 non-sensical distractors. Items were divided in three 
separate lists, with an equal number of conventional and novel metaphors.  
Participants who took part in the pre-testing were between 18 and 28 years of 
age and they came from the University of Birmingham undergraduate population and 
from an international school in London (Southbank International School) where only 
native speakers of English were selected. Every participant had to assess whether the 
sentences made sense or not (binary choice), whether they were easy to understand or 
not (scale from 1 to 7), whether they were literal15 or not, and whether they sounded 
familiar to them or not (scale from 1 to 7). The sentences differed in relation to three 
conditions: metaphorical, literal and nonsensical (see a detailed explanation for this 
condition below).  
In addition, to control for predictability in the sentences, we administered a 
                                                          
15 The definition of “literal” was appropriately provided on the instructions sheet with clear 
examples. A copy of the task is included in the Appendix.  
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sentence completion task to the same 66 participants. The predictability completion 
pre-test was given to participants prior to the sensicality, ease of understanding, 
figurativeness and familiarity tests. Participants had to complete the sentence 
fragments with the first word or words that came to their minds. By administering this 
task, we could assess whether participants would use the same word(s) or similar ones 
used in the metaphorical, literal and non-sensical sentences. We avoided as much as 
possible target words in our stimuli that had been used by the participants in this pre-
test. The predictability of the target words selected was therefore very low (metaphors: 
< 1%, literal and nonsensical: 0%). The target words were identical in the three 
conditions. The words used in topic position were controlled for log-frequency (using 
N-Watch; Davis, 2005: metaphor: 1.63, literal: 1.41, nonsensical: 1.46: p > .25), and 
length in number of characters (metaphor: 6.9, literal: 6.8, nonsensical: 6.7: F < 1). 
For the 33 selected stimuli, a paired-samples t-test revealed that the sensicality 
ratings did not differ between metaphoric (M = .90, SD = .17) and literal expressions 
(M =.96, SD = .06); t(32) = 1.66, p > .10. The nonsensical expressions were indeed 
rated as significantly less sensical (M = .34, SD = .26; ps < .001). Hence, the metaphors 
and literal expressions made equal sense to participants. However, as for ease of 
understanding, there was a significant difference in the scores between metaphors (M 
= 5.55, SD = .98) and literals (M = 6.21, SD = .62); t(32) = 3.07, p < .01, meaning that 
metaphors were judged to be more difficult to understand than literal expressions. 
Nevertheless, the average suggests that, overall, the metaphors’ ease of understanding 
was still quite high. In contrast, nonsensical expressions were judged to be 
significantly more difficult to understand (M = 2.88, SD = 1.03). 
We also checked the familiarity of the expressions. The metaphors were 
considered as familiar as their literal counterparts (metaphor: M = 5.14, SD = 1.14, 
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literal: M = 5.24, SD = .92), t < 1. The nonsensical expressions were judged to be rather 
unfamiliar, as expected (M = 2.16, SD = .91). 
Hence, the nonsensical items we created were really considered nonsensical in 
the pre-testing. Non-sensical items were included in the pre-testing and in the actual 
testing because we wanted to check whether PwS would be able to recognise semantic 
violations in the sentences, which was reported to be deficient by Kuperberg (2000) in 
patients displaying thought disturbance. The tables with the results from all three 
conditions (metaphorical, literal and nonsensical) are included in Appendix D.  
 
Table 22 – Metaphor experiment examples 
Condition Example 
Metaphor Jacqueline claims that her life is a fashion show and that she will enjoy it. 
Literal Jacqueline claims that her event is a fashion show and that she will enjoy it. 





 The same participants that took part in test batteries 1 and 2 described in Chapter 





5.2.3. Procedure  
 
The experimenter gave all participants a description of the experimental 
procedure and informed them that they would be reading short texts on a computer 
screen. The experimenter made it clear to participants that they were not supposed to 
read the fragments aloud and that they had to answer occasional comprehension 
questions using the joystick and pressing the “YES” or “NO” button. All participants 
had their head and chin stabilised by a head/chin rest. The study was approved by the 
ethics committee of the University of Birmingham. 
 
5.3 Experiment 1: Eye-movements while reading task 
 
We recorded eye movements with the Eyelink 1000 system operating at 1000 
Hz (sampling every millisecond). Sentences were displayed between two and four 
equally spaced lines. We analysed the same reading measures as in the irony 




Less than 2% of the items with tracker loss16 and items for which the preceding 
                                                          
16 Tracker loss here, like for the Irony Experiment, refers to camera losing track of the pupil (e.g. due to 
excessive head movement, occlusion of the eyelid, participant wearing mascara, etc) 
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context was not processed attentively (i.e. evidence of skimming) were deleted from 
the analyses. The two regions of interest are exemplified as follows: target (underlined) 
and spill-over (in italics): “Jacqueline claims that her life is a fashion show and that…” 
The spill-over region was defined as the first word following the target region if longer 
than three characters, otherwise the next two words. 
Similarly to the irony eye-tracking experiment (see Chapter 4), we analysed the 
results using a linear mixed effects model in R (R Core Team, 2016) and the package 
lme4, version 1.1-12 (Bates et al., 2015). Like in the irony analysis, effects of Group, 
Condition and interaction were observed. The same reading fixation measures 
observed for the irony experiment analysis (see Chapter 4) were observed for the 
metaphor experiment analysis.  
Following the same procedure used for the irony eye-tracking experiment data 
analysis, we included random intercepts and random slopes with the Condition 
variable. Like what happened in the irony experiment, we had non-convergence issues 
and we had to de-correlate the random effects structure for subjects. The random 
effects structure did not include Condition for the Regressions Into the regions of 
interest because it caused non-convergence. Like in the irony experiment analysis, we 
used a generalized linear mixed effect models, using binomial regression 
(family=binomial, see Appendix D) to analyse the Regressions In data. 
We used the Anova function to test for effects of Condition and Group, as well 
as the interaction between Condition and Group. We also used sum coding for 
comparisons related to the effect of Condition. Since we were interested in 
investigating the effect metaphor has on reading, we compared the Metaphor condition 
to the Literal condition and to the Nonsensical condition. Interactions and Condition 
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effects were examined further using comparisons between the conditions for each 
group separately. However, to find out exactly how each group processed the 
conditions, we ran mean comparisons between literal and metaphors, literal and 
nonsensical items for each group separately, even when the interaction was not 
significant.  
 
5.3.2. Metaphor eye-movement experiment results 
 
Average reading times for the different reading measures can be found in Table 
23. An overview of the analyses can be found in Table 24. 
 
Table 23 – Reading Times – Target and spill-over regions  
 Target region Spill-over region 
 All Patients Controls All Patients Controls 
First Pass       
Metaphor 443 (223) 425 (190) 464 (260) 343 (128) 356 (149) 327 (100) 
Literal 416 (162) 420 (169) 412 (158) 354 (127) 374 (139) 331 (112) 
Nonsense 452 (162) 458 (166) 445 (161) 360 (134) 380 (165) 338 (83) 
       
Regression Path       
Metaphor 678 (400) 760 (440) 582 (329) 486 (254) 501 (323) 469 (141) 
Literal 645 (263) 711 (303) 570 (189) 449 (223) 507 (261) 382 (150) 
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Nonsense 758 (370) 853 (445) 646 (220) 589 (232) 604 (237) 572 (228) 
       
Regressions In       
Metaphor .20 (.16) .19 (.17) .21 (.16) .26 (.17) .27 (.18) .24 (.16) 
Literal .20 (.18) .27 (.20) .13 (.13) .26 (.18) .30 (.20) .21 (.14) 
Nonsense .22 (.16) .25 (.16) .20 (.16) .29 (.19) .30 (.20) .28 (.17) 
       
Total Time       
Metaphor 734 (446) 790 (501) 669 (370) 519 (220) 551 (265) 480 (146) 
Literal 674 (334) 730 (397) 609 (230) 505 (225) 552 (268) 449 (148) 
Nonsense 825 (333) 865 (362) 777 (295) 594 (261) 613 (301) 571 (209) 




Table 24: Eye-movement analyses - Metaphor 
 Target Spillover 
 χ2 α χ2 α 
First Pass     
Condition 3.93      > .14     2.83 > .24 
Group 2.54 > .11 6.96 < .01 
Interaction < 1  < 1  
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Literal vs. Metaphor      
Patients t < 1  t = 1.07 p > .28 
Controls t < 1  t < 1  
Regression Path     
Condition 13.10 < .01 11.43 <.01 
Literal vs. Metaphor  t < 1  t = 1.15 p > .25 
Literal vs. Nonsense t = 3.04 p < .01 t = 4.29 p < .001 
Group 4.02 < .05 1.41 > .23 
Interaction 1.44 > .48 2.82 > .24 
Literal vs. Metaphor      
Patients  t < 1  t = 1.28 p = .20 
Controls t < 1  t < 1  
Literal vs. Nonsense     
Patients t = 2.40 < .05 t = 2.35 p < .05 
Controls 
 
t = 1.90 p < .06 t = 4.05 p < .001 
Regressions In     
Condition 1.13 > .56 1.77 > .41 
Group 1.46 > .22 < 1  
Interaction 10.05 < .01 2.25 > .32 
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Literal vs. Metaphor 
Patients 
t = 2.01 p < .05 t < 1  
Literal vs. Metaphor 
- Controls 
t = 1.55 p > .12 t < 1  
Literal vs. Nonsense - 
Patients 
t < 1  t < 1  
Literal vs. Nonsense - 
Controls 
t < 1  t = 1.48 p > .14 
Total Time     
Condition 
     Group 












Literal vs. Metaphor      
Patients t < 1  t < 1  
Controls t < 1  t = 1.08 p > .27 
Literal vs. Nonsense     
Patients t = 2.31 p < .05 t = 1.89 p < .06 







5.3.2.1. Target Region 
 
We did not find a significant effect of Condition, Group or an interaction in First 
Pass. For the Regression Path measure, there was an effect of Condition with 
nonsensical items taking significantly longer and being more taxing to be processed 
than literal sentences. The planned comparisons for each group separately indicated 
that the same pattern was found for both PwS and controls. There was also a main 
effect of Group, with PwS taking longer to read than controls.  
For the Regressions In measure, we found a significant interaction, with PwS 
making significantly more regressions into the target when processing metaphors 
compared to literal items, which was not found for the control group. In Total Time, 
we found a significant effect of Condition, with nonsensical items taking significantly 
longer to be processed compared to literals. This effect was true for both groups, 
patients and controls, although controls showed a much more robust effect than 
patients in this measure. In conclusion, we can say that, in general, nonsensical items 
required significantly longer processing times in the target region when compared to 
literals. This means that for both groups a nonsensicality effect was present. For 
patients, we also found a higher number of regressions for the metaphor condition 
when compared to the literal condition. The fact that the nonsensicality effect was 
present not only for controls, but also for patients might be an indication that thought 
disturbance was not perhaps a major symptom present in the patient group as 
otherwise we would not have expected a difference between the literal or metaphor 
and nonsensical conditions (see David, Kuperberg & McGuire, 1998; Kuperberg, 
2000). In addition, the fact that PwS made significantly more regressions into the 
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target when processing metaphors when compared to literal items might suggest that 
they were trying to make sense of the figurativeness expressed by the metaphor in the 
target region. 
Summarising, the results displayed in Table 22 confirm the hypothesis that PwS 
make significantly more regressions into the target region when compared to controls, 
they also hightlight that nonsensicality required longer processing times from all 
participants, as we expected, considering that the patients who took part in this study 
had been on second-generation anti-psychotic medication for more than ten years and 
were stabilised. 
  
5.3.2.2 Spill-over Region 
 
We found a significant effect of Group in First Pass, with PwS taking longer to 
read than controls. We found a significant effect of Condition for the Regression Path 
measure, due to nonsensical items engendering longer fixation times. The same 
pattern was found for Total Time. The planned comparisons for both measures 
indicated that the nonsense effect was more robust for controls than for PwS, with 
only a borderline significant effect for PwS in Total Time. This might suggest that 
patients had difficulties processing not only nonsensical items, but literal items as 
well, which was not true for the control group.  
In general, results did not indicate a significant difference for metaphor 
processing in relation to literal processing, though it is important to point out that the 
metaphoric expressions were rated as quite well established (5.1/7). Patients displayed 
a tendency to be slower than controls in all conditions, metaphors, literals and 
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nonsense. By and large, the pattern was comparable for both groups except that PwS 
showed in their regression data that the metaphors were less easily processed than the 
literal expressions, and that the difference in fixation durations (Regression Path and 
Total Time) between literal and nonsensical items was somewhat less than one would 
expect based on the control data. 
 
5.3.3. Metaphor Effect Correlations 
 
The “metaphor effect” is calculated by subtracting the literal processing times 
from the metaphor processing times. It is in fact a numerical expression of the effort 
participants made while reading the metaphors used in the study in comparison to 
literals. We processed these values in a correlation with the components extracted 
from the PCA analysis (see Chapter 2). Judging from the eye-movement while reading 
results, we suspected that the cognitive skills employed by PwS and controls might 
differ. For this reason, we decided to analyse each group separately. Results of the 
metaphor effect correlations can be found in Table 25. 
 
Table 25: Metaphor effect correlations with components extracted from PCA 
 Region Measure Component Pearson score 
Controls Spill-over Regression Path Flexibility and Working Memory r = -.572** 




The metaphor effect for the patient group did not correlate with any component 
extracted from the PCA analysis. For controls, we found a negative correlation 
between C1 (Flexibility and Working Memory) and the metaphor effect for 
Regression Path in the spill-over region. This suggests that controls who showed 
greater flexibility and a more effective working memory displayed a smaller metaphor 
effect. This result makes sense, as participants with better flexibility and working 
memory would process metaphors more straightforwardly. The result also suggests 
that metaphor interpretation might not happen during the early reading stages and 
might not be resolved immediately upon encountering the target, spilling over to 
subsequent material, especially when cognitive flexibility and working memory 
functions are less efficient. 
The metaphor effect correlation results do not support the view that PwS process 
metaphors in the same way as neurotypical controls (Bonis, Epelbaum, Deffez & 
Feline, 1997; Iakimova, Passerieux, Laurent and Hardy-Bayle, 2005). Rather, patients 
do not seem to use flexibility and working memory in the same way as controls, which 
we believe to be a novel finding. 
 
5.3.4. Metaphor Eye-movement Results Discussion 
 
The eye-tracking results suggested that the processing of the metaphors, 
compared to literal expressions, did not result in substantial processing costs, though 
the Regressions In results for the PwS did indicate some extra effort was needed to 
interpret metaphors. Both groups presented a significant nonsense effect, with controls 
displaying a much more robust effect than patients in the later eye movement 
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measures. Further examination using PCA component values indicated a qualitative 
difference between groups, with patients not using certain cognitive functions such as 
flexibility and working memory in the same way as controls when resolving 
metaphoric expressions. Since controls showed a significant correlation with the 
Flexibility and Working Memory component, we can speculate that cognitive 
flexibility and working memory are relevant cognitive functions for metaphor 
processing.  
The fact that cognitive functions such as cognitive flexibility and working 
memory are recruited during later stages of reading and not in the target region, might 
be an indication that metaphors may not always be processed immediately and/or 
straightforwardly. When looking at the results of the control group, we did not find 
any statistically significant differences between literal and metaphoric expressions. 
This runs counter the predictions from the standard pragmatic view, which predicts 
that metaphors should always take longer than literal expressions. These results could 
be reconciled with the direct access view, though the correlational data might help 
refine this view as they suggest that individual differences with respect to flexibility 
and working memory can impact how difficult it is to attain a metaphoric 
interpretation. The results could also be explained according to the graded salience 
view, though only when assuming that the items used were indeed quite familiar to 
the readers. 
Finally, we can say that the eye-tracking results revealed that overall, patients 
displayed increased processing times for all conditions when compared to controls. 
However, as far as eye movement results are concerned, we cannot say that the 
patterns presented by both groups were vastly dissimilar. Both patients and controls 
displayed a clear nonsense effect, though literal processing was not quite the same in 
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the patient group, as the discrepancy in processing times between literal and 
nonsensical items was much larger among neurotypical controls. Taken together, the 
eye-tracking results and the correlational analyses revealed small, but relevant 
differences in how patients and controls processed the different expressions on-line. 
However, on-line results do not allow us to infer whether patients and controls 
ultimately arrived at the same interpretation or not, which we investigated in a second 
experiment using a sentence interpretation task.  
 
5.4 Experiment 2: Sentence Interpretation Task  
 
We decided to run a second behavioural experiment because, although the eye-
tracking was very useful at pointing out differences in reading patterns across 
conditions, it could not really tell us how patients were interpreting the sentences they 
read and whether the sentences in the different conditions (literal, metaphorical, or 
nonsensical form) made sense to them or not. The behavioural task we designed aimed 
at clarifying patients’ ultimate interpretation of the sentences. It is possible that a 
difference between on-line and off-line interpretations may appear, as, in an off-line 
task, participants have more time to reflect and come up with different meaning 
possibilities, which in the case of the PwS, might include lots of extraneous 








 The same participants who took part in the eye-tracking experiment participated 
in the Sentence Interpretation task. A time gap of at least seven months between 
experiments was imposed. However, for the Sentence Interpretation task, we had 
fewer participants (PwS 25, controls, 21), as some of the participants who took part in 
eye-movement experiment had moved outside England.  
 
5.4.2 Stimuli  
 
We used the same stimuli as in the eye-tracking experiment, but this time 
participants were given a different list from the one they had received in the first 
experiment, which means that they did not have to interpret the sentence in the same 
condition from the first experiment.  For example, if they had read a specific sentence 
containing a metaphor in the eye-tracking experiment, then they would have to 





 Sentences were read aloud, one at a time, giving participants time to express 
their individual interpretation of each stimulus. We also asked participants to say 
whether each sentence made sense to them or not and give their interpretation to 
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it. The sentences used in this experiment were the same sentences used in the eye-
tracking experiment, however, participants were given a different list from the one 
they had read before, so they had to interpret different sentences from the ones 
they had seen during the eye-tracking experiment. The sentences presented were 
cut short after the target region: “Laura affirmed that the detective was a pig”; 
“We heard that Joe’s surgeon is a butcher”. There was a time gap of at least seven 




We hypothesised that patients would make literality and concreteness 
mistakes (Iakimova et al., 2005) when giving their interpretation of the 
metaphorical sentences. Literality mistakes would be mistakes such as “It’s 
common place nowadays that adults are to be in touch with their inner child” for 
the interpretation of “It’s obvious that some adults are babies” or “He’s got enough 
legs to keep the balls out” for the interpretation of “Luckily, the goalkeeper was a 
centipede.” In these cases, the expression is interpreted in its primary (literal) 
meaning. A concreteness mistake would be “They’ve been having fun together” 
for “Apparently the love affair is a rollercoaster” (all these examples were 
extracted from participants’ own answers). In these cases, patients expressed a 







5.4.5 Sentence Interpretation Task Results 
 
Table 24 provides an overview of patients’ performance in the sentence 
interpretation task. Paired samples t-tests revealed significant differences between the 
percentage of number of mistakes in the metaphor and literal conditions, t(24) = 2.67, 
p < .05, with more mistakes in the metaphorical sentence interpretation. Also, we 
found significant differences between the literal and nonsensical conditions, t(24) = 
2.13, p < .05, with more mistakes against the nonsensical sentences. We did not find 
significant differences in the percentage of number of mistakes between the 
metaphorical and the nonsensical conditions, t(24) < 1. It should be noted though that 
there was a lot of variance in the number of errors made amongst patients (see 
Appendix D), with some of them making eight mistakes in metaphor processing out 
of 11 items and others 0 mistakes. In summary, patients made more mistakes when 
interpreting metaphors than when interpreting literal items, but nonsensical sentences 
were also a source of mistakes. Mistakes in nonsensical sentences could be due to 
patients failing to inhibit irrelevant activations to the context of the passage. Some of 
these mistakes included, for the nonsensical item, “Sam is convinced that the chair is 
a stage”: “Chair head of an organisation. He could be on show all the time with other 
people”; for the nonsensical item, “We heard that Joe’s teacher is a butcher”: “I think 
of my cousin. Surprised that he had a teacher that was a butcher” or expanding the 
context to unrealistic proportions: e.g. for the nonsensical item, “It’s obvious that his 
spoon was his compass”: “He used the spoon as a compass.”  
From the results obtained in the Sentence Interpretation task, we can surmise 
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that the nonsensical effect found in the eye-tracking experiment for patients cannot be 
entirely due to patients taking their time to recognise the nonsensicality of the 
sentences. Perhaps, patients also took longer to process nonsensical items when 
compared to other conditions in the eye-tracking experiment because they were 
building up on the sentence context and not inhibiting irrelevant activations properly. 
The results obtained for nonsensical processing in the eye-tracking experiment is 
likely not entirely due to a proper nonsense effect, but partially to generating extra 
(idiosyncratic) context or a lack of control of irrelevant activations to the context of 
the passage. 
 
Table 26: Percentage of errors in the sentence interpretation task – patient and control group 
 
Literal expressions Metaphoric expressions Nonsensical expressions 
Patients 22.7 (15.1) 39.2 (28.2) 33.6 (24.1) 
Controls 5.5 (9.8) 15.5 (22.4) 21.2 (16.0) 
Note: standard deviations in brackets. 
 
Table 26 also contains the results for the control participants. Control 
participants made significantly more errors against metaphorical expressions than 
literal expressions, t(20) = 2.19, p < .050, and more errors against literal than 
nonsensical expressions, t(20) = 3.97, p < .001. The comparison between metaphorical 
and nonsensical sentences was not significant (t < 1). Compared to patients, controls 
made fewer errors in all conditions, metaphors, t(44) = 3.11, p <.01; literals, t(44) = 
17.16, p =.001 and nonsensical items, t(44) = 12.36, p <.05.  
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Numerically speaking, although both groups displayed significant differences 
between literal and nonsensical items processing, the difference was larger for the 
controls (about 4x more errors against nonsensical items) than for the patients (only 
about 1.5x more errors). This suggests that both literal and nonsensical processing was 
challenging for patients, while literal interpretation seems straightforward for 
controls. Interestingly, the finding that controls displayed a much more striking 
difference between these two conditions was also apparent in the eye-movement 
analysis. 
 One unexpected finding was that controls relatively often made errors against 
the metaphorical interpretation while these same sentences were judged as acceptable 
by the participants in the pre-test. It might be that the undergraduate population who 
participated in the pre-test had a somewhat different tolerance for the metaphorical 
expressions used or were generally better at text comprehension. Participants who 
took part in the interpretation study were not students and had finished school some 
time ago, which perhaps could have made an impact on metaphor interpretation 
accuracy. 
To further examine the hypothesis that comprehension skills are linked to 
metaphor interpretation accuracy, we looked for differences in the GSRT results 
between control participants who made the smallest percentage of mistakes (M = 0) 
in metaphor processing (N = 8) to another group of controls who made the largest 
percentage of mistakes (M = 50.4; N = 5) in metaphor interpretation. There was indeed 
a tendency for better comprehenders to make fewer mistakes, though, likely due to the 
small numbers in the comparison, this did not reach full significance (t (11) = 1.88, p 
< .09). Correlations results between best GSRT results and mistakes in metaphor 
processing did not reach significance either (r = .409, p > .313). 
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As for the quality of the answers in the sentence interpretation task, mistakes 
while interpreting metaphor and nonsensical items differed between groups. When 
making mistakes against metaphor sentences, controls very often said: “Doesn’t make 
sense.” Patients, on the other hand, would often either give it a literal, concrete or a 
nonsensical meaning, such as for It seemed that their family was a mighty fortress: 
“They may be talking about animals or their appearance”; for It is well known that the 
politician is an actor: “He isn’t himself”; for The goalkeeper was a centipede: “He 
had many hands, like a centipede, 100 legs”; and for The world is a stage: “The stage 
is there for anyone to step and perform”. In these cases, the hypothesis that patients 
would make literality or concreteness mistakes when interpreting metaphors was 
confirmed. 
As for mistakes against nonsensical sentences, we found that controls 
sometimes tried to make sense by using semantic connections that were not acceptable 
to communicate any reasonable or meaningful information. These interpretations were 
metaphoric interpretations of the nonsensical expression. Examples of these 
interpretations were: for Apparently, the cups were fireflies: “Someone could have 
thrown plastic cups out of the window and they looked like fireflies”; for Tim claims 
that his connection is a rat race:  “He’s trying to get through to someone and he’s not 
being successful”; for Fiona claims that dampness is a virus: “It spreads, could make 
sense because viruses spread too”. Controls also interpreted nonsensical items 
literally, for Jim said that the machine is a ladder: “There is a machine and the 
mechanism was a ladder”; for Apparently, Joan’s fork was a mask: “It was covered in 
food. So, it’s got a mask on it.” 
When making mistakes in nonsensical items processing, patients also gave 
literal interpretations of the nonsense, but sometimes the semantic connections were 
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not very logical. Examples of such cases are: Sam is convinced that the chair is a 
stage: “Chair, head of an organisation. He could be on show all the time with other 
people”; According to Rachel, the glass is a snake: “Doesn’t make sense. Religious 
thing perhaps. Alcohol could have sexual connotations for a woman”. Patients also 
gave metaphorical interpretations to nonsensical items: Ricardo thinks his new 
chapter is a toy: “In a sense that he finds it very easy and he’s toying with its ideas”; 
for It’s indeed the case that some machines are sharks, “Kind of makes sense as sharks 
are unpredictable and dangerous”; for Jacqueline claims that her train is a fashion 
show: “True statements. Sometimes women go on the train dressed up to compete 
with other women”. Literal interpretation mistakes often referred to patients 
considering the literal sentence as nonsensical, such as for Luckily, the insect was a 
centipede: “Doesn’t make sense” or metaphorically, for Apparently, the attraction is 
a rollercoaster: “When couples get together, their relationships can be precarious even 
when they are attracted to one another”. We can say that, when making mistakes, 
controls presented more logical interpretations of the sentences. Patients’ mistaken 
interpretations, on the other hand, seemed to be more illogical. 
 
5.5 General Discussion 
 
Results from the Sentence Interpretation task partially supported the findings 
from the eye-movement experiment that highlighted a qualitative discrepancy 
between PwS and controls in metaphor processing (see 5.2.6.3. above). The sentence 
interpretation task revealed that patients processed around 40% of the metaphors 
either as nonsense or in a literal or concrete way. Patients’ mistaken interpretations in 
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this study are in line with the hyperactivity across the semantic network hypothesis 
(Kuperberg et al., 2008), which refers to the “loosening of associations” phenomenon, 
first described by Bleuler (1911) as typical in PwS.  The hyperactivity hypothesis can 
also, to a degree, explain why in about 30% of the cases patients misinterpreted 
nonsensical stimuli and even made about 20% of mistakes when processing 
straightforward literal expression, which was not seen in controls. It is worth noting 
that the patients who participated in this study had been on medication for over 10 
years or more and none of them presented thought disorder, which is more commonly 
associated with loosening of associations and hyperactivity across the semantic 
network. Hence, we can say that medication has not really helped eradicate this 
symptom, at least for the participants we tested. 
Familiarity could have played a role in making PwS more aware of the 
metaphorical meanings of a few of the stimuli, but we cannot be certain how familiar 
the metaphors were to the patients who engaged in the study. In addition, more 
efficient reading skills might make an impact on a metaphor sentence interpretation 
task as it is likely that more skilled and experienced readers will have been more 
frequently exposed to metaphorical language.  However, results from this study can 
only partially support this view, as we only found a borderline significant difference 
when we compared controls’ best GSRT scores and controls’ worst GSRT scores 
according to their accuracy in metaphor interpretation. In addition, and reinforcing 
these findings, correlation results between the best GSRT results and mistakes in 
metaphor processing did not reach significance either. 
As metaphors and nonsensical items did not display a significant difference in 
the number of mistakes in the Sentence Interpretation task, both for patients and 
controls, the results obtained in this task suggest that metaphoric interpretations might 
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have been influenced by the time participants had to interpret the sentence and come 
up with different and unusual meanings. We suspect that this was mainly the case for 
the patients, though given their high number of errors for the literal expressions, this 
need not be a feature of metaphor processing per se. 
The idea that working memory plays a significant role in context use and context 
construction (Kuperberg, 2010; Lee & Park, 2005) is supported by the results of the 
study, as the Flexibility and Working Memory component was the only component 
that correlated with the metaphor effect. However, this was only observed for the 
control group. It is possible that cognitive flexibility and working memory might be 
relevant cognitive functions when metaphor processing is involved. The fact that it 
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As far as general (non-figurative) language processing in schizophrenia is 
concerned, impairments have often been related to deficits in executive functions 
(Hoff et al., 1999; Kuperberg, 2010a, 2010b, Lee & Park, 2005), and semantic and 
contextual integration (e.g. David, Kuperberg & McGuire, 1998; Kuperberg, 2000; 
Langdon et al., 2002; Sitnikova, Salisbury, Kuperberg, & Holcomb, 2002; Titone, 
Levy, & Holzman, 2000;). 
With respect to executive function deficits, Hoff et al. (1999) suggested 
impairments in cognitive functioning and verbal working memory in schizophrenia, 
arising in the first 2 to 5 years after the diagnosis. Kuperberg (2010a; 2010b) and Lee 
and Park (2005) demonstrated that PwS display working memory impairments, with 
Kuperberg (2010a; 2010b) arguing that poor executive functioning, which includes 
poor working memory skills, negatively impacted contextual construction and 
contextual information use. Wood et al. (2007) speculated that working memory 
impairments in PwS arise when complex brain interconnections are necessary for 
patients to perform language tasks. In general, Lee and Park (2005) found that working 
memory deficits were reported in 124 studies investigating cognitive impairments in 
schizophrenia and that working memory deficits were present regardless of task 
modality. 
David, Kuperberg and McGuire (2000) and Kuperberg (2000) found that PwS 
who had thought disorder did not identify violations of the semantic context as 
accurately as patients who did not display the symptom. In general, thought disorder 
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has been connected to poor cognitive performance in a variety of tasks, including tasks 
tapping into executive functioning (Kerns & Berenbaum, 2002; Kuperberg, 2010a; 
2010b). In general, a deficit in online contextual language processing and use is 
reported in PwS, with or without thought disorder (Kuperberg, McGuire, & David, 
2000). In this sense, PwS may not fully grasp the global context of a text (Kuperberg, 
2000; Kuperberg, McGuire, & David, 1998), which might also affect figurative 
language interpretation.  
Research by Kuperberg, Kreher and Ditman (2010), Holcomb, et al. (2002) and 
Titone, et al. (2000) suggests that PwS are more likely to interpret a word in its more 
familiar meaning, which can, eventually, lead to difficulties in processing the full 
context online, with PwS displaying greater difficulties in processing contextual 
information when the context is unfamiliar.  
In the study described in this chapter, which is based on McElree, Frisson and 
Pickering (2006), we examined how a specific type of figurative language, i.e. logical 
metonymy, is processed by PwS. Metonymic expressions are more transparent and 
systematic than proverbs, idioms, and metaphors in the sense that there is a clear 
semantic relationship between the figurative (metonymic) and literal interpretation. In 
this type of metonymy, a salient property or aspect of an entity or concept is used to 
refer to the entity or concept itself. Some examples of the first type, called lexical or 
standard metonymy, can be found in (6-1 – 6-3): 
 
6-1.  Allegations of collusion were summarily rejected by the White House 




6-3. The gentleman read Dickens (from McElree et al., 2006) 
 
In (1), the White House is used to refer to the president and his entourage, in (2) 
Vietnam is used to refer to the war rather than the country (in fact, part of the Vietnam 
War was fought in Cambodia), and in (3), reference is made to the books written by 
Dickens. According to Nunberg (2004), these examples can be considered a form of 
deferred reference (Nunberg, 2004) in that a non-canonical denotation of the 
expression needs to be accessed or construed (the allegations are not rejected by the 
WH building and the gentleman didn’t read Dickens the person). In order to interpret 
these kinds of expression metonymically, they need to be integrated with the wider 
sentential context: the White House needs to be interpreted metonymically (place-for-
institution metonymy) because the verb rejected by needs to be followed by an 
animate agent, Vietnam refers to an event that is protested against (place-for-event 
metonymy), and Dickens needs to metonymically refer to an object (producer-for-
product metonymy) because of the verb read. In general, for lexical or standard 
metonymies, there is a predictable path, a “common metonymic convention” 
(McElree et al., 2006, p. 183), that can be established between the meaning of the 
word (e.g. Dickens the person) and its referent (e.g. books written by Dickens). 
Previous research has shown that this type of metonymy can be processed 
straightforwardly, without any early costs, when the metonymic interpretation is 
already established (Frisson & Pickering, 1999)17 or when there is relevant contextual 
information that allows a metonymic extension (e.g. after reading that someone named 
                                                          
17 Though see Lowder and Gordon (2013), for evidence of a processing cost for certain 
metonymies when used in argument position. However, Bott, Reese, and Frisson (2015), using a 
speed-accuracy-tradeoff design with Lowder and Gordon’s types of stimuli, found similar processing 
dynamics between the literal and metonymic interpretations of a word. 
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Needham is a writer, readers can process the expression read Needham without much 
difficulty, see Pickering & Frisson, 2001).  
The second type we examined is known as logical metonymy (Lascarides & 
Copestake, 1998; Pustejovsky, 1995). An example can be found in (4):  
 
(4) The gentleman began the book 
 
Just as it is the case for lexical metonymies, logical metonymies involve a 
deferred interpretation. For a sentence such as (4), the complement the book is not 
interpreted as a mere object, but rather as an event involving this object, as in reading 
the book (for a detailed discussion, see Pylkkanen & McElree, 2007). The source of 
this deferred interpretation lies in the verb’s meaning: verbs such as begin, finish, 
continue, start refer to events and therefore require the complement to be compatible 
with an event interpretation. When this is not the case, the complement will be 
“coerced” into the requisite semantic type so that it now can refer to an event, as is the 
case in the reading the book interpretation. There is ample evidence (e.g. Frisson & 
McElree, 2008; see Pylkkänen & McElree, 2007, for an overview) that this type of 
operation elicits a processing cost (“coercion cost”) in reading. Hence, while both 
types of metonymy can be seen as examples of deferred reference, they seem to differ 
in terms of processing. 
McElree et al. (2006) provided direct evidence for the idea that these two types 
of metonymy are dissimilar. They contrasted lexical metonymies, such as (3, repeated 




3. The gentleman read Dickens 
5. The gentleman began Dickens 
6. The gentleman spotted Dickens 
 
Example (5) is a combination of both types of metonymy. Dickens 
metonymically refers to Dickens’ books, while the verb began coerces the object 
reading of book into an eventive reading. They observed a greater processing cost for 
logical metonymies, while the lexical metonymies did not differ from literal 
expressions. They explained their result as follows: when the lexical metonymic 
interpretation is established, this sense can straightforwardly be accessed, possibly via 
an underspecified meaning. In contrast, a logical metonymic expression requires the 
reader to engage in more complex processes of “enriched composition” (Jackendoff, 
1997; Pustejovsky, 1995) as simple composition, i.e. the simple combination of the 
lexical representations of words in a syntactic frame, fails. Hence, arriving at a logical 
metonymic interpretation seems to implicate a greater reliance on context than lexical 
metonymy does. 
The present study employed the same conditions as McElree et al (2006), but is 
focused on how PwS process metonymy. Since both types of metonymy rely, to a 
different extent, on contextual information and since PwS have shown a deficit in 
combining the meanings of words in a text (see above), we expect that PwS will show 
extra processing difficulties, compared to controls, during the interpretation of both 
types of metonymy. However, since the interpretation of logical metonymy requires 
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more complex compositional processing than lexical metonymy, the difference 
between PwS and controls is likely to be more evident for logical metonymies. In 
addition, given that successful on-line text interpretation involves the use of working 
memory and other executive functions (e.g. Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Just & Carpenter, 
1992), and given that PwS have shown deficiencies in these areas (e.g. Kuperberg & 
Heckers, 2000; Cassidy et al., 2016), we will examine to what extent these are 






The same patients and controls who took part in the metaphor experiments (see 
Chapter 2 for details) took part in the metonymy experiments. The same selection 
procedure as described in Chapter 1 was applied. As was the case for the irony and 
metaphor experiment, there was a larger sample that took part in the eye-movement 
stage of the study than in the Sentence Interpretation Task (see below).  
 
6.2.2. Stimuli Pre-Testing 
 
We generated 33 stimuli triplets, based on the design used by McElree et al. 
(2006). Each triplet consisted of a literal condition, a lexical metonymy condition and 
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a logical metonymy condition (see Table 25). Only the verb that preceded the noun 
varied across conditions. Names of famous producers (e.g. Shakespeare, Bob Marley, 
Beethoven, Einstein) were used to avoid problems with participants failing to 
recognise the connection between the producer and their product. 
Frequency of conventional/literal and metonymical interpretations of the names 
used in the stimuli was assessed using the British National Corpus, a 100-million-
word English corpus, and Internet searches. The first 20 classifiable instances for each 
name were scored in terms of a literal or metonymic interpretation. The names in the 
corpus were used in the literal sense 90% of the time (range: 65-100%), which, in 
ordinary language use, demonstrates a preference for a literal over a metonymic 
interpretation. The frequency of the preceding verb calculated based on N-Watch 
(Davis, 2005), and the length in number of characters, did not differ across the 
conditions (ps > .10).  
The metonymy stimuli were mixed with fillers that contained names of other 
types of celebrities other than writers, and the stimuli were counterbalanced over three 
different lists. Only one verb appeared more than once in a specific list, and there were 









Table 27: Condition and stimuli examples 
Condition Example 
Literal The gentleman spotted Dickens while waiting for a friend to arrive.   
Lexical Metonymy The gentleman read Dickens while waiting for a friend to arrive. 
Logical Metonymy The gentleman started Dickens while waiting for a friend to arrive. 
 
 
6.3 Experiment 1: Eye-movement-while-reading Task 
 
We used the same apparatus and procedure as for the irony and metaphor eye 
movement experiments (see Chapter 2 for details). The study was in line with the 
standards of the ethics committee of the University of Birmingham and was granted 
its approval. 
As was the case in the irony and metaphor eye-movement experiment, the stimuli 
were divided over three lists, with an equal number of items per condition in each list. 
Participants only read one version of each item. An equal number of participants read 
an equal number of lists in each group. The 33 items were intermixed with 114 filler 




Items with tracker loss and items for which the preceding context was not 
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processed attentively (i.e. evidence of skimming) were deleted from the analyses 
(totalling less than 2%). The two regions of interest, target (underlined) and spill-over 
(in italics) are exemplified as follows: “The gentleman started Dickens while waiting 
for a friend to arrive.” Following the same procedure adopted for the metaphor data, 
the spill-over region was defined as the first word following the target region if longer 
than 3 characters, otherwise the next two words.  
As in the analyses of metaphor processing, the eye movement results were 
analysed using a linear mixed effects model in R (R Core Team, 2016) and the package 
lme4, version 1.1-12 (Bates, et al., 2015), checking for effects of Group (PwS vs. 
control), Condition (Literal, Lexical Metonymy, Logical Metonymy) and the 
interaction between Group and Condition. Relevant reading measures (First Pass, 
Regression Path, Regressions In and Total Time) were tested one by one within the 
model. The same procedure followed for the irony and metaphor analyses was 
followed for the metonymy analysis (see details in Chapter 2).  
Model comparisons using the anova function were used to test main effects of 
Condition and Group, as well as their interaction. Comparisons for a main effect of 
Condition were carried out using sum coding. As we were mainly interested in the 
effect lexical and logical metonymy had on reading, we compared the Lexical and the 
Logical Metonymy conditions to the Literal condition. Interactions were examined 
using comparisons between the conditions for each group separately. However, in 
order to get a more detailed picture of the processing in each group, we included means 
comparisons even when the interaction was not significant, as the reading times 




6.3.2. Metonymy Eye-movement Experiment Results 
 
Average reading times for the different reading measures can be found in Table 
28. An overview of the analyses can be found in Table 29. 
 
Table 28: Average Reading Times 
 Target region Spill-over region 
 All Patients Controls All Patients Controls 
First Pass       
Lexical Metonymy 412 (127) 412 (125) 412 (128) 327 (102) 325 (106) 329 (98) 
Literal 403 (124) 413 (136) 395 (112) 328 (107) 328 (119) 328 (94) 
Logical Metonymy 411 (133) 426 (158) 398 (107) 320 (99) 328 (130) 312 (68) 
       
Regression Path       
Lexical Metonymy 552 (219) 604 (266) 503 (171) 414 (164) 451 (182) 382 (145) 
Literal 575 (222) 620 (266) 534 (177) 397 (155) 397 (151) 397 (158) 
Logical Metonymy 586 (165) 626 (186) 549 (144) 448 (167) 466 (186) 432 (148) 
       
Regressions In       
Lexical Metonymy .18 (.17) .22 (.18) .14 (.15) .25 (.19) .33 (.21) .17 (.15) 
Literal .18 (.18) .21 (.20) .15 (.16) .23 (.19) .27 (.19) .18 (.18) 
Logical Metonymy .23 (.15) .25 (.17) .21 (.13) .26 (.23) .31 (.26) .22 (.20) 
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Total Time       
Lexical Metonymy 582 (249) 629 (295) 538 (203) 414 (164) 448 (195) 383 (132) 
Literal 596 (228) 648 (262) 548 (193) 420 (165) 446 (206) 395 (124) 
Logical Metonymy 658 (266) 714 (317) 605 (214) 455 (157) 490 (188) 423 (125) 





Table 29: Eye-movement analyses  
 Target Spill-over 
 χ2  α χ2 α  
First Pass 
Condition < 1       < 1  
Group < 1  < 1  
Interaction 1.19  1.76 > .41 
Literal vs. Lexical- 
PwS 
 t < 1   t < 1  
Literal vs. Lexical- 
Controls 
t < 1  t < 1  
Literal vs. Logical 
- PwS 
t < 1  t < 1  
Literal vs. Logical 
- Controls 




Condition 2.09 > .35 3.09 < .21 
Group 2.93 < .09 < 1  
Interaction < 1  2.48 >.29 
Literal vs. Lexical- 
PwS 
 t < 1  t <1   
Literal vs. Lexical- 
Controls 
t = 1.54 p > .12 t = 1.35 p > .18 
Literal vs. Logical 
- PwS 
t < 1  t = 1.39 p > .17 
Literal vs. Logical 
- Controls 
t = 1.23  p > .21 t = 1.77 p > .07 
Regressions In 
Condition 7.08 < .03* 1.91 > .38 
Literal vs. Lexical t = 1.20 p > .23   
Literal vs. Logical t = 2.43 p < .02*   
Group 2.61 > .10 6.65 < .01** 
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Interaction 1.06 > .58 2.27 > .32 
Literal vs. Lexical- 
PwS 
t < 1 <1 t = 1.17 p > .24 
Literal vs. Lexical- 
Controls 
t = 1.53 p > .12 t < 1  
Literal vs. Logical 
- PwS 
t = 1.03 p > .30 t < 1  
Literal vs. Logical 
- Controls 
t = 2.50 p < .02* t = 1.42 p > .15 
Total Time 
Condition 9.32 < .01** 5.68 < .06 
Literal vs. Lexical t = 2.03 p < .05* t = 1.49 p > .13 
Literal vs. Logical t = 3.09 p < .01** t = 2.43 p < .02* 
Group 2.65 > .10 2.67 > .10 
Interaction < 1  < 1  
Literal vs. Lexical - 
PwS 
t = 1.49 p > .13 t < 1  




Literal vs. Logical 
- PwS 
t = 2.15 p < .04** t = 1.69 p < .10 
Literal vs. Logical 
- Controls 






6.3.2.1 Target Region 
  
A main effect of Condition was found for the Regressions In and the Total Time 
measures, with logical metonymies requiring extra processing compared to literal 
expressions. Further analyses (independent samples t-tests) indicated that the 
Regressions In effect was restricted to control participants. In addition, the Total Time 
measure indicated that lexical metonymies were processed slightly faster than literal 
expressions, though the means comparisons for each group were not significant. None 
of the interactions were significant. 
 
6.3.2.2. Spill-over Region 
 
A near-significant main effect of Condition was found for the Total Time 
measure, with literal expressions processed faster than logical metonymies in the spill-
over region, while lexical metonymies and literal expressions did not differ. As most 
of the lexical metonymical expressions used in the stimuli were familiar ones, we can 
say that these results corroborate the idea that a familiar metonymic sense can be 
accessed immediately and without much difficulty by the reader (Frisson & Pickering, 
1999). An effect of Group was found for the Regressions In measure, with PwS 
making more regressions into the spill-over region overall. The interactions did not 
approach significance.  
Overall, logical metonymies took longer to process than both literal expressions 
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and lexical metonymies, replicating the pattern found by McElree et al. (2006). 
Although PwS showed increased processing times for all conditions compared to 
controls, the pattern displayed by both groups was reasonably similar. 
 
6.3.3 Logical Metonymy Effect Correlations 
 
To measure the effort participants displayed during logical metonymy 
interpretation, we subtracted the literal processing times from the logical metonymy 
processing time results for all eye-tracking measures in both groups. The processing 
difference in relation to the logical metonymy processing times was identified as the 
“logical metonymy effect.” The results of the logical metonymy effect were then 
correlated with the components identified in the PCA analysis detailed in Chapter 2. 
Because we suspected that PwS and controls might differ in their use of cognitive 
functions when processing logical metonymies, we analysed the two groups 
separately. Significant correlations results can be found in Table 30. Please note that 
these analyses were performed on a subset of the eye-tracking participants due to a 
number of participants not being available for testing in the second stage. The final 








Table 30: Logical metonymy effect correlations with components extracted from PCA 
Region Measure Component Pearson score 
Patients    









r = .445* 
 
 
r = .452* 
Controls    












r = .495* 
 
r = .473* 
Spill-over Regression Path Flexibility and 
Working Memory 




 Total Time Facial Emotion 
Recognition  





Note: Significance level is indicated by stars: *p ˂.05; **p ˂ .01; ***p ˂ .001.  
 
The logical metonymy effect for the control group in the target region correlated 
with Hinting Comprehension. Both correlations (with Regressions In and with Total 
Time) were positive, suggesting that the higher the use of mentalising skills (strongly 
embedded in this component), the greater the logical metonymy effect in Total Time 
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and the higher the probability of regressions into the target. If you are better at the 
Hinting Task, you are better at making sense of what someone is trying to say or 
hinting, and the process of using mentalising skills involves certain cognitive 
operations, such as moving from one perspective to the other and adjusting to the 
interlocutor’s point of view. These operations require more time; hence, the 
processing of the logical metonymy takes longer overall and likely requires more 
regressions into target. 
For the spill-over region, controls displayed negative correlations with the 
logical metonymy effect, both with the Flexibility and Working Memory component 
and the Facial Emotion Recognition component, suggesting that more effective 
cognitive flexibility and working memory, as well as more effective facial emotion 
recognition are associated with smaller logical metonymy effects in the spill-over 
region. Why this negative correlation in the spill-over? Previous research suggests that 
logical metonymy interpretation can take time to complete (McElree et al, 2006), it is 
possible that people with more effective cognitive flexibility and working memory 
might grasp interpretation faster in the target, not regressing in the spill-over region.  
Patients differed from controls in two ways: there was a correlation with the 
Difficulties in Cognitive Control component and no correlations with the Hinting 
Comprehension component. The Difficulties in Cognitive Control component relates 
to a person having difficulties to focus and not being able to control irrelevant 
activations to perform tasks. It could be fair to say then that cognitive control is a kind 
of pre-requisite for logical metonymy processing: when less distracted and displaying 
more effective inhibitory mechanisms, more chances of enriched processing 
occurring, which would lead to larger logical metonymy effects. However, the effect 
goes the opposite way in the spill-over, suggesting that larger logical metonymy 
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effects in the spill-over could be associated with more difficulties in cognitive control. 
Unclear why, but together these results do seem to suggest that Difficulties in 
Cognitive Control is a relevant component for logical metonymy processing in the 
patient, but not in the control group, possibly because controls do not experience much 
difficulty with cognitive control.  
In First Pass in the patient group, we found a positive correlation between the 
Flexibility and Working Memory component (the same component present in the 
correlation analysis in the control group), but in the opposite direction , which might 
indicate that patients who are more cognitively flexible and have more effective 
working memory, might engage more with the text in First Pass and try harder to 
interpret the logical metonymy, leading to a larger effect. 
Lastly, one thing patients and controls did have in common, the use of facial 
emotion recognition, was negatively correlated with the logical metonymy effect, 
which suggests that more effective facial emotion recognition skills can be associated 
with smaller logical metonymy effects, with fewer regressions into the spill-over for 
patients and shorter overall processing time differences for controls in the spill-over.  
As previously mentioned, ToM involves certain cognitive operations 
(adjustment to the Other perspective) that require time to be completed. In the case of 
facial emotion recognition, we do not see results pointing to it as a skill that enlarges 
the logical metonymy effect, on the contrary, it makes it smaller. In this case, these 
results reinforce the idea that facial emotion recognition is not directly associated with 






6.3.4 Logical Metonymy Eye-Tracking Results Discussion 
 
Results revealed that both groups found logical metonymies more taxing than 
literal items while lexical metonymies were processed as fast as literal items (and even 
somewhat faster in the Total Time measure, see Table 9). Although patients displayed 
increased processing times for all conditions when compared to controls, patterns 
presented by both groups were not considerably dissimilar. When we analyse results 
from correlations between factors extracted from the PCA and the logical metonymy 
effect, we notice that in the patient group larger logical metonymy effects correlated 
with flexibility and working memory, difficulties in cognitive control and facial 
emotion recognition. For controls, difficulties in cognitive control were not correlated 
with the logical metonymy effect, leading us to speculate that perhaps cognitive 
control difficulties might eventually be a cognitive marker of schizophrenia.  
 
6.4 Experiment 2: Sentence Interpretation Task 
 
A sentence interpretation task was carried out to establish exactly how 
participants from both groups processed logical metonymies. Judging from the logical 
metonymy effect correlation results, it could be the case that PwS had difficulties in 








The same participants engaged in the eye-tracking experiment participated in the 
Sentence Interpretation task. Again, as in the metaphor experiment, a time gap of at 
least seven months was kept between the two experiments. However, due to some 
participants being unable to take part in this stage of the study, the sample is somewhat 
smaller (PwS: 25, controls: 21). 
 
6.4.2 Stimuli  
 
Similarly to the metaphor experiment, we used the same stimuli as in the eye-
tracking experiment; and again, participants were given a different list from the one 
they had received in the eye-tracking experiment. For example, if they had seen an 
expression in the logical metonymy condition during the on-line reading task, it was 




The same procedure used for the irony and metaphor sentence interpretation task 
was used (see details in Chapter 3). We hypothesised that patients would be more 
likely to find logical metonymies to be senseless, as they would tend to consider the 
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literal interpretation of the coercion involved in the logical metonymies, not the 
figurative one. We did not expect major problems in lexical metonymy processing for 
patients as they did not show any major differences in reading times compared to the 
literal condition.  
 
6.4.4. Sentence Interpretation Task Results 
 
Paired Samples t-tests revealed significant differences between patients and 
controls in all conditions. Patients made significantly more mistakes when processing 
literal expressions, lexical metonymies and logical metonymies when compared to 
controls (lexical metonymies, t(44) = 2.73, p < .008; literals, t(44) = 5.35, p = .001 
and logical metonymies, t(44) = 6.93, p = .001).  
 
Table 31: Percentage of errors in the sentence interpretation task – patient and control group  















We examined patients’ explanations18 of the literal sentences where their 
judgment was inaccurate, and we found that the mistakes were related to: a) failure to 
acknowledge that a verb that is regularly used with living people as complements can 
be used with dead people as complements (“The archbishop decided to contact da 
Vinci” – “Doesn’t make sense, da Vinci is dead”; “The young physicist could always 
phone Einstein” – “Doesn’t make sense, Einstein is dead”; “The educated slave 
greeted Aristotle” – “Nonsense”); b) failure to acknowledge that a less typical literal 
construction can still make sense (“The book company’s decision to hire J.R.R. 
Tolkien…” – “Unfinished and doesn’t make sense”; “The scientist wrote Stephen 
Hawking” – “Nonsense”; “The record producer decided to photograph Rihanna” – 
“Doesn’t make sense, he’s a producer, not a photographer”). In the cases highlighted 
here, less typical literal constructions were involved. We assume that less typical 
literal sentences led to processing errors in the patient group. Patients seemed to 
display more restricted lexical combination interpretations when compared to controls 
or they tended to stick to the most typical lexical combinations, judging unusual, but 
still plausible lexical combinations as nonsense. This could have had an impact on 
their recognition of a literal sentence’s plausibility. In addition, as in this experiment, 
participants were not given more contextual information (the sentence was read only 
up to the target region) and references to deceased people could not be clearly 
established in a historical context, it could have made it harder for patients to fill in 
the gaps and come up with appropriate interpretations, although this did not seem to 
be a problem for controls. It is surprising, though, that this relatively high percentage 
(22%) of misinterpretations or rejections of a literal interpretation was not reflected in 
the eye movement record, as patients, when compared to controls, did not significantly 
                                                          
18 All examples in the following paragraphs come from patients’ actual answers in the test. 
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differ in their on-line processing times for literal sentences. A possible explanation for 
the literal processing difficulty for patients in the sentence interpretation task, is that 
patients find literal expressions non-sensical only when given less contextual 
information and/or enough time to consciously reflect on them, as was the case in the 
sentence interpretation task. 
As for errors in conventional metonymy processing among patients, we found 
that they sometimes failed to recognise the plausibility of less frequent lexical 
combinations, such as in the case of “The philanthropist published T.S. Eliot” – 
“Nonsensical. A philanthropist cannot be a publisher” and they sometimes also failed 
to recognise less typical producer-product relationships in metonymic sentences such 
as “The music student wished he could conduct Beethoven” – “No, doesn’t make 
sense. Beethoven lived a few hundred years ago and you can’t conduct a person”; 
“The bilingual neighbour wanted to translate Anne Frank” – “Doesn’t make sense, 
you can’t translate a person”; “The editor published Wittgenstein” – “The editor 
would publish Wittgenstein’s works. That would make sense”. In these cases, less 
typical lexical combinations are not selected as plausible. However, it should be noted 
that on average, lexical metonymies were quite well accepted by both groups (in about 
95% and 98% by patients and controls respectively). Patients could easily interpret 
sentences such as “The gentleman read Dickens” – “Self-explanatory. He read a book 
by Dickens”; “The archbishop decided to display da Vinci” – “Makes sense. He had 
a painting by da Vinci and decided to display it”; “In order to relax, he used to enjoy 
Bob Marley” – “Makes sense. Listening to Bob Marley’s music, smoking while 
listening to the music and relaxing”.  
Finally, errors in logical metonymy processing were more frequent than errors 
in any other condition (31% for patients, 9% for controls). Mistakes in logical 
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metonymy interpretation were: a) failed attempts to fill the gap and build a correct 
sense for the logical metonymy in the sentence, “The company decided to no longer 
delay Pavarotti” – “They could have been a promotional company, they were delaying 
the concert and they decided not to do it anymore”; “Astronomers in the eighteenth 
century completed Newton” – “He was a separate person, so I think it’s in his infancy 
in the 10th century, the study of stars and planets”; b) sentences were considered 
unfinished and nonsensical, “It’s a fact that the company that decided to delay J.K. 
Rowling…” – “Doesn’t make sense, they are not specifying what”; and c) sentences 
were deemed nonsensical sometimes due to a perceived mismatch between 
complement and verb, “According to music industry rumours, they had re-released 
Elvis Presley” – “You can only re-release his songs. Nonsense”; “Astronomers in the 
18th century developed Newton” – “Nonsense”; “The bilingual neighbour wanted to 
begin Anne Frank” – “Nonsense”; “The young physicist could always master 
Einstein” – “Doesn’t make sense. Einstein is a person, not art or something like that”; 
“According to music industry rumours, they had resumed Elvis Presley” – “No, 
doesn’t make sense. Elvis Presley is a person. You can’t resume Elvis Presley”. 
Again, when we look at the errors in logical metonymy processing, we find that 
typicality seems to play a role. More typical combinations in logical metonymical 
sentences did not lead to errors, “The company decided to no longer distribute 
Pavarotti” – “They didn’t want to sell his music anymore”; “The philanthropist 
finished T.S. Eliot” – “Makes sense. The philanthropist finished reading a book by 
T.S. Eliot”; “The student continued Sartre” – “It makes sense. He continued reading 
Sartre”; “The gentleman started Dickens” – “He started reading Charles Dickens”. 
Although we cannot be precise in relation to the degree of familiarity of the logical 
metonymy sentences, we can see that it is likely that less typical lexical combinations 
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were considered nonsensical and their figurative meanings were not possible to be 
perceived. Still, looking at Table 7, we can observe that patients’ performance in the 
metonymy interpretation task varied, unlike controls’ performance, which was very 
steady. 
Finally, we also examined whether the severity of positive and negative 
symptomatology had a connection with accuracy in logical metonymy processing. 
Results indicated that in the sample studied there were no significant correlations 
between positive or negative symptomatology and accurate logical metonymy 
processing, although we found a borderline positive correlation between positive 
symptomatology and the number of mistakes in logical metonymy processing (r = 
.340, n = 25, p = .096), suggesting that perhaps, with a larger sample, this result could 
have become significant. However, with the results obtained in this study, we cannot 
fully support the idea that more severe positive symptoms in a patient diagnosed with 
schizophrenia could be linked to poorer performance in logical metonymy 
interpretation. It is remarkable that although PwS that took part in this study had been 
on medication for a long time, they still could not process logical metonymies or even 
literal sentences as accurately and straightforwardly as controls.  
 
6.5 General Discussion 
 
The first striking finding we came upon was a significant difference in the 
number of mistakes between the two groups for all conditions in the sentence 
interpretation task. Patients displayed more difficulties in processing lexical 
metonymies, logical metonymies and literal items, although the greatest difficulty was 
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in logical metonymy processing. Controls did not show many difficulties in the 
interpretation task. In fact, when looking at Table 13 in the Appendix E, only one 
control participant made some errors against all conditions (mainly the logical 
metonymy condition), while for all other control participants no mistakes were 
observed for any of the sentences. It is unclear why this participant behaved 
differently. 
The results for the sentence interpretation task confirmed that around 30% of 
the logical metonymy fragments in the stimuli were processed as nonsensical or 
unfinished sentences by patients, which did not become clear in the results obtained 
in the eye-tracking experiment. Although the metonymy eye-tracking experiment did 
not reveal striking differences between groups, it revealed that there was still a cost 
for logical metonymy processing when eye movements were recorded. For the control 
group the extra processing effort displayed for logical metonymies could not be 
explained by inaccurate understanding, as controls did not make mistakes in literal 
processing (except for one participant). The eye movement results are in line with 
previous research showing that logical metonymies are more taxing to process than 
literal expressions (e.g. Frisson & McElree, 2008; McElree et al. (2006), Traxler, 
McElree, Williams & Pickering, 2005). The finding that logical metonymies and 
literal expressions were equally well understood by control participants, together with 
the fact that controls did not have their logical metonymy effect correlated with errors 
or difficulties in any cognitive function embedded in the components, supports the 
idea that deferred interpretation per se does not reflect difficulties in interpretation 
(see also McElree et al., 2006). 
Logical metonymy processing had a cost for both patients and controls and 
patients displayed a tendency to read all conditions more slowly. For the patient group 
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only, longer processing times in the spill-over region suggested that difficulties in 
using cognitive functions, such as cognitive control might be at play. Hence, these 
results indicate that logical metonymy processing, i.e. establishing an enriched 
interpretation of an expression such as The gentleman started Dickens, can be 
relatively straightforward to the neurotypical reader, although with a processing cost. 
For PwS, on the other hand, it can be challenging.  
It is notable that difficulties in cognitive control among PwS correlated with the 
Regression Path measure both in the target and in the spill-over region, which suggests 
that this function could be a primary requirement for a person to access the figurative 
meaning implied by logical metonymies and ironies, with more regressions into the 
spill-over region in Regression Path (see Chapter 4). Cognitive control difficulties did 
not seem to be an issue for controls, as this component did not correlate with any 
logical metonymy effect for this group. We can speculate that control participants 
more easily make use of cognitive control, which makes it not an obstacle for the 
figurative meaning processing to happen. For controls, more difficulties in flexibility 
of thought, working memory and facial emotion recognition made them display more 
overall regressions in the spill-over region. It seems that functions such as flexibility 
of thought and working memory might need to be recruited for proper logical 
metonymy processing among the neurotypical population.  
Results from this study showed that logical metonymies can be more easily 
interpreted when cognitive control (as a primary function), flexibility, working 
memory and facial emotion recognition are activated. In addition, this study showed 
that it is likely that patients and controls might not process logical metonymies in 
exactly the same way. The Sentence Interpretation Task results revealed 30% of errors 
in logical metonymy processing, which was not found among controls. Literal 
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processing also revealed that PwS and controls differed, with patients displaying 22% 
of errors in this condition, again different from controls. Apparently, patients and 
controls do not seem to understand logical metonymies in quite the same manner but 
neither do they seem to do that for literal expressions. Lexical metonymies didn’t seem 
to present a real processing issue for patients, which might indicate that lexical 
metonymies are perhaps more lexicalised figurative items, not requiring 
supplementary cognitive effort.  
 
7. General Thesis Summary and Discussion 
 
 The present thesis aimed at answering questions regarding cognitive 
functioning in people with schizophrenia (PwS) who have been on a long course of 
second-generation anti-psychotics. My research found that even after at least 10 years 
of medication, some cognitive mechanisms in PwS remained discrepant compared to 
neurotypical controls. The disparity in cognitive skills, or at least in the use thereof, 
between PwS and controls related to cognitive control, flexibility of thought, working 
memory and some aspects of theory of mind (mainly the perceived difficulty to do the 
tasks, the time taken, and a default self-centred perspective). This research also found 
out that these deficits interacted with figurative language processing, making 
understanding figurative language more taxing for PwS than for controls. Eventually, 
PwS tested often interpreted figurative utterances in a literal or concrete way, 
suggesting that perhaps literality and concreteness are not only related to poorer ToM 
skills, but also to poorer flexibility of thought, poorer working memory and difficulties 
in cognitive control. 
184 
 
The results obtained in the cognitive tests administered in two separate batteries 
highlighted that the patients who took part in this research had similar verbal IQs and 
reading skills when compared to neurotypical controls (first battery). However, 
patients’ performance in cognitive control, flexibility of thought, including time to 
change the train of thought, time to perceive hints in a conversation, difficulty in 
identifying hints, hint identification accuracy and number of errors in judging 
inconsistent “Other” trials significantly differed from controls (second battery). Such 
discrepancies suggest deficits in these functions.  
Being aware of the possible cognitive impairments present in the patient group, 
we extracted the figurative language effect for irony, metaphor and logical 
metonymies to see whether the figurative language effect would display any 
correlations with the components extracted from the PCA analysis which included the 
variables from the second battery of cognitive tests. We found out that, in fact, the 
functions from the second battery did correlate with the figurative language effect for 
both patients and controls, but not necessarily in the same way. 
As for differences in perspective-taking skills, results revealed that errors in 
perspective-taking for controls when judging the “Self” perspective were associated 
with difficulties in mentalising and in cognitive control. More effective facial emotion 
recognition was also connected with fewer errors in judging the “Other” perspective 
in inconsistent trials for controls. Additionally, more effective flexibility of thought, 
working memory and mentalising skills seemed to improve judgment accuracy of the 
“Other” perspective for both groups. These results suggest that mentalising and 
cognitive control are relevant cognitive functions for perspective-taking. 
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One of the most interesting results found in the research that concerns ToM was 
the fact that, unlike controls, patients did not display the intrusion of the “Other” 
perspective when judging the “Self” perspective. This finding has implications to 
ToM function in schizophrenia. It seems that although patients and controls could 
perform with relatively similar accuracy in the Perspective-taking task, still, the 
pattern of mistakes made by both groups was very different.  
In fact, patients displayed an intrusion of the “Self” when judging the “Other” 
perspective, which we can call a “self-reference effect”, while controls displayed an 
intrusion of the “Other” when judging the “Self” perspective, as if controls were tuned 
in with the “Other” perspective more than they were with their own perspective, while 
patients were tuned in with their own perspective more than with the “Other” 
perspective. It seems that patients had to make an extra effort to tune in to the “Other” 
perspective and the fact that patients were significantly slower than controls when 
evaluating the “Other” perspective only reinforces this idea. Adjustments to the 
“Other” point-of-view can apparently be taxing for patients. 
Patients in partial remission did not display any differences in hinting 
comprehension accuracy in relation to controls, but they still found hinting 
comprehension significantly more taxing than controls and they took significantly 
longer to do the task, which suggests that remission can improve accuracy in 
mentalising, but does not make it a lot more straightforward for these patients. 
Perhaps, if these patients had perhaps more effective working memory skills or 
cognitive control and flexibility skills, they could benefit more from the remission 
stage and mentalising would become easier. Overall, however, excluding patients in 
partial remission, the patient group as a whole displayed significant differences in 
accuracy for the Hinting Task. Perhaps mentalising is a cognitive function that is most 
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difficult to recuperate, even after a long and regular course of anti-psychotic 
medication. 
The organisation of the variables within the components suggested that facial 
emotion recognition, differently from mentalising skills, did not cluster in the same 
component as perspective-taking, indicating that facial emotion recognition is an 
autonomous skill, not recruiting the same type of ToM processing as mentalising and 
perspective-taking. Because we tested outpatients who had been on second-generation 
anti-psychotic medication for more than 10 years, and these patients did not present a 
facial emotion recognition impairment in relation to neurotypical controls, it would 
be fair to say that an impairment in facial emotion recognition might not be permanent 
for PwS. Hence, it cannot be considered a trait of the disorder, as suggested by Rohler 
et al. (2009). 
 The present thesis was able to disclose that poor processing of figurative 
language can still be present in PwS, even after more than 10 years on a steady course 
of second-generation anti-psychotic medication. This suggests that it is a real 
symptom of the disorder, although possibly only present to the extent of the 
impairment in the cognitive functions mentioned above. While the poor performance 
on figurative language understanding was most clear when patients were asked 
directly about their interpretation and were given ample time to respond (cf. sentence 
interpretation tasks, see Chapters 4, 5 and 6), there were already some subtle 
differences during their on-line processing as well. Interestingly, this research also 
indicated that when running eye-movement experiments related to language 
processing among PwS, it is advisable to double check interpretations by also running 
sentence interpretation experiments. This is mainly because the time spent on specific 
regions might not significantly differ in comparison with neurotypical controls, but 
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interpretations might differ. In fact, one of the surprising findings was that the reading 
times between patients and controls only showed small differences, while the results 
of the interpretation tasks revealed quite substantial differences between the two 
groups.  
Another interesting finding this research was able to produce was the fact that 
not only PwS, but also some controls, could present some degree of literality or 
concreteness, depending on how effective cognitive functions such as flexibility of 
thought, working memory and cognitive control were for these participants. Overall, 
however, control participants did not present considerable problems in these 
functions, as their performance in the sentence interpretation task was significantly 
more accurate than PwS’s. 
 It is worth noting that, during eye-tracking, participants read to and for 
themselves and are not really in a communicative setting. In contrast, during the 
sentence interpretation task, there was a live interaction with another person (the 
experimenter), and the participants had to take into account what the interlocutor was 
saying and evaluate its content in order to assess whether what the interlocutor said 
made sense, how it could be interpreted, and then tell the experimenter how they 
assessed what they had been told. This requires some degree of ToM and, as we found 
in the ToM experiments (and as shown frequently in the literature, e.g. Corcoran et 
al., 1995; Pickup & Frith, 2001), patients struggle more with understanding other 
people’s perspective. Hence, as patients tend to have a more self-centred perspective 
(see Chapter 3), it can become more difficult to understand the interlocutor’s utterance 
in a conversation. These factors might have contributed to the discrepancy identified 
in the results between the on-line and off-line tasks. 
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 As for irony processing, the results revealed that familiar ironies did not display 
early processing differences in relation to their literal counterparts; however, there 
was a cost for irony processing in later reading measures. This study supports evidence 
from familiar sarcasm data (Turcan & Filik, 2016). A possible explanation for these 
findings is that both literal and ironic interpretations are retained (e.g. Giora, 1995; 
1997), to be later resolved through contextual integration, which is expected to require 
longer processing when reading. 
The relevant cognitive functions associated with the irony effect were facial 
emotion recognition, flexibility of thought, working memory and ToM. Our results, 
following previous ones (Spotorno et al., 2012; 2013), indicated a connection between 
mentalising skill and irony processing. The fact that for controls irony processing 
activated mentalising functions at early reading stages, such as First Pass, corroborates 
previous findings that ToM activations are recruited at early stages of irony processing 
(Spotorno et al., 2013). 
Correlations between the components and the irony effect in the patient group 
did not reach significance; however, although only borderline significant, it became 
apparent that there was a higher probability of regressions into the spill-over region 
related to more difficulties in cognitive control and lower scores in the Hinting Task 
in this group. Cognitive control, as well as ToM, seem to be two major cognitive 
functions for irony processing and the tendencies displayed in the patient group data 
only reinforce this idea. 
Judging from the results obtained for irony processing, both in the eye-tracking 
experiment and in the sentence interpretation experiment, better accuracy in irony 
processing tends to require longer processing times and, thus, a larger irony effect. 
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Control data support this idea, as controls, showing increased processing times for 
ironies compared to literal expressions, had a significant larger accuracy rate in the 
sentence interpretation task when compared to PwS. 
In fact, patients processed the literal counterpart of the ironic expressions just as 
accurately as controls, which suggests that the literal counterpart of the ironic 
expression sounds straightforward to patients, as the contradiction present in the ironic 
remark is absent in its literal counterpart. Results for the literal counterparts in relation 
to the ironic expressions suggest that literal versions of ironic expressions are very 
straightforwardly interpreted by PwS.  
It is striking that although patients had as much time as they needed to process 
the ironic sentences in the sentence interpretation task, they, in 42% of the cases, did 
not arrive at an accurate interpretation, finding the expression contradictory and/or 
senseless. If we are to compare the results from the eye-tracking experiment and the 
results obtained from the sentence interpretation task, we must be cautious, as 
participants, having more time to come up with an interpretation for the passage, can 
start providing idiosyncratic interpretations that are not relevant for the context. 
Idiosyncratic interpretations are not easily determined by eye-tracking measures. 
Hence, it remains unclear whether the patient eye-tracking data reflect a correct ironic 
interpretation or not and whether the high number of interpretation errors seen in the 
interpretation task is the result of unrestricted processing time. 
On the other hand, although the eye-tracking results for the irony study did not 
reveal dramatic differences between patients and controls, the correlations with the 
PCA components revealed more substantial discrepancies between the two groups, 
showing that perhaps patients don’t even recruit the relevant cognitive functions 
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involved in irony processing, making accuracy even more distant for patients than for 
controls. This would suggest that even though the eye-tracking data in itself might not 
directly reflect a problem in irony processing for patients, the correlational results 
suggest that whatever interpretation they achieve on-line, the cognitive mechanisms 
they used differed from controls. 
As for metaphor processing, our findings revealed more of a qualitative 
discrepancy between groups rather than a quantitative discrepancy. Qualitative 
discrepancies refer to the cognitive functions used by controls (flexibility of thought 
and working memory) while processing metaphors, functions that did not seem to be 
employed in the same way or to the same extent by patients. Additionally, patients in 
the sentence interpretation task in the metaphor study processed around 40% of the 
sentences either in a literal or concrete and nonsensical way, which was not revealed 
by the eye-movement measures alone. In this sense, the irony and metaphor concurred 
in that the most explicit differences between patients and controls were found in the 
off-line data while on-line processing differences were mainly apparent when related 
to cognitive skill rather than reading times per se. 
The nonsensical stimuli used for the metaphor study engendered idiosyncratic 
explanations from patients in about 30% percent of the cases. Literal counterparts of 
the metaphoric expression also were not very straightforward, generating about 20% 
of misinterpretations. This phenomenon was not displayed by controls’ results. It is 
worth noting that patients recruited for this study did not present thought disorder, a 
symptom that is known for relating to semantic network hyperactivity and loosening 
of associations (Kuperberg, 2008). Hence, we can say that medication has not been 
able to eradicate cognitive flexibility and working memory problems to make patients’ 
language processing more effective and accurate. 
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Familiarity might have played a role in patients’ understanding of metaphoric 
sentences, although we have no data on how familiar the metaphoric stimuli were to 
patients who participated in the study. In addition, the fact that more experienced 
readers often have the opportunity to encounter metaphorical language, it is possible 
that patients who were more often engaged in reading found interpreting metaphors a 
more straightforward process, though this remains to be investigated further. 
As the Flexibility and Working Memory component was the only one to 
correlate with the metaphor effect, and only in the control group, not in the patient 
group, the metaphor eye-tracking study results support the idea that working memory 
plays a significant role in context use and context construction (Kuperberg, 2010; Lee 
& Park, 2005), The fact that significant differences appeared only between literal and 
nonsensical items in the eye-tracking experiment reinforces the findings from the 
sentence interpretation task results, which suggested no significant differences in 
accuracy between metaphors and nonsensical items. This is an interesting finding, as 
one task results confirmed the other task results pointing out that metaphors and 
nonsensical items were in fact very similarly processed as far as accuracy (or lack 
thereof) was concerned. 
The sentence interpretation results for the metonymy experiment revealed a 
significant difference in number of mistakes between patients and controls for all 
conditions. This means that patients displayed more difficulties in processing lexical 
metonymies, literals and logical metonymies when compared to neurotypical controls. 
Logical metonymies revealed the most dramatic differences, but all three conditions 
seemed to have had a low accuracy rating for patients. Controls, on the other hand, 
did not have many difficulties when interpreting the items from the sentence 
interpretation task. In fact, in the sentence interpretation task, around 30% of the 
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logical metonymy stimuli were interpreted incorrectly either as unfinished or as 
nonsense by the patients, while controls made less than 9% errors for this condition. 
These results were not clear in the eye-tracking experiment, as they only revealed a 
cost for logical metonymy processing overall. 
As controls only made few mistakes in the sentence interpretation task while 
interpreting logical metonymies, it would be very unlikely to attribute the processing 
cost found in the eye-tracking experiment to inaccurate understanding. Previous 
research had also highlighted that logical metonymies are more taxing to be processed 
than their literal counterparts (Frisson & McElree, 2008; McElree et al., 2006; Traxler, 
McElree, Williams & Pickering, 2005). Results obtained in the logical metonymy 
sentence interpretation task study support the idea that deferred interpretations 
(coercions) do not impose obstacles to interpretation, at least for neuro-typical 
controls.    
The metonymy eye-tracking study results highlighted that difficulties in 
cognitive control, flexibility and working memory, and facial emotion recognition 
could be relevant for logical metonymy processing. However, the cognitive control 
function only appeared correlated with the logical metonymy effect in the patient 
group. For neurotypical controls, as they did not display correlations between the 
logical metonymy effect and difficulties in cognitive control, this component does not 
seem to be implicated in their processing of logical metonymies. Finally, results from 
this research indicate that logical metonymies can be more accurately interpreted 
when inhibitory skills are at play, and when flexibility, working memory and facial 
emotion recognition are recruited. 
193 
 
The small number of participants (both patients and controls) is a limitation of 
the present study. This is especially relevant for patients, who showed more 
variability. Another limitation of this research is the fact that the correlational findings 
can only be exploratory considering the small number of participants in the study 
(which is also why we did not correct for multiple comparisons). A greater number of 
participants would possibly have granted stronger grounds for our findings. 
The advantage of studying the cognitive correlates underlying figurative 
language processing in schizophrenia, and not only the psychiatric symptoms that 
correlate with figurative language comprehension impairment, is the fact that 
psychiatric symptoms are in themselves entities that only describe pathological 
behaviour, not clarifying the underlying causal mechanisms that are involved in 
symptom manifestation. Research on the cognitive correlates underlying the 
difficulties presented by PwS can be more fruitful for engendering possible treatments 
for the disorder. 
Since anti-psychotic medication acting upon the dopamine receptors in the brain 
hasn’t been able to provide a better prospect for patients or a better integration for 
them in the community, not to mention that some patients do not even report a 
decrease in their positive and negative symptomatology, it is worth finding out 
whether cognitive therapy dedicated to the development of alternative synapses could 
help patients recover some of their cognitive functions, especially cognitive control, 
flexibility of thought and working memory. Although PwS do seem to present 
decreased neuronal density, neuronal size and neuropil (axons, dendrites and glia), 
causing an apparent reduction in the grey matter in these patients (Boska, 2010), it 
could still be worth trying to develop alternative cognitive therapy tackling the decline 
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of the above-mentioned functions, at least in children at risk of developing 
schizophrenia.  
 The ability to understand figurative utterances is relevant for social interaction 
and could help patients with schizophrenia integrate better in the community. Maybe, 
the development of future therapeutics to tackle cognitive deficits in cognitive control, 
flexibility, working memory and ToM could result in PwS performing more 
accurately in everyday language use, especially when the meaning is less 
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The Control and Flexibility Task 
 
The Control and Flexibility task was created by the experimenter to test participants’ ability to 
inhibit activation of non-relevant thoughts and memories and focus on the purpose of the task. 
The purpose of the task was to find sentences on the right column that would match 
corresponding abbreviations on the left column and then connect them with a line. If there were 
not a match for a sentence among the abbreviations in the left column, then participants would 
have to write “No match” either beside the sentence or beside the abbreviation.  
Participants had two minutes to complete the task. About 6 abbreviations out of a total of 14 
could be read as separate words, like “L.O.V.E.”, “L.O.N.D.O.N”, “P.E.A.C.E”, “P.A.P.E.R.”. 
Participants were supposed to inhibit activations connected to these words and see them purely 
as abbreviations representing sentences on the right in order to complete the task. 





















Section 1: The Cognitive Control Task 
 
Choose a sentence in the right that best matches the abbreviations on the left and connect them with a line. If you find that there is no match, write 
“No match” beside the abbreviations that have no correspondent sentences for them. Make as many connections as you can. You will be informed 
when time is out. 
 
Example: I.C.H.Y. _________________________________ I CAN’T HEAR YOU 
 
L.O.V.E       Two wrongs don’t make a right. 
D.A.Y.A.N.D.N.I.T.      Would you fill out this form, please? 
A.E.Y.W.L.T.O      I hope you and your wife have a nice trip. 
P.E.A.C.E.       I was about to leave the restaurant when my friends arrived. 
L.O.N.D.O.N.       I don’t know how to use this. 
T.W.D.M.A.R.       I’m sorry we’re sold out. 
I.D.K.H.T.U.T.      Diana and Youssef are not distant now, I think. 
D.O.G.        I am not going to the party tonight. 
I.W.A.T.L.T.R.W.M.F.A.     Laura owes nothing, David Orson noted. 
P.O.S.T.       You’re not comfortable, I guess. 
I.S.W.S.O.       The pen is mightier than the sword. 
P.A.P.E.R.       Linda Orwell visited Emma. 
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M.I.S.T.T.M.P.      Don’t overreact, Gary. 

























Participants from both groups made more mistakes when appreciating surprise than when appreciating sadness, t(55) = 4.497, p < 
.001, anger, t(55) = 3.772, p <.001, fear, t(55) = 9.014, p <.001, happiness, t(55) = 12.314, p <.001 and disgust, t(55) = 8.301, p <.001. 
They also made more mistakes when appreciating sadness than when appreciating fear, t(55) = 3.386, p <.001, happiness, t(55) = 6.588, 
p <.001 and disgust, t(55) = 3.641, p = .001. 
Participants from both groups made more mistakes when appreciating anger than when appreciating fear, t(55) = 5.037, p < .001, 
happiness, t(55) = 9.040, p <.001 and disgust, t(55) = 5.017, p <.001.They also made more mistakes when appreciating fear than when 
appreciating happiness, t(55) = 4.172, p <.001 and they made more mistakes when appreciating neutrality than when appreciating 
sadness, t(55) = 3.506, p = .001, anger, t(55) = 2.969, p <.005, happiness, t(55) = 9.070, p <.001, fear, t(55) = 6.462, p <.001 and 
disgust, t(55) = 7.032, p <.001. 









PLEASE READ THE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY!!! 
   
   
  You will see 40 sentences fragments. For each fragment, you will have to answer 2 questions. These questions are: 
    
1. Is the sentence ironic? Answer with Y for YES or N for NO. 
Irony is about an expression being used to signify the opposite of what the person is saying, giving it a humorous or 
emphatic effect. For example, imagine it is bitter cold and grey outside and someone says: “Beautiful weather, isn’t it?” 
The sentence “Beautiful weather, isn’t it?” is used in an ironic way because bitter cold and grey weather is usually not 
considered beautiful. However, it the neighbor had said to the other, “Awful weather, isn’t it?”, this would not have been 
ironic; 
    
2. How easy is it to understand the irony in the fragment on a scale from 1 to 7? If it was very hard to understand the irony 
in the fragment, write down 1, if it was very easy, write down 7. Use the rest of the scale to indicate gradations (e.g. 4 
means neither hard not easy). If you indicated that the sentence was literal, then you want to write a 1 in this column. 
 
3. If you wrote down that the underlined sentence is ironic, indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 how familiar you are with the 
ironic expression with 1 meaning not at all familiar and 7 meaning very familiar (use the scale to indicate gradations). If 






Item Condition Ironic Fragment Average – Ironic? 
1 Yes/0 No 
2 1 At dinner John was bragging about how he beat all his competitors in the swimming championship at school. 
Later, he admitted that apart from him all the other competitors were at least five years younger. His sister Laura 
said, “What an accomplishment!” and she raised her glass. 0.75 
3 1 Fifty people were standing in a queue to get tickets for the show when suddenly a woman jumped in front of 
them and said it was now her turn to be served. Someone from the queue shouted “Very smart!” and called 
security instantly. 0.91 
4 1 The girl was trying to open the house door, when suddenly she felt two cold hands around her neck. She 
screamed and when she turned back she saw that it was her brother. He was laughing. She said “Very funny!”  
and then slammed the door in his face. 0.91 
5 1 There are five people in a waiting room. Suddenly, a man lights a cigarette. A woman sitting beside him gets 
annoyed. She says, “How incredibly polite” and the man stands up, but continues to smoke. 1 
6 1 Jessie’s boss told her, “I can’t pay you for the next month, but when I get that big order in, I’ll pay you half your 
salary.” She said to her boss, “That’s wonderful news!” and immediately called her friend. 0.09 
7 1 Linda’s boss said to her, “Now that James and Margaret resigned, you’ll have to do their jobs as well and will 
need to come in over the weekends and stay longer every day.” Linda replied, “I couldn’t be more thrilled!” and 
returned to her desk. 0.82 
8 1 A man is carrying his drunken son back to his bedroom, when suddenly the boy throws up on the father’s new 
expensive Ralph Lauren shirt. The father says, “Oh, great!” and tries to get his son to sit down. 1 
9 1 A woman received a phone call from the police. They said that her drunken son had crashed a neighbour’s car 
that had not been lent to him and was now in jail. When they told her that the bail amounted to £10,000, she 
said, “That’s super news!” and hung up. 0.91 
10 1 Liam had heard that putting your savings in shares could be very profitable. He bought some stocks in a small 
company, but one month later the company went bust and he lost all his money. He said, “That’s what I call a 
worthwhile investment” and he poured himself a drink. 1 
11 1 Karen and Jean are playing chess in a park. They have just started their game. Each one develops their own 
strategy. After only six moves, Karen manages to beat Jean. Jean says to her: “Clearly, we’re the same level” 
and gives her a wink. 0.95 
12 1 After queuing for fifteen minutes outside a theatre in Covent Garden, the couple realises that there are no further 
taxis available to hire and that they will have to walk in the bitter cold for at least an hour. The wife says, “Isn’t 
that wonderful?” and the husband just nods his head. 1 
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13 1 The lady lent a rare and expensive book to her neighbour three months ago. She really wants it back, but he 
can’t find it anywhere. He tells the lady, “I think I lost your book. I hope you won’t be disappointed.” The lady 
replies, “Oh, no, not disappointed at all” and she gives him a grimace. 0.91 
14 1 A lady was telling her friend that a guest in a modern art auction at Sotheby’s offered £200 pounds for a painting 
by Picasso. The friend exclaimed: “What a spectacular offer!” and they giggled. 0.86 
15 1 A man was smoking in the restaurant lavatory. When a customer went to that same lavatory, he could smell the 
cigarette smoke. On his way out, he said to the man who was smoking: “The air in here is very good indeed!” 
and he left. 0.95 
16 1 The opera was having its world premiere, but the conception was mistaken and the music was poor. Lots of 
people didn’t go back to their seats after the first interval. The producer said to the director: “What a superb 
premiere!” and checked Facebook on his phone to see if people had already posted any comments. 0.82 
17 1 While at dinner Brett talks to his colleague about his new foundation to combat dementia. He tells him that he 
wants to raise at least £100,000. Several months later, they meet again and Brett tells his colleague that they 
only raised £5,000. The colleague says, “Well, it seems the campaign was a real success” and he ordered another 
coffee. 0.91 
18 1 The girls went to the cinema to see a horror movie that was supposed to be really scary, but the movie was 
nothing but trivial. At the end of the show, one said to the other: “Oh that was really creepy! How about a 
drink?” and they went to a pub.  0.91 
19 1 Two singers sang together in the same musical. On the night of the last performance they met at the theatre. 
During the performance they often sang off key. After the show, one said to the other, “Today we gave a terrific 
performance!” and they started packing to empty their dressing rooms.  0.09 
20 1 Four friends are gambling in a casino. In the middle of the night one of them said: “I’ll bet my sports car to get 
my credit back”. They go outside to have a look at the car and they realise it’s just a Fiat Panda. One of the 
friends says: “Nice sports car” and they go back to the casino. 0.95 
21 1 Amelia and three friends had gone to London for the day. In the evening, she called home to ask her Dad to pick 
her up in Milton Keynes. She had taken the last train but forgot to check whether she would make the 
connection. Her father said, “You planned that very well” and then jumped in the car. 1 
22 1 Leonard offers to show his new co-worker Karl around town. However, it quickly begins to rain heavily and 
they are forced to stay at a café without seeing any of the city. Karl tells Leonard, “What a fantastic city!” and 
they plan to meet again the following day weather permitting. 0.95 
23 1 Oliver has gained weight and he decides to go see his doctor. The doctor puts him on a diet. One month after 
starting the diet, he hasn’t lost any weight at all. Oliver goes to see his doctor again and he says: “This diet really 
works!” and he makes a new appointment for the following month. 0.89 
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24 1 While at a conference abroad, Peter runs into his colleague Tom. Tom asks him where the university cafeteria is. 
Peter offers to accompany him and Tom accepts. After looking for over an hour, they finally arrive at the 
cafeteria. Tom says, “Luckily we found this quickly” and they buy a sandwich. 0.91 
25 1 At the party the hostess realised that one of her female guests had gained a lot of weight and was dressed in a 
track suit. When the guest approached her, the hostess said, “And you, my dear, elegant as ever!” and she looks 
her all over. 0.91 
26 1 Gemma and Steve have the same class this morning. They settle in and listen to the professor. The two students 
find the lecture uninteresting and tiresome. At the end, Gemma says to Steve, “The professor was captivating 
today” and they go out for a coffee. 1 
27 1 Josie is ill and asks her roommate to prepare her some herbal tea. Josie must stay in bed and rest all day. After 
drinking the tea, Josie feels even worse and ends up vomiting. Her roommate says, “This tea has really shown its 
effectiveness” and they decide to turn the TV on. 0.91 
29 1 Because he had to work, Brett came home late for dinner. His daughter had already eaten the whole cake that 
was for dessert, leaving him with just a few crumbs. Brett said: “Thanks for leaving me such a big piece!” and 
went to wash his hands. 1 
30 1 The lecturer was marking assignments. One of these was absolutely awful, showing hardly any understanding of 
the topic and full of grammatical errors. The lecturer got a pen and wrote, “Great work!” at the bottom of the 
page. 0.95 
31 1 Tom was building an addition to his house. His younger brother was supposed to help, but he didn’t show up. At 
the end of a long day, when Tom’s brother finally appeared, Tom said, “Thanks for your help” and he put his 
tools back in the case. 1 
32 1 The boy was playing football in the rain and the field was very muddy. When the game was over, he came back 
home. His clothes were terribly dirty. His mother said, “Thank you for keeping your clothes so clean!” and then 
she put the clothes in the washing basket. 1 
34 1 A widower had bought an enormous two-story flat and she decorated it with marble columns all over. The first 
time she received guests at her property, one of them said, “How are you enjoying life in this cosy little flat?” 
and the lady replied, “I’m very happy here indeed”. 0.73 
35 1 The book Sophia had been gifted was long and boring. The person who had given it to her asked, “Isn’t that a 
great novel?” Sophia replied, “An absolute treat” and ordered some wine for both of them. 0.86 
36 1 The family TV was many years old and had a crappy image. A friend of their son’s commented, “What a grand 
TV you have there!” and the son asked his parents to buy a new one immediately. 1 
38 1 Michael and Jim go fishing together once a year in a lake. As usual, they talk while waiting for the fish to bite. 
At the end of the day, neither of them managed to catch a single fish. As they were leaving, Michael told Jim: 
“Good fishing today” and they returned home. 0.93 
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39 1 The little chiwawa was barking menacingly at the visitors. One of them said, “I’m scared of that enormous 
beast” and then its owner decided to give it a treat. 1 
40 1 Helen and Gerald were at an art auction. Gerald explained to Helen the value of the ancient Greek sculptures 
presented. Helen was very interested and listened to him carefully. A  Greek sculpture of the Classic period was 
presented, but no one bid on it. Helen said to Gerald: “The competition was stiff for that sculpture” and started 
walking outside.  
 0.82 


















Irony Eye-tracking stimuli. 
In the first version (a) of each item the fragment is used ironically. In the second version (b) it is used literally. In the third version (c) a neutral 
expression was used. 
1 
a Fifty people were standing in a queue to get tickets for the show when suddenly a woman jumped in front of them and said it was now 
her turn to be served. Someone from the queue shouted “Very smart!” and called security instantly. 
b Fifty people were standing in a queue to get tickets for the show when suddenly a woman had the idea of pre-reserving the tickets on the 
event’s website via mobile phone. Someone from the queue shouted “Very smart!” and called his mate to do the same. 
c Fifty people were standing in a queue to get tickets for the show when suddenly a woman jumped in front of them and said it was now 
her turn to be served. Someone from the queue shouted “I’m not feeling well” and called security instantly. 
 
2 
a The girl was trying to open the house door, when suddenly she felt two cold hands around her neck. She screamed and when she turned 
back she saw that it was her brother. He was laughing. She said “Very funny!” and then slammed the door in his face. 
b The girl was trying to open the house door, when suddenly she saw her brother slip on the snow and kick somebody else’s back 
unintentionally. She started laughing loudly. She said “Very funny!” and then went over to help him.  
c The girl was trying to open the house door, when suddenly she felt two cold hands around her neck. She screamed and when she turned 
back she saw that it was her brother. He was laughing. She said “You scared me!” and then slammed the door in his face. 
 
3 
a There are five people in a waiting room. Suddenly, a man lights a cigarette. A woman sitting beside him gets annoyed. She says, “How 
incredibly polite” and the man stands up, but continues to smoke. 
b There are five people in a waiting room. Suddenly, a woman goes outside to light a cigarette. A man follows her and lights the cigarette 
for her. She says, “How incredibly polite” and the man starts a conversation. 
c There are five people in a waiting room. Suddenly, a man lights a cigarette. A woman sitting beside him gets annoyed. She says, “Your 
cigarette smells” and the man stands up, but continues to smoke. 
 
4 
a A man is carrying his drunken son back to his bedroom, when suddenly the boy throws up on the father’s new expensive Ralph Lauren 
shirt. The father says, “Oh, great!” and tries to get his son to sit down. 
228 
 
b The man is carrying his younger son back to his bed. When the little boy was grabbing his pillow, he told is father he had got an A+ in 
his Math’s test. The father says, “Oh, great!” and tries to get his son to sleep again. 
c A man is carrying his drunken son back to his bedroom, when suddenly the boy throws up on the father’s new expensive Ralph Lauren 
shirt. The father says, “What a mess” and tries to get his son to sit down. 
 
5 
a A woman received a phone call from the police. They said that her drunken son had crashed a neighbour’s car that had not been lent to 
him and was now in jail. When they told her that the bail amounted to £10,000, she said, “That’s super news!” and hung up. 
b A woman received a phone call from the queen’s staff. They said that her son would be awarded a medal for his incredible driving 
abilities in Formula 3 competitions. When they told her that the family could also attend the ceremony, she said, “That’s super news!” and hung 
up.  
c A woman received a phone call from the police. They said that her drunken son had crashed a neighbour’s car that had not been lent to 
him and was now in jail. When they told her that the bail amounted to £10,000, she said, “That’ a lot of money!” and hung up. 
 
6 
a Liam had heard that putting your savings in shares could be very profitable. He bought some stocks in a small company, but one month 
later the company went bust and he lost all his money. He said, “That’s what I call a worthwhile investment” and he poured himself a drink. 
b Liam had heard that putting your savings in shares could be very profitable. He bought some stocks in a small company, and one month 
later the company was sold and he tripled all his money. He said, “That’s what I call a worthwhile investment” and he poured himself a drink.  
c Liam had heard that putting your savings in shares could be very profitable. He bought some stocks in a small company, but one month 
later the company went bust and he lost all his money. He said, “That’s a lot of money down the drain” and he poured himself a drink.  
 
7 
a Karen and Jean are playing chess in a park. They have just started their game. Each one develops their own strategy. After only six 
moves, Karen manages to beat Jean. Jean says to her: “Clearly, we’re the same level” and gives her a wink. 
b Karen and Jean are playing chess in a park. They have just started their game. Each one develops their own strategy. After two hours of 
play, no one has taken the lead, so Jean says, “Clearly, we’re the same level” and gives her a wink.  
c Karen and Jean are playing chess in a park. They have just started their game. Each one develops their own strategy. After only six 







a After queuing for fifteen minutes outside a theatre in Covent Garden, the couple realises that there are no further taxis available to hire 
and that they will have to walk in the bitter cold for at least an hour. The wife says, “Isn’t that wonderful?” and the husband just nods his head. 
b After queuing for one minute outside a theatre in Covent Garden, the couple realises that there are lots of taxis available to hire and that 
they will not have to walk home in the bitter cold. The wife says, “Isn’t that wonderful?” and the husband just nods his head. 
c After queuing for fifteen minutes outside a theatre in Covent Garden, the couple realises that there are no further taxis available to hire 
and that they will have to walk in the bitter cold for at least an hour. The wife says, “It’s good we brought our umbrella” and the husband just 
nods his head. 
 
9 
a The lady lent a rare and expensive book to her neighbour three months ago. She really wants it back, but he can’t find it anywhere. He 
tells the lady, “I think I lost your book. I hope you won’t be disappointed.” The lady replies, “Oh, no, not disappointed at all” and she gives him 
a grimace. 
b The lady lent a rare and expensive book to her neighbour three months ago. He reads it with interest but finds it rather complicated. He 
tells the lady, “I think I find the book a bit difficult, I hope you are not disappointed.” The lady replies, “Oh, no, not disappointed at all” and she 
gives him a smile. 
c The lady lent a rare and expensive book to her neighbour three months ago. She really wants it back, but he can’t find it anywhere. He 





a A lady was telling her friend that a guest in a modern art auction at Sotheby’s offered £200 pounds for a painting by Picasso. The friend 
exclaimed: “What a spectacular offer!” and they giggled. 
b A lady was telling her friend that a guest in a modern art auction at Sotheby’s offered £20 million pounds for a painting by Picasso. The 
friend exclaimed: “What a spectacular offer!” and they carried on the conversation. 
c A lady was telling her friend that a guest in a modern art auction at Sotheby’s offered £200 pounds for a painting by Picasso. The friend 
exclaimed: “What a ridiculous offer!” and they giggled. 
 
11 
a A man was smoking in the restaurant lavatory. When a customer went to that same lavatory, he could smell the cigarette smoke. On his 
way out, he said to the man who was smoking: “The air in here is very good indeed!” and he left. 
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b A man was spraying bathroom essence in the restaurant lavatory. When a customer got to that same lavatory, he could smell the citrus 
essence. On his way out, he said to the man who was spraying the essence: “The air in here is very good indeed!” and he left. 
c A man was smoking in the restaurant lavatory. When a customer went to that same lavatory, he could smell the cigarette smoke. On his 
way out, he said to the man who was smoking: “I wish you would do that somewhere else” and he left. 
 
12 
a The opera was having its world premiere, but the conception was mistaken and the music was poor. Lots of people didn’t go back to their 
seats after the first interval. The producer said to the director: “What a superb premiere!” and checked Facebook on his phone to see if people 
had already posted any comments. 
b The opera was having its world premiere. The conception was perfectly staged and the music was beautiful. Lots of people didn’t want to 
leave at the end and were still applauding. Afterwards, the producer said to the director: “What a superb premiere!” and checked Facebook on 
his phone to see if people had already posted any comments. 
c The opera was having its world premiere, but the conception was mistaken and the music was poor. Lots of people didn’t go back to their 
seats after the first interval. The producer said to the director: “What a horrible premiere!” and checked Facebook on his phone to see if people 
had already posted any comments. 
 
13 
a While at dinner Brett talks to his colleague about his new foundation to combat dementia. He tells him that he wants to raise at least 
£100,000. Several months later, they meet again and Brett tells his colleague that they only raised £5,000. The colleague says, “Well, it seems 
the campaign was a real success” and he ordered another coffee. 
b While at dinner Brett talks to his colleague about his new foundation to combat dementia. He tells him that he wants to raise at least 
£100,000. Several months later, they meet again and Brett tells his colleague that they raised over a million. The colleague says, “Well, it seems 
the campaign was a real success” and he ordered another coffee. 
c While at dinner Brett talks to his colleague about his new foundation to combat dementia. He tells him that he wants to raise at least 
£100,000. Several months later, they meet again and Brett tells his colleague that they only raised £5,000. The colleague says, “Well, it seems 
that the campaign didn’t go too well” and he ordered another coffee. 
 
14 
a The girls went to the cinema to see a horror movie that was supposed to be really scary, but the movie was nothing but trivial. At the end 
of the show, one said to the other: “Oh that was really creepy! How about a drink?” and they went to a pub.  
b The girls went to the cinema to see a horror movie that was supposed to be really scary, but the movie was even scarier than they had 
expected. At the end of the show, one said to the other: “Oh that was really creepy! How about a drink?” and they went to a pub. 
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c The girls went to the cinema to see a horror movie that was supposed to be really scary, but the movie was nothing but trivial. At the end 
of the show, one said to the other: “That was a waste of time. How about a drink?” and they went to a pub.  
 
15 
a Four friends are gambling in a casino. In the middle of the night one of them said: “I’ll bet my sports car to get my credit back”. They go 
outside to have a look at the car and they realise it’s just a Fiat Panda. One of the friends says: “Nice sports car” and they go back to the casino. 
b Four friends are gambling in a casino. In the middle of the night one of them said: “I’ll bet my sports car to get my credit back”. They go 
outside to have a look at the car and they realise that it’s a vintage Ferrari. One of the friends says: “Nice sports car” and they go back to the 
casino. 
c Four friends are gambling in a casino. In the middle of the night one of them said: “I’ll bet my sports car to get my credit back”. They go 




a Amelia and three friends had gone to London for the day. In the evening, she called home to ask her Dad to pick her up in Milton 
Keynes. She had taken the last train but forgot to check whether she would make the connection. Her father said, “You planned that very well” 
and then jumped in the car. 
b Amelia and three friends had gone to London for the day. In the evening, she got home from the station by bus. She had taken the last 
train and made sure she would make the connection. Her father said, “You planned that very well” and then made her a cup of tea. 
c Amelia and three friends had gone to London for the day. In the evening, she called home to ask her Dad to pick her up in Milton 
Keynes. She had taken the last train but forgot to check whether she would make the connection. Her father said, “I’ll be there in half an hour” 
and then jumped in the car. 
 
17 
a Leonard offers to show his new co-worker Karl around town. However, it quickly begins to rain heavily and they are forced to stay at a 
café without seeing any of the city. Karl tells Leonard, “What a fantastic city!” and they plan to meet again the following day weather 
permitting. 
b Leonard offers to show his new co-worker Karl around town. The weather is nice and they see a lot of the city highlights. Afterwards, 
Karl tells Leonard, “What a fantastic city!” and they plan to meet again the following day for more exploring. 
c Leonard offers to show his new co-worker Karl around town. However, it quickly begins to rain heavily and they are forced to stay at a 






a Oliver has gained weight and he decides to go see his doctor. The doctor puts him on a diet. One month after starting the diet, he hasn’t 
lost any weight at all. Oliver goes to see his doctor again and he says: “This diet really works!” and he makes a new appointment for the 
following month. 
b Oliver has gained weight and he decides to go see his doctor. The doctor puts him on a diet. One month after starting the diet, he has lost 
four pounds. Oliver goes to see his doctor again and he says: “This diet really works!” and he makes a new appointment for the following month. 
c Oliver has gained weight and he decides to go see his doctor. The doctor puts him on a diet. One month after starting the diet, he hasn’t 




a While at a conference abroad, Peter runs into his colleague Tom. Tom asks him where the university cafeteria is. Peter offers to 
accompany him and Tom accepts. After looking for over an hour, they finally arrive at the cafeteria. Tom says, “Luckily we found this quickly” 
and they buy a sandwich. 
b While at a conference abroad, Peter runs into his colleague Tom. Tom asks him where the university cafeteria is. Peter offers to 
accompany him and Tom accepts. Within just a few minutes, they arrive at the cafeteria. Tom says, “Luckily we found this quickly” and they 
buy a sandwich. 
c While at a conference abroad, Peter runs into his colleague Tom. Tom asks him where the university cafeteria is. Peter offers to 
accompany him and Tom accepts. After looking for over an hour, they finally arrive at the cafeteria. Tom says, “Now I’m really hungry” and 
they buy a sandwich. 
 
20 
a At the party the hostess realised that one of her female guests had gained a lot of weight and was dressed in a track suit. When the guest 
approached her, the hostess said, “And you, my dear, elegant as ever!” and she looks her all over. 
b At the party the hostess realised that one of her female guests had hardly changed in years and was immaculately dressed. When the guest 
approached her, the hostess said, “And you, my dear, elegant as ever!” and she looks her all over. 
c At the party the hostess realised that one of her female guests had gained a lot of weight and was dressed in a track suit. When the guest 







a Gemma and Steve have the same class this morning. They settle in and listen to the professor. The two students find the lecture 
uninteresting and tiresome. At the end, Gemma says to Steve, “The professor was captivating today” and they go out for a coffee. 
b Gemma and Steve have the same class this morning. They settle in and listen to the professor. The two students find the lecture 
stimulating and interesting. At the end, Gemma says to Steve, “The professor was captivating today” and they go out for a coffee. 
c Gemma and Steve have the same class this morning. They settle in and listen to the professor. The two students find the lecture 
uninteresting and tiresome. At the end, Gemma says to Steve, “The professor was tedious today” and they go out for a coffee. 
 
22 
a Josie is ill and asks her roommate to prepare her some herbal tea. Josie must stay in bed and rest all day. After drinking the tea, Josie 
feels even worse and ends up vomiting. Her roommate says, “This tea has really shown its effectiveness” and they decide to turn the TV on. 
b Josie is ill and asks her roommate to prepare her some herbal tea. Josie must stay in bed and rest all day. After drinking the tea, Josie 
feels much better and starts to feel hungry. Her roommate says, “This tea has really shown its effectiveness” and they decide to turn the TV on. 
c Josie is ill and asks her roommate to prepare her some herbal tea. Josie must stay in bed and rest all day. After drinking the tea, Josie 




a Bob and Fiona find themselves on the same plane to New York. Both of them fly often. During the flight, they talk about their business 
trip. Just then, the pilot announces that their arrival will be delayed. Fiona says to Bob: “I’m impressed by their punctuality” and she decides to 
write an email. 
b Bob and Fiona find themselves on the same plane to New York. Both of them fly often. During the flight, they talk about their business 
trip. Just then, the pilot announces that their arrival will be on time. Fiona says to Bob: “I’m impressed by their punctuality” and she decides to 
write an email. 
c Bob and Fiona find themselves on the same plane to New York. Both of them fly often. During the flight, they talk about their business 
trip. Just then, the pilot announces that their arrival will be delayed. Fiona says to Bob: “I’m unimpressed by their punctuality” and she decides 




a Because he had to work, Brett came home late for dinner. His daughter had already eaten the whole cake that was for dessert, leaving 
him with just a few crumbs. Brett said: “Thanks for leaving me such a big piece!” and went to wash his hands. 
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b Because he had to work, Brett came home late for dinner. His daughter had already eaten some of the cake that was for dessert, but she 
left him a large slice. Brett said: “Thanks for leaving me such a big piece!” and went to wash his hands. 
c Because he had to work, Brett came home late for dinner. His daughter had already eaten the whole cake that was for dessert, leaving 
him with just a few crumbs. Brett said: “I’m terribly sorry for being so late!” and went to wash his hands. 
 
25 
a The lecturer was marking assignments. One of these was absolutely awful, showing hardly any understanding of the topic and full of 
grammatical errors. The lecturer got a pen and wrote, “Great work!” at the bottom of the page. 
b The lecturer was marking assignments. One of these was absolutely outstanding, showing excellent understanding of the topic and no 
grammatical errors whatsoever. The lecturer got a pen and wrote, “Great work!” at the bottom of the page. 
c The lecturer was marking assignments. One of these was absolutely awful, showing hardly any understanding of the topic and full of 
grammatical errors. The lecturer got a pen and wrote, “This was bad!” at the bottom of the page. 
 
26 
a Tom was building an addition to his house. His younger brother was supposed to help, but he didn’t show up. At the end of a long day, 
when Tom’s brother finally appeared, Tom said, “Thanks for your help” and he put his tools back in the case. 
b Tom was building an addition to his house. His younger brother was supposed to help and he did show up in time. At the end of a long 
day, when Tom’s brother finally finished, Tom said m, “Thanks for your help” and he put his tools back in the case. 
c Tom was building an addition to his house. His younger brother was supposed to help, but he didn’t show up. At the end of a long day, 
when Tom’s brother finally appeared, Tom said, “I thought you were going to help” and he put his tools back in the case. 
 
27 
a The boy was playing football in the rain and the field was very muddy. When the game was over, he came back home. His clothes were 
terribly dirty. His mother said, “Thank you for keeping your clothes so clean!” and then she put the clothes in the washing basket. 
b The boy was playing football on a dry sunny day and the field was very dry. When the game was over, he came back home. His clothes 
were not dirty at all. His mother said, “Thank you for keeping your clothes so clean!” and then she put the clothes in the washing basket. 
c The boy was playing football in the rain and the field was very muddy. When the game was over, he came back home. His clothes were 
terribly dirty. His mother said, “I think you shouldn’t play football in the rain!” and then she put the clothes in the washing basket. 
 
28 
a Eve and Aline decide to go to a nightclub. Upon arriving they find that the music is out-dated and that the dance floor is empty. Alice 
turns to Eve and says: “The club is awesome tonight!” and then go back home. 
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b Eve and Aline decide to go to a nightclub. Upon arriving they find that the music is great and that the dance floor is full. Alice turns to 
Eve and says: “The club is awesome tonight!” and then go back home. 
c Eve and Aline decide to go to a nightclub. Upon arriving they find that the music is out-dated and that the dance floor is empty. Alice 
turns to Eve and says: “This is not what I expected!” and then go back home. 
 
29 
a The book Sophia had been gifted was long and boring. The person who had given it to her asked, “Isn’t that a great novel?” Sophia 
replied, “An absolute treat” and ordered some wine for both of them. 
b The book Sophia had been gifted was amazing and absorbing. The person who had given it to her asked, “Isn’t that a great novel?” 
Sophia replied, “An absolute treat” and ordered some wine for both of them. 
c The book Sophia had been gifted was long and boring. The person who had given it to her asked, “Isn’t that a great novel?” Sophia 
replied, “I didn’t like it much” and ordered some wine for both of them. 
 
30 
a The family TV was many years old and had a crappy image. A friend of their son’s commented, “What a grand TV you have there!” and 
the son asked his parents to buy a new one immediately. 
b The family TV was brand new and had 3D image. A friend of their son’s commented, “What a grand TV you have there!” and the son 
asked his parents to buy one for his room. 
c The family TV was many years old and had a crappy image. A friend of their son’s commented, “What a cheap TV you have there!” and 
the son asked his parents to buy a new one immediately. 
 
31 
a Justin is helping his neighbour Brandon move. Justin is carrying large cardboard boxes. The boxes are so heavy that Justin hardly 
manages to lift them. He says to Brandon: “I’m glad you didn’t overpack these boxes” and Brandon thanks Justin for all his help. 
b Justin is helping his neighbour Brandon move. Justin is carrying large cardboard boxes. The boxes are quite light and Justin easily 
manages to lift them. He says to Brandon: “I’m glad you didn’t overpack these boxes” and Brandon thanks Justin for all his help. 
c Justin is helping his neighbour Brandon move. Justin is carrying large cardboard boxes. The boxes are so heavy that Justin hardly 
manages to lift them. He says to Brandon: “You really overpacked these boxes” and Brandon thanks Justin for all his help. 
 
32 
a Michael and Jim go fishing together once a year in a lake. As usual, they talk while waiting for the fish to bite. At the end of the day, 
neither of them managed to catch a single fish. As they were leaving, Michael told Jim: “Good fishing today” and they returned home. 
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b Michael and Jim go fishing together once a year in a lake. As usual, they talk while waiting for the fish to bite. At the end of the day, 
both of them managed to catch lots of fish. As they were leaving, Michael told Jim: “Good fishing today” and they returned home. 
c Michael and Jim go fishing together once a year in a lake. As usual, they talk while waiting for the fish to bite. At the end of the day, 
neither of them managed to catch a single fish. As they were leaving, Michael told Jim: “Worst fishing ever” and they returned home. 
 
33 
a The little chiwawa was barking menacingly at the visitors. One of them said, “I’m scared of that enormous beast” and then its owner 
decided to give it a treat. 
b The giant Rottweiler was barking menacingly at the visitors. One of them said, “I’m scared of that enormous beast” and then its owner 
decided to give it a treat. 
c The little chiwawa was barking menacingly at the visitors. One of them said, “I hope it will stop yapping soon” and then its owner 























Table 32 - Percentage of errors in the sentence interpretation task - Irony Experiment – patient group 
 
PARTICIPANTS IRONY PROCESSING ERROR PERCENTAGE  
1  0 
2  50 
3  23 
4  91.5 
5  9 
6  75 
7  27 
8  4 
9  14 
10  25 
11  14 
12  42 
13  14 
14  75 
15  96 
16  50 
17  83 
18  25 
19  20 
20  91 
21  10 
22  70 
23  60 
24  15 






Table 33 - Percentage of errors in the sentence interpretation task - Irony Experiment – control group 
 
PARTICIPANTS IRONY PROCESSING ERROR PERCENTAGE  
1  10 
2  16.6 
3  0 
4  0 
5  4 
6  0 
7  5 
8  8.3 
9  33.3 
10  0 
11  0 
12  8.3 
13  10 
14  18 
15  41.6 
16  5 
17  0 
18  23 
19  10 
20  32 








Irony Analysis in R 
 
#read in file 
 










data$subj <- factor(data$subj) 
data$item <- factor(data$item) 
data$group <- factor(ifelse(data$patient_control == 1, "PwS", 
"Control")) 
data$cond = as.factor(data$cond) 
data$LogFPtarget<-log(data$fptarget) 
data$LogRPtarget<-log(data$Rptarget) 
data$fptarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$fptarget)) 
data$rptarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$Rptarget)) 
data$rpspill <- as.numeric(as.character(data$Rpspill)) 
data$LogRPspill<-log(data$Rpspill) 
data$tttarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$tttarget)) 
data$LogTTtarget<-log(data$tttarget) 
data$ttspill <- as.numeric(as.character(data$ttspill)) 
data$LogTTspill<-log(data$ttspill) 
data$sptarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$SecPtarget)) 
data$LogSPtarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$LogSPtarget)) 
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data$ritarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$ritarget)) 
 
tapply(data$fptarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$rptarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 





Myplot<-Myplot + geom_smooth(method="lm") 
Myplot+ geom_point(aes(colour = factor(group)), size=2) 
 
 
#FP all conds 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 










#RP all conds 
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M1 = lmer(data = data, rptarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, rptarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, rptarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, rptarget ~ cond  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 











M1 = lmer(data = data, tttarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, tttarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, tttarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 





M1 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ cond  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ group * cond  + (1+cond|subj) 
+ (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ group + cond  + (1+cond|subj) 
+ (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ cond  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 













M1 = glmer(data = data, sptarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M2 = glmer(data = data, sptarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M3 = glmer(data = data, sptarget ~ group  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item), family="poisson") 









#log does not work - substitute by hand 
M1 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M2 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M3 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item), family="poisson") 










M1 = lmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
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M2 = lmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 











lit_iro<-data[data$condLI == 1,] 
head(lit_iro) 
 
tapply(lit_iro$fptarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = lit_iro, LogTTtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = lit_iro, LogTTtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = lit_iro, LogTTtarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) 
+ (1+cond|item)) 















### Groups separately 
 
irony_PwS<-data[data$group == "PwS",] 
head(irony_PwS) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = irony_PwS, LogTTtarget ~ cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
summary(M1) 
 
irony_Controls<-data[data$group == "Control",] 
head(irony_Controls) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = irony_Controls, tttarget ~ cond  + 























Condition 1 - Metaphors 
 
Item Condition Sentences 
Sensicality 













Laura affirmed that the detective was a 
pig 0.95 5.77 
 
0.09 5.48 0 
2 1 
Jacqueline claims that her life is a fashion 
show 1 6.14 
 
0.77 5.45 0 
3 1 Sam is convinced that the world is a stage 1 6.32 
 
0 6.36 1 
4 1 
It's obvious that Gregory's bedroom is a 
disaster area 0.95 5.86 
 
0.14 5.4 0 
7 1 It's true that some mouths are sewers 0.82 4.5 
 
0.09 4.1 0 
8 1 
It's indeed the case that some lawyers are 
sharks 1 6.18 
 
0.77 6.41 0 
10 1 Apparently, Joan's smile was a mask 1 6.14 
 
0.14 6.1 0 
12 1 Ricardo thinks his new girlfriend is a toy 1 6.23 
 
0 5.27 0 
13 1 
According to Rachel, the woman is a 
snake 0.82 5.09 
 
0.14 4.33 0 





It is reported that the cheating husband is 
a worm 0.95 5.91 
 
0 5.04 0 
16 1 Jim said that the promotion is a ladder 0.86 4.5 
0.09 
 4.5 0 
19 1 It is well known that some jobs are jails 0.86 4.95 
 
0.14 4.68 0 
20 1 Jim claims that his profession is a rat race 0.86 5.23 
 
0.73 5.4 0 
21 1 Julie believes that the toddler is an angel 1 6.40 
 
0 6.63 0 
22 1 It's obvious that some adults are babies 0.91 5.54 
 
0.09 5.21 0 
24 1 We heard that Joe's surgeon is a butcher 0.95 5.73 
 
0.23 5.61 0 
25 1 It is well known that words are weapons 1 6.32 
 
0.14 5.94 2 
26 1 
As we all expected, the lecturer was a 
dragon 0.91 5.45 
 
0.68 4.86 0 
27 1 As we expected, university was a journey 1 6.73 
 
0.04 6.66 0 
28 1 
Mary whispered to us that the relationship 
was a prison 0.09 1.82 
 
0.76 1.87 0 
29 1 Apparently, her eyes were fireflies 0.82 4.59 
 
0.63 3.77 0 
30 1 Apparently, the job fair was a circus 1 6.23 
 
0 5.68 0 
33 1 
I'm not surprised to hear that the 
grandfather is a fossil 0.86 5.32 
 
0.04 4.81 0 
34 1 
It's often remarked that that politician is 
an actor 1 6.27 
 
0.5 5.25 0 
35 1 
Apparently, the love affair is a 
rollercoaster 0.91 6.09 
 




It seemed that their family was a mighty 
fortress 0.82 4.5 
 
0.18 3.2 0 
42 1 Luckily, the goalkeeper was a centipede 0.64 3.91 
 
0.04 2.43 0 
43 1 I'm aware that the woman is a whale 0.91 5.64 
0.04 
 5.71 0 
44 1 It looks like her teeth are pearls 1 6.32 
 
0.77 6.25 0 
38 1 It's obvious that his wife was his compass 0.91 4.95 
 
0.68 4.14 0 
46 1 Fiona claims that corruption is a virus 1 5.86 
 
0.18 4.82 0 
23 1 I was told that the movie was a treat 1 6.59 
 
0.82 6.07 0 
        
  average metaphors 0.90 5.55    















Condition 2 - Literals 
 
Item Condition Sentences 
Sensicality 







(1-7) Predictability score 
(Number of participants) 
1 2 
Laura affirmed that the creature 
was a pig 0.95 6.64 0.95 5.43 0 
2 2 
Jacqueline claims that her event 
is a fashion show 1 6.95 0.95 6.8 0 
3 2 
Sam is convinced that the floor is 
a stage 0.86 4.63 0.45 3.73 0 
4 2 
It's obvious that Gregory's village 
is a disaster area 0.91 5.73 0.91 4.78 0 
7 2 
It's true that some tunnels are 
sewers 0.95 5.68 0.95 5.43 0 
8 2 
It's indeed the case that some 
animals are sharks 0.95 6 0.91 4.6 0 
10 2 
Apparently, Joan's gift was a 
mask 0.95 5.77 0.95 4.7 0 
12 2 
Ricardo thinks his new present is 
a toy 1 6.68 0.82 6.12 0 
13 2 
According to Rachel, the animal 
is a snake 0.95 6.41 0.95 4.62 2 
11 2 
It seems to me that Tom's 
weapon is a stone 1 6.73 1 6 0 
15 2 
it is reported that the crawling 
insect is a worm 0.82 5.64 0.91 4.67 0 
16 2 
Jim said that the apparatus is a 
ladder 0.95 6.18 0.95 5.43 0 
19 2 
It is well known that some 




Jim claims that his experiment is 
a rat race 1 6.04 0.48 5.15 0 
21 2 
Julie believes that the spirit is an 
angel 1 5.82 0.68 4.45 0 
22 2 
It's obvious that some infants are 
babies 0.77 5.04 0.77 4.37 0 
24 2 
We heard that Joe's neighbour is 
a butcher 1 6.82 0.95 5.17 0 
25 2 
It is well known that knives are 
weapons 1 6.91 1 6.86 0 
26 2 
As we all expected, the symbol 
was a dragon 0.95 6.27 0.86 4.4 0 
27 2 
As we expected, flying is a 
journey 0.82 4.59 0.68 3.73 0 
28 2 
Mary whispered to us that the 
hospital was a prison 1 6.45 0.77 5.73 0 
29 2 
Apparently, the bugs were 
fireflies 1 6.95 1 4.67 0 
30 2 
Apparently, the big tent was a 
circus 0.95 6 0.91 4.33 0 
33 2 
I'm not surprised to hear that the 
skeleton is a fossil 1 6.18 0.86 5 0 
34 2 
It's often remarked that that 
performer is an actor 0.95 6.18 0.95 5.71 1 
35 2 
Apparently, the attraction is a 
rollercoaster 0.91 6.18 0.86 3.83 0 
40 2 
It seemed that their temple was a 
mighty fortress 0.95 5.95 0.77 4.94 0 
42 2 
Luckily, the insect was a 
centipede 0.95 6.72 0.95 5.58 1 
43 2 
I'm aware that the animal is a 
whale 0.95 6.64 0.95 6.33 0 
44 2 
It looks like her earrings are 




It's obvious that his tool was his 
compass 1 6.23 0.86 5 0 
46 2 
Fiona claims that influenza is a 
virus 1 6.90 1 6.75 0 
23 2 
I was told that the cake was a 
treat 1 6.64 0.91 6.5 3 
        
  average literals 0.96 6.21 0.88 5.24 0.21 
  standard deviation literals 0.06 0.62 0.14 0.92 0.65 
  
t-test(metaphor and literal 















Condition 3 – Nonsense 
Item Condition Sentences 
Sensicality 














1 3 Laura affirmed that the suitcase was a pig 0.32 3.23 0.09 2.2 0 
2 3 
Jacqueline claims that her train is a 
fashion show 0.36 2.4 0.14 1.9 0 
3 3 Sam is convinced that the chair is a stage 0.23 2.5 0.14 1.95 0 
4 3 
It's obvious that Gregory's article is a 
disaster area 0.82 4.68 0.09 4.38 0 
7 3 It's true that some lamps are sewers 0 2.09 0.14 1.28 0 
8 3 
It's indeed the case that some machines 
are sharks 0.41 2.82 0.27 2.70 0 
10 3 Apparently, Joan's fork was a mask 0.14 2.14 0.14 1.37 0 
12 3 Ricardo thinks his new chapter is a toy 0.09 1.82 0.04 1.62 0 
13 3 According to Rachel, the glass is a snake 0.27 2.95 0.09 1.55 0 
11 3 
It seems to me that Tom's bottle is a 
stone 0.04 1.77 0.32 1.5 0 
15 3 
It is reported that the expensive pencil is 
a worm 0.04 1.64 0.09 1.05 0 
16 3 Jim said that the machine is a ladder 0.41 3.04 0.52 2 0 
19 3 
It is well known that some experts are 
jails 0.09 2.04 0.05 1.22 0 
20 3 
Jim claims that his connection is a rat 
race 0.45 3.27 0.18 3.33 0 
21 3 Julie believes that the screen is an angel 0.18 2.18 0.09 2.05 0 
22 3 It's obvious that some valleys are babies 0.09 2.45 0.09 1.8 0 
24 3 We heard that Joe's teacher is a butcher 0.81 5.04 0.73 4.25 0 




As we all expected, the finger was a 
dragon 0.09 1.68 0.36 1.31 0 
27 3 
As we all expected, community is a 
journey 0.27 2.18 0.18 1.90 0 
28 3 
Mary whispered to us that the bookcase 
was a prison 0.68 3.68 0.04 2.38 0 
29 3 Apparently, the cups were fireflies 0.14 1.95 0.41 1.2 0 
30 3 Apparently, the huge wall was a circus 0.14 2.14 0.14 1.57 0 
33 3 
I'm not surprised to hear that the 
construction is a fossil 0.23 2.59 0.27 2.12 0 
34 3 
It's often remarked that that designer is 
an actor 0.82 4.90 0.67 3.44 0 
35 3 
Apparently, the loudspeaker is a 
rollercoaster 0.09 1.82 0.27 1.47 0 
40 3 
It seemed that their drawer was a mighty 
fortress 0.54 3.68 0.04 3.05 0 
42 3 Luckily, the reporter was a centipede 0.18 2.5 0.14 1.55 0 
43 3 I'm aware that the night is a whale 0.09 1.82 0.05 1.4 0 
44 3 It looks like her clothes are pearls 0.73 4.14 0.18 3.44 0 
38 3 
It's obvious that his spoon was his 
compass 0.36 3 0.36 2.41 0 
46 3 Fiona claims that dampness is a virus 0.68 4.04 0.36 2.4 2 
23 
 
3 I was told that the sound was a treat 0.68 4.13 0.36 3.72 0 
        
  average non-sensicals 0.34 2.88 0.23 2.16 0.06 
  standard deviation non-sensicals 0.26 1.03 0.18 0.91 0.35 







Metaphor Eye-tracking stimuli. 
In the first version (a) of each item the fragment is used metaphorically. In the second version (b) it is used literally. In the third version 
(c) it is used nonsensically. 
  
1. 
a. Laura affirmed that the detective was a pig and that she was not happy with that. She decided not to let it ruin her day and tried to 
think of happier thoughts. After a good night’s sleep, she no longer cared. 
b Laura affirmed that the creature was a pig and that she was not happy with that. She decided not to let it ruin her day and tried to 
think of happier thoughts. After a good night's sleep, she no longer cared. 
c Laura affirmed that the suitcase was a pig and that she was not happy with that. She decided not to let it ruin her day and tried to 
think of happier thoughts. 
 2. 
a Jacqueline claims that her life is a fashion show and that she will enjoy it. She spends most of her time shopping and enjoys 
wearing new clothes. Her dream job is to be a model, but she is afraid that she doesn’t have the right looks. 
b Jacqueline claims that her event is a fashion show and that she will enjoy it. She spends most of her time shopping and enjoys 
wearing new clothes. Her dream job is to be a model, but she is afraid that she doesn't have the right looks. 
c Jacqueline claims that her train is a fashion show and that she will enjoy it. She spends most of her time shopping and enjoys 
wearing new clothes. Her dream job is to be a model, buth she is afraid that she doesn't have the right looks. 
3. 
a Sam is convinced that the world is a stage, but I’m sure that not everyone thinks that. He has explained this to many of his friends. 
They tend to give him wary looks in response because Sam often makes mistakes.  
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b Sam is convinced that the floor is a stage, but I’m sure that not everyone thinks that. He has explained this to many of his friends. 
They tend to give him wary looks in response because Sam often makes mistakes. 
c Sam is convinced that the chair is a stage, but I’m sure that not everyone thinks that. He has explained this to many of his friends. 
They tend to give him wary looks in response because Sam often makes mistakes. 
 
4. 
a It’s obvious that Tim’s bedroom is a disaster area and that it will take time to make it right again. If Gregory keeps ignoring this 
fact then it will only get worse. 
b It’s obvious that Tim’s village is a disaster area and that it will take time to make it right again. If Tim keeps ignoring this fact 
then it will only get worse. 
c It’s obvious that Tim’s article is a disaster area and that it will take time to make it right again. If Gregory keeps ignoring this fact 
then it will only get worse. 
 
5. 
a It’s true that some mouths are sewers, as Jonathan said. He likes to talk to people about this matter. Unfortunately, none of his 
friends enjoy listening to him.  
b It’s true that some tunnels are sewers, as Jonathan said. He likes to talk to people about this matter. Unfortunately, none of his 
friends enjoy listening to him. 
c It’s true that some lamps are sewers, as Jonathan said. He likes to talk to people about this matter. Unfortunately, none of his 
friends enjoy listening to him.  
 
6. 
a It’s indeed the case that some lawyers are sharks, as Bob’s mom claimed before. The first time she said this, Bob wasn’t listening. 
He was too busy thinking about how much he liked sharks and where the nearest aquarium was located. 
b It’s indeed the case that some animals are sharks, as Bob’s mom claimed before. The first time she said this, Bob wasn't listening. 
He was too busy thinking about how much he liked sharks and where the nearest aquarium was located. 
c It’s indeed the case that some machines are sharks, as Bob’s mom claimed before. The first time she said this, Bob wasn't 
listening. He was too busy thinking about how much he liked sharks and where the nearest aquarium was located. 
7. 




b Apparently, Joan’s gift was a mask, as Rosie had mentioned before. Joan and Rosie are good friends. That is why Rosie knew 
about it. 




a It seems to me that Tom’s heart is a stone and everybody would agree. It is really a shame. Since he was a baby he has always 
been so properly nurtured and cared for. 
b It seems to me that Tom’s weapon is a stone and everybody would agree. It is really a shame. Since he was a baby he has always 
been so properly nurtured and cared for. 
c It seems to me that Tom’s bottle is a stone and everybody would agree. It is really a shame. Since he was a baby he has always 
been so properly nurtured and cared for. 
 
9. 
a Ricardo thinks his new girlfriend is a toy, and he’s happy with it. His mother has demanded that he acts more maturely. Ricardo 
usually ignores his mother's demands because he thinks she complains too much. 
b Ricardo thinks his new present is a toy, and he’s happy with it. His mother has demanded that he acts more maturely. Ricardo 
usually ignores his mother's demands because he thinks she complains too much. 
c Ricardo thinks his new chapter is a toy, and he’s happy with it. His mother has demanded that he acts more maturely. Ricardo 
usually ignores his mother’s demands because he thinks she complains too much. 
 
10. 
a According to Rachel, the woman is a snake and nobody can do a thing about that. Everybody is afraid. It is really too bad we 
can’t get rid of her. 
b According to Rachel, the animal is a snake and nobody can do a thing about that. Everybody is afraid. It is really too bad we can't 
get rid of it. 
c According to Rachel, the glass is a snake and nobody can do a thing about that. Everybody is afraid. It is really too bad we can’t 
get rid of it. 
 
11. 
a It is reported that the cheating husband is a worm but I wonder if it is true. There have been so many discussions on the matter. 
One thing is true, however, nobody likes worms. 
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b It is reported that the crawling insect is a worm but I wonder if it is true. There have been so many discussions on the matter. One 
thing is true, however, nobody likes worms. 
c It is reported that the expensive pencil is a worm but I wonder if it is true. There have been so many discussions on the matter. 
One thing is true, however, nobody likes worms. 
 
12 
a Jim said that the promotion is a ladder and that he would use it. He would be silly not to. Many have warned him to be cautious, 
but Jim has decided not to listen to them.  
b Jim said that the apparatus is a ladder and that he would use it. He would be silly no to. Many have warned him to be cautious, but 
Jim has decided not to listen to them. 
c Jim said that the machine is a ladder and that he would use it. He would be silly not to. Many have warned him to be cautious, but 
Jim has decided not to listen to them. 
 
13 
a It is well known that some jobs are jails and that nobody wants to work in such places. Unfortunately, some people can't be picky. 
They must work where they can because they have children to support. 
b It is well known that some buildings are jails and that nobody wants to work in such places. Unfortunately, some people can't be 
picky. They must work where they can because they have children to support. 
c It is well known that some experts are jails and that nobody wants to work in such places. Unfortunately, some people can’t be 
picky. They must work where they can because they have children to support. 
 
14 
a Tim claims that his profession is a rat race and that he is no longer happy with that. He decided to stop what he is doing. Some 
people might be upset with Jim and his absence, but he needs a break to decide what to do next.  
b Tim claims that his experiment is a rat race and that he is no longer happy with that. He decided to stop what he is doing. Some 
people might be upset with Jim and his absence, but he needs a break to decide what to do next. 
c Tim claims that his connection is a rat race and that he is no longer happy with that. He decided to stop what he is doing. Some 
people might be upset with Jim and his absence, but he needs a break to decide what to do next. 
 
15 
a Julie believes that the toddler is an angel and that she needs to comfort him. As she is a caring person, it will be easy for her. She 
enjoys looking after others and believes this will be no different. 
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b Julie believes that the spirit is an angel and that she needs to comfort it. As she is a caring person, it will be easy for her. She 
enjoys looking after others and believes this will be no different. 
c Julie believes that the screen is an angel and that she needs to comfort it. As she is a caring person, it will be easy for her. She 
enjoys looking after others and believes this will be no different. 
 
16 
a It’s obvious that some adults are babies, as Mary said. I strongly agree with her. In fact, I know a few although I wish I didn’t. I 
try to spend most of my time with mature family members instead. 
b It’s obvious that some infants are babies, as Mary said. I strongly agree with her. In fact, Iknow a few although I wish I didn't. I 
try to spend most of my time with mature family members instead. 
c It’s obvious that some valleys are babies, as Mary said. I strongly agree with her. In fact, I know a few although I wish I didn’t. I 
try to spend most of my time with mature family members instead. 
 
17 
a We heard that Joe’s surgeon is a butcher and that he is afraid of him. Joe is a nervous man and tends to avoid most people. 
However, we think he is right to be afraid. 
b We heard that Joe’s neighbour is a butcher and that he is afraid of him. Joe is a nervous man and tends to avoid most people. 
However, we think he is right to be afraid. 
c We heard that Joe’s teacher is a butcher and that he is afraid of him. Joe is a nervous man and tends to avoid most people. 
However, we think he is right to be afraid.  
 
18 
a I was told that the movie was a treat for the children and that they really enjoyed it. It feels wonderful to be able to go out with the 
children on a Sunday afternoon.  
b I was told that the cake was a treat for the children and that they really enjoyed it. It feels wonderful to be able to go out with the 
children on a Sunday afternoon. 
c I was told that the sound was a treat for the children and that they really enjoyed it. It feels wonderful to be able to go out with the 
children on a Sunday afternoon. 
 
19 
a It is well known that words are weapons, as Robbie pointed out. Sarah was unsure why Robbie had brought this up. It made her 
wary, and she decided to go back home on her own. 
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b It is well known that knives are weapons, as Robbie pointed out. Sarah was unsure why Robbie had brought this up. It made her 
wary, and she decided to go back home on her own. 
c It is well known that shoes are weapons, as Robbie pointed out. Sarah was unsure why Robbie had brought this up. It made her 
wary, and she decided to go back home on her own.  
 
20 
a As we all expected, the lecturer was a dragon and we would have to tolerate that. It is surprising that nobody felt like complaining 
about that. If people weren't so tolerant, a lot of complaints would have been made by now. 
As we all expected, the symbol was a dragon and we would have to tolerate that. It is surprising that nobody has felt like 
complaining about that. If people weren't so tolerant, a lot of complaints would have been made by now. 
As we all expected, the finger was a dragon and we would have to tolerate that. It is surprising that nobody has felt like 
complaining about that. If people weren’t so tolerant, a lot of complaints would have been made by now. 
21 
a As we expected, university is a journey, and we had to go through it. We meet many people along the way. Some of them will 
become friends, but most of them we will never see again. 
b As we expected, flying is a journey, and we had to go through it. We meet many people along the way. Some of them will 
become friends, but most of them we will never see again. 
c As we expected, community is a journey, and we had to go through it. We met many people along the way. Some of them will 
become friends, but most of them we will never see again. 
22 
a Mary whispered to us that the relationship was a prison and that she hated it. But she wouldn't dare to escape. Her mom told her 
that she would not support her if she decided to leave. 
b Mary whispered to us that the hospital was a prison and that she hated it. But she wouldn't dare to escape. Her mom told her that 
she would not support her if she decided to leave. 
c Mary whispered to us that the bookcase was a prison and that she hated it. But she wouldn't dare to escape. Her mom told her that 





a Apparently, her eyes were fireflies, as we could notice. We waited to get a better look because they were too far away at that 
moment. 
b Apparently, the bugs were fireflies, as we could notice. We waited to get a better look because they were too far away at that 
moment. 




a Apparently, the job fair was a circus, as we could soon find out. We had to follow the signs, but it wasn't long before we arrived. 
b Apparently, the big tent was a circus, as we could soon find out. We had to follow the signs, but it wasn't long before we arrived. 
It was very exciting to see what there was waiting for us. 
c Apparently, the huge wall was a circus, as we could soon find out. We had to follow the signs but it wasn't long before we 
arrived. It was very exciting to see what there was waiting for us. 
25 
a I’m not surprised to hear that the grandfather is a fossil, as Jenny had pointed out. That's what happens over time. Nobody can 
help it.  
b I’m not surprised to hear that the skeleton is a fossil, as Jenny had pointed out. That's what happens over time. Nobody can help 
it. 
c I’m not surprised to hear that the construction is a fossil, as Jenn had pointed out. That's what happens over time. Nobody can 
help it. 
26. 
a It’s often remarked that this politician is an actor, even though he might not like that term. It provides the perfect description of 
his behaviour. 








a Luckily, the goalkeeper was a centipede and delighted everyone in attendance. We don’t often see things like that. 
b Luckily, the insect was a centipede and delighted everyone in attendance. We don’t often see things like that. 
c Luckily, the reporter was a centipede and delighted everyone in attendance. We don’t often see things like that. 
 
28 
a Apparently, the love affair is a rollercoaster, as John pointed out. He knows now he has to be worried about the ups and downs in 
order not to get hurt. 
b Apparently, the attraction is a rollercoaster, as John pointed out. He knows now he has to be worried about the ups and downs in 
order not to get hurt. 
c Apparently, the loudspeaker is a rollercoaster, as John pointed out. He knows now he has to be worried about the ups and downs 
in order not to get hurt. 
 
29 
a It’s obvious that his wife was his compass, as Jennie had mentioned. They are inseparable and have been for many years. 
b It’s obvious that his tool was his compass, as Jennie had mentioned. They are inseparable and have been together for many years. 
c It’s obvious that his spoon was his compass, as Jennie had mentioned. They are inseparable and have been for many years. 
 
30 
a It seemed that their family was a mighty fortress, as Margaret observed. Regardless of what happened, Margaret was always 
welcome whenever she needed. 
b It seemed that their temple was a mighty fortress, as Margaret observed. Regardless of what happened, Margaret was always 
welcome whenever she needed. 
c It seemed that their drawer was a mighty fortress, as Margaret observed. Regardless of what happened, Margaret was always 
welcome whenever she needed. 
 
31 
a I’m aware that the woman is a whale, but you should keep your voice down. People can get very upset at the aquarium when you 
say things too loudly. You should be quiet. 
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b I’m aware that the animal is a whale, but you should keep your voice down. People can get very upset when you say things too 
loudly. You should be quiet. 
c I’m aware that the night is a whale, but you should keep your voice down. People can get very upset when you say things too 
loudly. You should be quiet.  
 
32 
a It looks like her teeth are pearls now; she must have had something done to them. She probably wanted to treat herself because 
she is going out to a party later tonight. 
b It looks like her earrings are pearls now; she must have had something done to them. She probably wanted to treat herself because 
she is going out to a party. 
c It looks like her clothes are pearls now; she must have had something done to them. She probably wanted to treat herself because 
she is going out to a party later on tonight. 
 
33 
a Fiona claims that corruption is a virus and that it can cause widespread damage. She hates hearing about the horrible things 
happening around the world, it makes her feel sad. 
b Fiona claims that influenza is a virus and that it can cause widespread damage. She hates hearing about the horrible things 
happening around the world. It makes her feel sad. 
c Fiona claims that dampness is a virus and that it can cause widespread damage. She hates hearing about the horrible things 















Table 34 - Percentage of errors in the sentence interpretation task - Metaphor Experiment – patient group 
Participant Percentage of Errors in Metaphor 
Processing 
Percentage of Errors in Literal Processing Percentage of Errors in Nonsense 
Processing 
1 16 26 63 
2 21 0 10.5 
3 0 10.5 10.5 
4 63 21 31.5 
5 52 21 63 
6 52 52 63 
7 0 42 10.5 
8 10.5  42 42 
9 0 0 0 
10 31.5 31.5 10.5 
11 21 21 73.5 
12 84 42 31.5 
13 42 31.5 63 
14 42 10.5 42 
15 84 31.5 10.5 
16 73 0 42 
17 47 31.5 21 
18 0 6 26 
19 31.5 36 21 
20 68 31.5 10.5 
21 47 16 63 
22 31.5 10.5 58 
23 84 0 0 
24 68 21 10.5 
25 10.5 31.5 63 





Table 35 - Percentage of errors in the sentence interpretation task – Metaphor Experiment - control group 
Participant Percentage of Errors in Metaphor 
Processing 
Percentage of Errors in Literal Processing Percentage of Errors in Nonsense 
Processing 
1 0   10.5 10.5 
2 52.5 42 10.5 
3 10.5 10.5 31.5 
4 42 0 10.5 
5 10.5 0 10.5 
6 84 10.5 10.5 
7 10.5 0 52.5 
8 0 10.5 42 
9 0 0 26 
10 10.5 0 21 
11 31.5 0 21 
12 42 0 21 
13 0 0 31.5 
14 0 0 21 
15 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 
17 10.5 10.5 42 
18 0 10.5 21 
19 10.5 0 10.5 
20 10.5 10.5 52.5 
21 0 0 0 







Metaphor Analysis in R 
#read in file metaphor_final.csv 
 













data$subj <- factor(data$subj) 
data$item <- factor(data$item) 
data$group <- factor(ifelse(data$patient_control == 1, "PwS", 
"Control")) 
data$cond <- factor(data$cond) 
data$LogFPtarget<-
as.numeric(as.character(data$LogFPtarget),na.rm = TRUE) 
data$LogFPspill<-
as.numeric(as.character(data$LogFPspill),na.rm = TRUE) 
data$LogRPtarget<-
as.numeric(as.character(data$LogRPtarget),na.rm = TRUE) 
data$LogRPspill<-
as.numeric(as.character(data$LogRPspill),na.rm = TRUE) 
data$LogTTtarget<-




as.numeric(as.character(data$LogTTspill),na.rm = TRUE) 
data$LogSPtarget <- 
as.numeric(as.character(data$LogSPtarget),na.rm = TRUE) 
data$LogSPspill <- 
as.numeric(as.character(data$LogSPspill),na.rm = TRUE) 
 
data$fptarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$fptarget)) 
data$rptarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$rptarget)) 
data$fpspill <- as.numeric(as.character(data$fpspill)) 
data$rpspill <- as.numeric(as.character(data$rpspill)) 
data$tttarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$tttarget)) 
data$ttspill <- as.numeric(as.character(data$ttspill)) 
data$ritarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$ritarget)) 
data$rispill <- as.numeric(as.character(data$rispill)) 
 
tapply(data$fptarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$fptarget, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$fpspill, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$fpspill, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
 
tapply(data$rptarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$rptarget, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$rpspill, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$rpspill, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
 
tapply(data$ritarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$ritarget, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 




tapply(data$rispill, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
 
tapply(data$tttarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$tttarget, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$ttspill, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$ttspill, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
 
Myplot<-ggplot(data,aes(x=cond,y=LogFPtarget))+geom_point() 
Myplot<-Myplot + geom_smooth(method="lm") 
Myplot+ geom_point(aes(colour = factor(group)), size=2) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, fptarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
#FP max model all conds; does not work, decorrelate 
#M1 = lmer(data = data, fptarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
#M2 = lmer(data = data, fptarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
#M3 = lmer(data = data, fptarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 





M1 = lmer(data = data, fptarget ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, fptarget ~ group  + cond + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, fptarget ~ group  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
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M4 = lmer(data = data, fptarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 










#need to simplify further, take out cond from subj random 
structure 
M1 = lmer(data = data, fpspill ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, fpspill ~ group  + cond + (1|subj) +  
(1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, fpspill ~ group  + (1|subj) +  
(1+cond|item)) 










#RP max model all conds; does not work, decorrelate does not 
work, further simplified without cond anywhere 
M1 = lmer(data = data, rptarget ~ group * cond  + (1|subj)  + 
(1|item)) 




M3 = lmer(data = data, rptarget ~ group  + (1|subj) +  
(1|item)) 










#RP spill max model all conds; does not work, decorrelate 
M1 = lmer(data = data, rpspill ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, rpspill ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, rpspill ~ group  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, rpspill ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 









#RI target max model all conds; does not work, decorrelate, 
simplified without cond in subj or item structure 




M2 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M3 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 










#RI spill max model all conds; does not work, decorrelate, 
simplified without cond in subj or item structure 
M1 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M2 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M3 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 










#TT target max model works 
M1 = lmer(data = data, tttarget ~ group * cond  + 
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(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, tttarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, tttarget ~ group  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 










#TT spill max model does not work, decorrelate does not work, 
take out cond from subj and item structure 
M1 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) +  
(1|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) +  
(1|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ group  + (1|subj) + (1|item)) 









#comparisons between conditions 






















# FP comparisons between conditions for each group 
patientdata<-data[data$patient_control == 1,] 
head(patientdata) 












controlsdata<-data[data$patient_control == 2,] 
head(controlsdata) 










# RP comparisons between conditions for each group 
patientdata<-data[data$patient_control == 1,] 
head(patientdata) 










controlsdata<-data[data$patient_control == 2,] 
head(controlsdata) 












# RI comparisons between conditions for each group 
patientdata<-data[data$patient_control == 1,] 
head(patientdata) 










controlsdata<-data[data$patient_control == 2,] 
head(controlsdata) 










# TT comparisons between conditions for each group 














controlsdata<-data[data$patient_control == 2,] 
head(controlsdata) 










M1 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
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M2 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
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M2 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M4 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M5 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M6 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M7 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
 
M4 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M5 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M6 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M7 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ cond  + (1|subj) + (1|item), 
family="binomial") 
 
M8 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (1|item), family="poisson") 
M9 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (0+cond|subj)+ (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M10 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj)+ (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M11 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 






















#GROUP (when interaction sign) 
 
patientdata<-data[data$patient_control == 1,] 
head(patientdata) 





controldata<-data[data$patient_control == 2,] 
head(controldata) 








#RP all conds 
 
M9 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1|item), family="poisson") 
M10 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M11 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (1|item), family="poisson") 
M12 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1|item) + (0+cond|item), 
family="poisson") 
M13 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (1|item) + (0+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M14 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group * cond  + 










M1 = lmer(data = data, tttarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, tttarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, tttarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 





M1 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ cond  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ group * cond  + (1+cond|subj) 
+ (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ group + cond  + (1+cond|subj) 
+ (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, ttspill ~ cond  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 













M1 = glmer(data = data, sptarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M2 = glmer(data = data, sptarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M3 = glmer(data = data, sptarget ~ group  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item), family="poisson") 









#log does not work - substitute by hand 
M1 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M2 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M3 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item), family="poisson") 










M1 = lmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
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M2 = lmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond+group|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group  + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond+group|item)) 










#only literal and ironic  Don't use for now 
 
lit_iro<-data[data$condLI == 1,] 
head(lit_iro) 
 
tapply(lit_iro$fptarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = lit_iro, LogTTtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = lit_iro, LogTTtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = lit_iro, LogTTtarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) 
+ (1+cond|item)) 

















































Metonymy Eye-tracking stimuli. 
In the first version (a) of each item, there is a lexical metonymy. In the second version (b), there is no figurative language involved, it 
expresses the literal condition. In the third version (c), a logical metonymy is present. 
 
1 
a The gentleman read Dickens while waiting for a friend to arrive. She had been running late quite often recently. 
b The gentleman spotted Dickens while waiting for a friend to arrive. She had been running late quite often recently. 
c The gentleman started Dickens while waiting for a friend to arrive. She had been running late quite often recently. 
 
2 
a The bilingual neighbour wanted to translate Anne Frank after he was given the manuscript. He thought it was a very gripping and 
moving document. 
b The bilingual neighbour wanted to warn Anne Frank after he was given the manuscript. He thought it was a very gripping and 
moving document. 







a The music student wished he could conduct Beethoven one day in London. He had always loved that city and couldn't wait to go 
back there. 
b The music student wished he could visit Beethoven one day in Vienna. He had always loved that city and couldn't wait to go back 
there. 




a The philanthropist published T. S. Eliot just before the beginning of the holidays. He has planned to go to the seaside for a well-
deserved rest. 
b The philanthropist welcomed T.S. Eliot just before the beginning of the holidays. He has planned to go to the seaside for a well-
deserved rest. 
c The philanthropist finished T.S. Eliot just before the beginning of the holidays. He has planned to go to the seaside for a well-
deserved rest. 
5 
a In order to relax, he used to play Bob Marley on his stereo at home. He lived in a beautiful villa in the hills of Los Angeles. 
b In order to relax, he used to paint Bob Marley on his easel at home. He lived in a beautiful villa in the hills of Los Angeles. 
c In order to relax, he used to enjoy Bob Marley on his stereo at home. He lived in a beautiful villa in the hills of Los Angeles. 
 
6 
a The educated slave quoted Aristotle at the festival in Athens. The festival was normally held during the spring. 
b The educated slave greeted Aristotle at the festival in Athens. The festival was normally held during the spring. 
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c The educated slave began Aristotle at the festival in Athens. The festival was normally held during the spring. 
 
7 
a The well-read housewife neutral Agatha Christie in the town by the seaside. It was a very nice and warm place, especially in the 
summer. 
b The well-read housewife befriended Agatha Christie in the town by the seaside. It was a very nice and warm place, especially in 
the summer. 




a The record producer decided to re-sample Rihanna without first obtaining all the necessary permissions. The lawsuit could cost 
him hundreds of thousands. 
b The record producer decided to photograph Rihanna without first obtaining all the necessary permissions. The lawsuit could cost 
him hundreds of thousands. 
c The record producer decided to discontinue Rihanna without first obtaining all the necessary permissions. The lawsuit could cost 
him hundreds of thousands. 
 
9. 
a The editor published Wittgenstein just before resigning from the firm. He had decided to set up his own company. 
b The editor contacted Wittgenstein just before resigning from the firm. He had decided to set up his own company. 






a According to music industry rumours, they had re-released Elvis Presley in the hope of selling millions of records to a new and 
younger public. However, in the end the sales were quite disappointing. 
b According to music industry rumours, they had interviewed Elvis Presley in the hope of selling millions of records to a new and 
younger public. However, in the end the sales were quite disappointing. 
c According to music industry rumours, they had resumed Elvis Presley in the hope of selling millions of records to a new and 
younger public. However, in the end the sales were quite disappointing. 
 
11 
a The eccentric physics student corroborated Einstein and then decided to develop his own theory. He sent his best research to the 
journal Nature, but it got rejected. 
b The eccentric physics student annoyed Einstein and then decided to develop his own theory. He sent his best research to the 
journal Nature, but it got rejected. 
c The eccentric physics student mastered Einstein and then decided to develop his own theory. He sent his best research to the 
journal Nature, but it got rejected. 
 
12 
a In the show, the band member wanted to play Frank Sinatra rather than anyone else in order to impress his family. Sinatra was 
well appreciated by everyone in his family. 
b In the show, the band member wanted to meet Frank Sinatra rather than anyone else in order to impress his family. Sinatra was 
well appreciated by everyone in his family. 
c In the show, the band member wanted to practice Frank Sinatra rather than anyone else in order to impress his family. Sinatra was 





a It’s a fact that the company that decided to launch J.K. Rowling took a gamble that paid off tremendously. They’re now the 
second largest publishing house in the UK. 
b It’s a fact that the company that decided to phone J.K. Rowling took a gamble that paid off tremendously. They’re now the 
second largest publishing house in the UK. 
c It’s a fact that the company that decided to delay J.K. Rowling took a gamble that paid off tremendously. They’re now the second 
largest publishing house in the UK. 
 
14 
a The romantic teenager must have re-read Jane Austen at least five times in two years. She has always had a dreamy streak in her.  
b The romantic teenager must have contacted Jane Austen at least five times in two years. She has always had a dreamy streak in 
her.  




a As an undergraduate lecturer, Jonathan tried to explain Freud but he was not very succesful. The students liked psycho-analytical 
theories even though they are often not experimentally supported. 
b As an undergraduate lecturer, Jonathan tried to invite Freud but he was not very succesful. The students liked psycho-analytical 
theories even though they are often not experimentally supported. 
c As an undergraduate lecturer, Jonathan tried to enjoy Freud but he was not very succesful. The students liked psycho-analytical 





a The radio station announced that they will play Lady Gaga every time someone donates a tenner to their chosen good cause. They 
were raising money for the Acorns charity. 
b The radio station announced that they will hear Lady Gaga every time someone donates a tenner to their chosen good cause. They 
were raising money for the Acorns charity. 
c The radio station announced that they will begin Lady Gaga every time someone donates a tenner to their chosen good cause. 
They were raising money for the Acorns charity. 
 
17 
a At the end of the contest, the young candidate sang Justin Bieber in a mockish way, but he failed miserably. He was quickly voted 
off. 
b At the end of the contest, the young candidate imitated Justin Bieber in a mockish way, but he failed miserably. He was quickly 
voted off. 




a The scientist translated Stephen Hawking before going back to live in Lisbon. He appreciated the weather there and was happy 
with his decision. 
b The scientist wrote Stephen Hawking before going back to live in Lisbon. He appreciated the weather there and was happy with 
his decision. 






a The student re-read Sartre while living in the south of France. He found the philosopher a bit boring though. 
b The student invited Sartre while living in the south of France. He found the philosopher a bit boring though. 
c The student continued Sartre while living in the south of France. He found the philosopher a bit boring though. 
 
 20 
a The old musician was elated when asked to conduct Mozart in front of the king’s entourage. The concert was to take place in the 
summer palace. 
b The old musician was elated when asked to honour Mozart in front of the king’s entourage. The concert was to take place in the 
summer palace. 




a The unknown painter was asked to duplicate Michelangelo but he refused the request as it went against everything he believed in. 
Years later, he was working as a shoe maker. 
b The unknown painter was asked to support Michelangelo but he refused the request as it went against everything he believed in. 
Years later, he was working as a shoe maker. 
c The unknown painter was asked to complete Michelangelo but he refused the request as it went against everything he believed in. 







a Astronomers in the eighteenth century developed Newton in a number of different ways. But they never received the same name 
recognition. 
b Astronomers in the eighteenth century helped Newton in a number of different ways. But they never received the same name 
recognition. 




a The company decided to no longer distribute Pavarotti because they noticed that sales had fallen sharply in the last few years. 
They were now at the point of going bankrupt. 
b The company decided to no longer employ Pavarotti because they noticed that sales had fallen sharply in the last few years. They 
were now at the point of going bankrupt. 
c The company decided to no longer delay Pavarotti because they noticed that sales had fallen sharply in the last few years. They 
were now at the point of going bankrupt. 
 
24 
a Because the insurance was too high, they decided not to exhibit Picasso but rather go for some up and coming young talent. An 
artist from the Lake District had caught their eyes. 
b Because the insurance was too high, they decided not to invite Picasso but rather go for some up and coming young talent. An 
artist from the Lake District had caught their eyes. 
c Because the insurance was too high, they decided not to commence Picasso but rather go for some up and coming young talent. 





a The publishers made the decision to adapt Roald Dahl because they wanted their books to contain nothing too cynical. But by 
doing so, they ruined most of the good bits. 
b The publishers made the decision to call Roald Dahl because they wanted their books to contain nothing too cynical. But by doing 
so, they ruined most of the good bits. 
c The publishers made the decision to conclude Roald Dahl because they wanted their books to contain nothing too cynical. But by 
doing so, they ruined most of the good bits. 
 
26 
a Even his favourite actor found it hard to recite Shakespeare in front of an audience. People seemed to be having fun though. 
b Even his favourite actor found it hard to oppose Shakespeare in front of an audience. People seemed to be having fun though. 
c Even his favourite actor found it hard to start Shakespeare in front of an audience. People seemed to be having fun though. 
 
27 
a The young physicist could always simplify Einstein if he wanted to. At the moment, he was not entirely sure of his propositions 
and admitted that some of the ideas are quite challenging. 
b The young physicist could always phone Einstein if he wanted to. At the moment, he was not entirely sure of his propositions and 
admitted that some of the ideas are quite challenging. 
c The young physicist could always master Einstein if he wanted to. At the moment, he was not entirely sure of his propositions and 







a Outside the theatre, the muscled man performed Tom Jones in an absent-minded way. He was thinking about the girl he was 
going to see that evening. 
b Outside the theatre, the muscled man protected Tom Jones in an absent-minded way. He was thinking about the girl he was going 
to see that evening. 
c Outside the theatre, the muscled man attempted Tom Jones in an absent-minded way. He was thinking about the girl he was going 
to see that evening. 
 
29 
a On the talent show, the young man performed Eminem in a very convincing way. He said Eminem was the best when it comes to 
rap music. 
b On the talent show, the young man praised Eminem in a very convincing way. He said Eminem was the best when it comes to rap 
music. 




a The archbishop decided to display da Vinci at some other time in the near future. However, he wouldn’t say whether that was 
next year or not. 
b The archbishop decided to contact da Vinci at some other time in the near future. However, he wouldn’t say whether that was 
next year or not. 
c The archbishop decided to discontinue da Vinci some other time in the near future. However, he wouldn’t say whether that was 





a The gallery owner who studied Art and Design continued to forge Warhol for quite a few years. But in the end he realised it was a 
mistake. 
b The gallery owner who studied Art and Design continued to harass Warhol for quite a few years. But in the end he realised it was 
a mistake. 
c The gallery owner who studied Art and Design continued to postpone Warhol for quite a few years. But in the end he realised it 
was a mistake. 
 
32 
a The book company’s decision to print J.R.R. Tolkien turned out to be a lucrative move. Both the company and the author made a 
tidy sum out of the arrangement. 
b The book company’s decision to hire J.R.R. Tolkien turned out to be a lucrative move. Both the company and the author made a 
tidy sum out of the arrangement. 
c The book company’s decision to continue J.R.R. Tolkien turned out to be a lucrative move. Both the company and the author 
made a tidy sum out of the arrangement. 
 
33. 
a The local cinema decided to screen Hitchcock after several people requested it. Everyone likes a good psychological thriller. 
b The local cinema decided to award Hitchcock after several people requested it. Everyone likes a good psychological thriller. 






Table 36 - Percentage of errors in the sentence interpretation task – Metonymy Experiment - patient group  
Participant Percentage of Errors in Literal 
Processing 
Percentage of Errors in Lexical 
Metonymy Processing 
Percentage of Errors in Logical 
Metonymy Processing 
1 50 0 0 
2 20 20 17 
3 36 0 30 
4 20 0 42 
5 9 17 50 
6 36 0 43 
7 18 0 50 
8 30 10 33 
9 9 0 50 
10 27 0 7 
11 9 0 40 
12 0 10 8 
13 18 0 45 
14 20 0 33 
15 20 0 25 
16 10 10 17 
17 30 10 25 
18 4.5 0 25 
19 27 0 21.5 
20 18 0 20 
21 0 0 7 
22 32 0 29 
23 73 11 64 












Table 37 - Percentage of errors in the sentence interpretation task - Metonymy Experiment – control group 
Participant Percentage of Errors in Literal Processing Percentage of Errors in Lexical 
Metonymy Processing 
Percentage of Errors in Logical 
Metonymy Processing 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 
14 9 8.3 40 
15 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 
18 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 
21 0 0 0 




#read in file metonymy_final.csv 
 














data$subj <- factor(data$subj) 
data$item <- factor(data$item) 
data$group <- factor(ifelse(data$patient_control == 1, 
"PwS", "Control")) 
data$cond <- factor(data$cond) 
data$LogFPtarget<-
as.numeric(as.character(data$LogFPtarget),na.rm = TRUE) 
data$LogFPspill<-
as.numeric(as.character(data$LogFPspill),na.rm = TRUE) 
data$LogRPtarget<-
as.numeric(as.character(data$LogRPtarget),na.rm = TRUE) 
data$LogRPspill<-
as.numeric(as.character(data$LogRPspill),na.rm = TRUE) 
data$LogTTtarget<-




as.numeric(as.character(data$LogTTspill),na.rm = TRUE) 
 
data$fptarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$fptarget)) 
data$rptarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$rptarget)) 
data$rpspill <- as.numeric(as.character(data$rpspill)) 
data$tttarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$tttarget)) 
data$ttspill <- as.numeric(as.character(data$ttspill)) 
data$ritarget <- as.numeric(as.character(data$ritarget)) 
data$rispill <- as.numeric(as.character(data$rispill)) 
 
tapply(data$fptarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$fptarget, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$fpspill, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$fpspill, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$rptarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$rptarget, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$rpspill, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$rpspill, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$ritarget, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$ritarget, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$rispill, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$rispill, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 




tapply(data$tttarget, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$ttspill, list(data$group, data$cond), na.rm = 
TRUE, mean) 
tapply(data$ttspill, list(data$cond), na.rm = TRUE, mean) 
 
Myplot<-ggplot(data,aes(x=cond,y=LogFPtarget))+geom_point() 
Myplot<-Myplot + geom_smooth(method="lm") 
Myplot+ geom_point(aes(colour = factor(group)), size=2) 
 
#First model to try - maximal 
#First pass TARGET 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) 
+ (1+cond|item)) 










#First pass SPILL 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ group + cond  + 
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(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 











M1 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) 
+ (1+cond|item)) 













M1 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 










#TOTAL TIME TARGET 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group + (1+cond|subj) 
+ (1+cond|item)) 












#TOTAL TIME SPILL 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group * cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group + cond  + 
(1+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group + (1+cond|subj) + 
(1+cond|item)) 










#REGS IN TARGET 
M1 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (1|item), family="binomial") 
M2 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (1|item), family="binomial") 
M3 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 












#REGS IN SPILL 
M1 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (1|item), family="binomial") 
M2 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (1|item), family="binomial") 
M3 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 










M1 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogFPtarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 




M1 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ group + cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogFPspill ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogRPtarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group + cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogRPspill ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogTTtarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
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(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M1 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M2 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group + cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M3 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
M4 = lmer(data = data, LogTTspill ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj) + (1+cond|item)) 
 
M4 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (1|item), family="binomial") 
M5 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (1|item), family="binomial") 
M6 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ group  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M7 = glmer(data = data, ritarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
 
M4 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group * cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (1|item), family="binomial") 
M5 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group + cond  + (1|subj) 
+ (1|item), family="binomial") 
M6 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ group  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
M7 = glmer(data = data, rispill ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(1|item), family="binomial") 
 
M8 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group * cond  + 
(1|subj) + (1|item), family="poisson") 
M9 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group + cond  + 
(1|subj) + (0+cond|subj)+ (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
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M10 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ group + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj)+ (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
M11 = glmer(data = data, LogSPtarget ~ cond  + (1|subj) + 
(0+cond|subj)+ (1+cond|item), family="poisson") 
